The chimera of algorithmic objectivity: difficulties of machine learning in the development of a non-normative notion of health

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.12795/IETSCIENTIA.2022.i01.03

Keywords:

Machine learning, Health, Objectivity, Normativity

Abstract

This essay explores whether machine learning, a sub-discipline of artificial intelligence, can contribute to developing a more objective approach to the development and formulation of concepts and descriptions. Taking as an example the case of the definition of health proposed by Christopher Boorse, the paper discusses and contrasts a series of possibilities and problems that

may arise when applying machine learning to solving some of the problems encountered by this theory. Based on the analysis, the paper concludes that machine learning (both supervised and unsupervised) entail elements of normativity and subjectivity that make it unfeasible to develop concepts and descriptions in a neutral and objective manner as the theory requires. This does not imply that machine learning is invalidated for the evaluative analysis of health, but rather highlights and makes explicit the subjective elements present in it.

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Published

2022-06-27

How to Cite

Guersenzvaig, A., & Casacuberta, D. (2022). The chimera of algorithmic objectivity: difficulties of machine learning in the development of a non-normative notion of health. IUS ET SCIENTIA, 8(1), 35–56. https://doi.org/10.12795/IETSCIENTIA.2022.i01.03
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