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RESEARCH PAPERS

No. 57

The explanatory gap and the conceivability jargon

  • Asier Arias Domínguez
DOI
https://doi.org/10.12795/themata.2018.i57.10
Submitted
July 7, 2017
Published
2018-06-25

Abstract

As every mysterian argument, that of the explanatory gap is a modal argument that depends on the validity of two assumptions: a) the notion of the conceivable can be clearly defined, and b) there is some kind of link between the conceivable and the possible. The invalidity of these assumptions, however, is not the only threat to the validity of the explanatory gap argument, since it also relies on an inconsistent logocentric conception of scientific knowledge and on an ambiguous and indiscriminate use of the notions of explanation and identity.

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