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GENERAL PHILOSOPHY INFORMATION PAPERS

No. 58

Conditionals and the universal quantification: A logical and psychological relationship

Submitted
October 25, 2017
Published
2018-12-12

Abstract

In classical logic, it is evident that there is a clear relationship between the conditional and the universally quantified sentences. In this paper, I claim that this relationship is not only a requirement of that logic, but we also have important evidence that seems to prove that the human mind assumes it in a natural way by virtue of purely psychological reasons. To show this, I resort to an ancient text authored by Sextus Empiricus, in which the relationship is explained in a very precise manner, and the framework given by a current cognitive theory, the mental models theory, in which descriptions of the way it appears that human beings tend to understand both conditionals and the universally quantified sentences are included.

References

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