‘Superior minds’ and proportional representation: John Stuart Mill’s political elitism, then and now: “Mentes superiores” y representación proporcional: el elitismo político de John Stuart Mill, entonces y ahora

John Christian Laursen; Shaun Bowler

doi:10.12795/araucaria.2025.i60.012

Authors

John Christian Laursen University of California, Riverside https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0028-4149
Shaun Bowler University of California, Riverside

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2025.i60.012

Keywords:

John Stuart Mill, Carl Andrae, proportional representation, elitism, plural voting, political innovation

Abstract

Ha habido al menos dos razones generales para la promoción de la representación proporcional en las elecciones en todo el mundo. John Stuart Mill apoyó la representación proporcional en parte porque pensaba que haría posible la elección a las asambleas legislativas de personas más educadas, quienes a su vez elaborarían mejores leyes. Carl Andrae la promovió porque necesitaba un método que evitara que las minorías quedaran excluidas de tener influencia legislativa -es decir, se generara una tiranía de la mayoría- en la Dinamarca del siglo XIX. En este artículo sacamos a relucir el elitismo de Mill, o la preferencia por “mentes superiores” y gente mejor educada, en contraste con Andrae, que no realiza ningún juicio sobre la superioridad de representación que la representación proporcional crearía. En los años subsiguientes se ha confiado mucho más en el enfoque de Andrae que en el de Mill, en parte porque no está claro en absoluto que legisladores más educados elaboren mejores leyes que otras personas, ni cómo elegir a mejores legisladores.

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Author Biography

Shaun Bowler, University of California, Riverside

Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=S3-MV4YAAAAJ&hl=en

References

(johnl@ucr.edu) Información detallada sobre sus publicaciones puede encontrarse en: https://profiles.ucr.edu/app/home/profile/johnl , (shaun.bowler@ucr.edu) Información detallada sobre sus publicaciones puede encontrarse en: https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=S3-MV4YAAAAJ&hl=en

John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, in John Stuart Mill, Three Essays: On Liberty, Representative Government, The Subjection of Women, ed. R. Wollheim, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 263, 254.

Ibid., p. 254.

Ibid., p. 272.

F. D. Parsons, Thomas Hare and Political Representation in Victorian Britain, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 55.

Ibid. p. 55-56.

Helge Larsen and N. Neergaard. “C. G. Andrae” in Dansk biografisk Leksikon, Copenhagen, 2014. https://biografiskleksikon.lex.dk

Ibid.

John Stuart Mill, 1975, op. cit., p. 79.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 80.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 81.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 82.

Ibid., p. 83.

Shirley R. Letwin, The Pursuit of Certainty, Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 1988, p. 334.

Ibid., p. 335.

Ibid. P. 335.

Gerardo López Sastre, John Stuart Mill: El utilitarismo que cambiaría el mundo, Barcelona: Shackleton Books, 2023, p. 54.

Ibid., p. 55, 57.

John Stuart Mill, 1975, op. cit. p. 161.

Ibid., p. 165.

Ibid., p. 180.

Ibid., p. 181.

Ibid., p. 187.

Ibid., p. 247.

Ibid., p. 281-282.

Ibid., p. 284.

Ibid., p. 284-285.

Ibid., p. 286.

Ibid., p. 285.

Ibid., p. 288.

Ibid., p. 289.

Linda Raeder, John Stuart Mill and the Religion of Humanity, Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 2002.

Ibid. p. 340.

Camille Dejardin, John Stuart Mill, libéral utopique. Actualité d’une pensée visionnaire, Paris, Gallimard, 2022, p. 305.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 82, 283-312.

Ibid., p. 18.

Ibid., p. 82-89.

Gerardo López Sastre, John Stuart Mill: El utilitarismo que cambiaría el mundo, p. 89.

Chris Barker, Educating Liberty: Democracy and Aristocracy in J. S. Mill's Political Thought, Rochester, University of Rochester Press, 2018, p. 2.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 13.

Ibid., p. 14.

John Stuart Mill, Essays on Politics and Society, eds. J. Robson and A. Brady, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1977, p. 311-339, 341-370.

John Stuart Mill, 1975, p. 252.

Ibid., p. 254.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 257.

Ibid., p. 257-8.

Ibid., p. 258.

Ibid.

Jenifer Hart, Proportional Representation, Oxford, Clarendon, 1992, p. 43.

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Ibid.

Jorge Urdánoz, “John Stuart Mill and proportional representation. A misunderstanding”, Political Science 71, 2019, p. 165.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 168.

