Causality and chance: the question of physical determinism in Francisco Suárez

Abstract

This paper examines the position of Francisco Suárez in the problematic of modern determinism. Particularly, whether the Suarezian theory of causality is framed within the Aristotelian (non-determinist) tradition or whether, on the contrary, his theory precedes or serves as a bridge with the determinist theories of modernity. To this end, the most relevant aspects of the Suarezian theory of efficient cause are examined for this question: the distinction between causes per se and per accidens and their relation to physical and moral causes, the requirements of a necessary cause, and the supposed determinism of natural causes without concurrence or interaction with free ones. Through an examination of these concepts, it is concluded that Suárez’s position is analogous to that of Aristotle, admitting the existence of chance as a cause per accidens