Husserl’s Critique of Psychologism and Its Impact on the Heideggerian Notion of Truth

Abstract

This text examines Husserl’s critique of psychologism and its influence on Heidegger’s conception of truth. In his attempt to de-psychologize logic, Husserl defends the notion of absolute truth and the distinction between real being and ideal being, while simultaneously linking truth to intuition and extending it to non-judicative domains. Truth is thus connected to objectivity and intentionality. The presuppositions underlying this critique entail a notion of truth that exemplifies the traditional understanding of truth, while also opening the possibility of its alternative. Heidegger takes up these ideas, emphasizing both their negative aspects—such as the connection to Platonism—and their positive ones—namely, the displacement of judgment as the privileged locus of truth. The possibility of adequation beyond judgment proves crucial, influencing the characterization of truth as unconcealment in Heidegger’s later thought. In this way, Heidegger develops his critique of the traditional notion of truth both with and against Husserl.