Ibid., p. 167-168.

Ibid., p. 272.

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Poul Georg Andrae, 1926, op. cit. p. 30, 89. F. D. Parsons, 2009, op. cit. p. 55-56 says it was the years 1840-1843.

Jean Farrugia, Sir Rowland Hill: Reformer Extraordinary 1795–1879: Some notes on his life and work, London, National Postal Museum, 1979, p. 18.

Sebastián Cortesi, “Un reformador del mundo: La representación proporcional en la correspondencia de John Stuart Mill (1859-1873)”, Revista de Estudios Políticos 193, 2021, p. 317-337. Cortesi does not mention Andrae or Denmark.

Poul Georg Andrae, 1926, op. cit. p. 29.

Ibid., p. 28.

Ibid., p. 80, 87.

Ibid., p. 38-42.

Harry Phillips, Proportional Representation in Western Australia (Perth: Western Australia Electoral Commission, 2012, p. 4.

Randall Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998.

John Stuart Mill, Public and Parliamentary Speeches, eds. J. Robson and B. Kinzer, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1988, p. 12.

Ibid. p. 183.

Ibid. p. 186.

Ibid., p. 239.

Ibid., p. 241.

Ibid., p. 242.

John Stuart Mill, Autobiography and Literary Essays, eds. J. Robson and J. Stillinger, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1981, p. 261-262.

Ibid., p. 262.

Sebastián Cortesi, 2021, op. cit., p. 330, 331.

Ibid., p. 334.

M. Kreuzer, “Historical Knowledge and Quantitative Analysis: The case of the origins of proportional representation”, American Political Science Review, 104, 2010, p. 380. The rest of this article provides a thoughtful critique of the use of historical evidence in this literature.

See Patrick Emmenegger and André Walter, “When Dominant Parties Adopt Proportional Representation: the mysterious case of Belgium,” European Political Science Review 11, 2019, p. 433–450.

Sebastián Cortesi, 2021, op. cit., p. 331, 332.

T. Ridley-Castle, “How many countries around the world use proportional representation?” Electoral Reform Society, 2023. https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/how-many-countries-around-the-world-use-proportional-representation/

Concerning the reactions of the British aristocracy to the extension of the franchise, rather than the electoral system, see Samuel Berlinski, Torun Dewan, and Brenda Van Coppenolle, “Franchise Extension and the British Aristocracy”, Legislative Studies Quarterly 4, 2014, p. 531–558. See also Laura Bronner, “Property and Power: MPs’ Assets and Support for Democratization in the 1867 Reform Act”, Legislative Studies Quarterly 4, 2014, p.439–466.

Amel Ahmed, Democracy and the Politics of Electoral System Choice: Engineering Electoral Dominance, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013; Ernesto Calvo, “The Competitive Road to Proportional Representation. Partisan Biases and Electoral Regime Change under Increasing Party Competition”, World Politics 61, 2009, p. 254–95; Carles Boix, “Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies”, American Political Science Review 93, 1999, p. 609–624; André Blais, Agnieska Dobrzynska, and Indridi H. Indridason, “To Adopt or Not to Adopt Proportional Representation: The Politics of Institutional Choice”, British Journal of Political Science 35, 2005, p.182–190.

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Ibid.

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Eric Schwitzgebel and Joshua Rust, “The Moral Behavior of Ethicists: Peer Opinion”, Mind 118, 2009, p. 1043-1059. Schwitzgebel and his colleagues have published several more articles that undermine any assumptions that elite philosophers are more moral than ordinary people.

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A current example of franchise restrictions might be that of requirements for mental competence in order to vote. Many polities have such restrictions which are becoming especially relevant in aging societies. Such restrictions can be applied unequally and unfairly.

Thomas Däubler and Lukáš Linek, “Party selectors, voters, and the choice of productive representatives under different types of list proportional representation”, European Journal of Political Economy 85, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102618

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S. Bowler and B. Grofman, B. eds., Elections in Australia, Ireland, and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote: Reflections on an embedded institution, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2000; S. Bowler, D. Farrell, and R. T. Pettitt, “Expert opinion on electoral systems: So which electoral system is ‘best’?” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties, 15, 2005, pp.3-19.

More technically, rather than rank ordering the list of candidates themselves, voters can vote “above the line”, meaning that they give permission for their preference ranking to follow the party ranking of candidates.

R. Carty, Party and Parish Pump: electoral politics in Ireland, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1981.

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