The difficult –perhaps impossible– delimitation of sexual work excluded from labor subordination

Abstract

We propose to draw attention to the difficulty involved in delimiting sexual work that would be excluded from employment according to the doctrine of the social order of Jurisdiction that prohibits the exercise of prostitution for others. To do this, we will verify how different judicial pronouncements have tolerated the subordinate exercise of other economic activities with a high sexual content linked to prostitution or very similar to it. This way, it is

not the sexual or erotic content of the service that would harm your work. Having discarded this hypothesis, what we ask ourselves in this study is what would be the delimiting criterion that determines the admissibility or not of sex work under an employment contract. Intuitively we could think that this is physical contact or copulation, but if that were the case we would be forced to reject the employment status of many activities whose scope in an employment contract has been explicitly or implicitly admitted by the courts. We refer, in particular, to erotic massage services, pornographic creation or sexual attention for people with disabilities. In addition to these specific cases, the aim is to denounce the legal uncertainty that the current judicial doctrine in this matter produces. Insecurity that affects a central issue of our discipline as the possible object of the employment contract.