ROLE-TAKING AS FACT AND EPISTEMIC VIRTUE (FROM SUBSTITUTION TO IMPERSONATION)

Abstract

The mechanism of the so-called role-taking is not only relevant in the psychological and social development of the subject, but also in terms of his cognitive and, more specifically, rational and ethical life. Therefore, it must be approached not only as a fact, but as an epistemic virtue, with wide repercussions. In this article I take four references to investigate this duality of fact-virtue and its challenges, namely the evolutionary psychology studies on role-taking, A. Schütz's theses on “common sense”-constructions, the critical dynamics of Kant´s sensus communis logicus and the proposals of S. Benhabib on what she calls substitutionalist universalism (with a note on  the Habermasian ethics of discourse). In all cases, it is a question of ensuring that a substitution mechanism does not become an impersonation trap of the Other