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GENERAL PHILOSOPHY INFORMATION PAPERS

No. 62

Building the Davidsonian model: about the interpretation of Pedace

Submitted
February 20, 2020
Published
2020-12-29

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to critically analyze Pedace's interpretation of the Davisian system, concentrating mainly on the concept of normativity that concerns the function of language and its relation to the mind and the world. For this, the links between the principle of charity, holism and externalism will be exposed first. Second, Pedace's proposal about mental attributions will be analyzed, focusing on the intersubjective processes of the second person.

References

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  11. Pedace, K. (2017). Mente y lenguaje: la filosofía de Donald Davidson, modelo para armar. Buenos Aires: Sadaf.
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