Ethical judgment and practical judgment from Rosmini's moral philosophy

Abstract

In this article, the author seeks to highlight a little-noticed theme in Antonio Rosminis´ moral philosophy: the difference between ethical judgment and practical judgment: they might seem synonymous expressions, but, in reality, they keep an enormous difference, analogous to the one that occurs between the theoretical (philosophical) and practical dimensions of daily life. The article shows, following the Rosminian texts, especially the Trattato della coscienza morale, that ethical judgments are moral formulas that constitute the science of morality, but not its realization, while practical judgments are the voluntary act by which it becomes effective an ethical formulation, or by which a moral formula is applied and modifies the real status of the world. The ethical judgment is a theoretical judgment and, therefore, it differs clearly from the practical judgment that initiates the moral act. Both deal with the moral dimension, which is why they belong to the genre of moral judgments, but they differ in that the ethical ones are merely ethical, while when they become the principle of the moral act, they take the name of practical ones.