Mill y la realidad virtual: una reivindicación del principio del daño

Mill and Virtual Reality: a vindication of the Harm Principle

Authors

  • Blanca Rodríguez López Universidad Complutense de Madrid

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2025.i60.13

Keywords:

virtual reality, high pleasures, experiments in living, equivalence principle, harm principle

Abstract

Virtual reality offers multiple benefits. From a Millean perspective, two benefits stand out. One is that it makes the sources of higher pleasures available to more individuals. A second one is that RV offers a broader catalog of ways of life. In some virtual environments, it is possible to have virtual real experiences. For these situations, some authors have proposed the Equivalence Principle.

My purpose in this text is to offer a consequentialist reading of this principle, respecting the freedom of individuals with the only limitations established by Mill in the Harm Principle. 

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Published

2025-10-14

How to Cite

Rodríguez López, B. (2025). Mill y la realidad virtual: una reivindicación del principio del daño: Mill and Virtual Reality: a vindication of the Harm Principle. Araucaria, 27(60). https://doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2025.i60.13