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RESEARCH PAPERS

No. 66

Arithmetical Certainties: A Few Exceptions Among Countless Knowledge-Statements

DOI
https://doi.org/10.12795/themata.2022.i66.07
Submitted
April 21, 2022
Published
2022-12-30

Abstract

In this paper I disagree with Kusch (2016) on three issues concerning expressions of arithmetical certainties – in Wittgenstein’s sense – and regular uses of arithmetical expressions. Specifically, I explain why calculations do not turn into certainties by the fact that they have been proved; I argue that proved calculations constitute knowledge-statements; and, last but not least, I conclude from this that such proved calculations are sayable, whilst arithmetical certainties are ineffable or unsayable.

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