Facticity, afectivity and intentionality: the «New Heidegger’s» hermeneutical hypothesis.
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to present a hermeneutical approach to affectivity in the context of the so called young Heidegger’s hermeneutical transformation of phenomenology. This hypothesis is confronted to the “New Husserl’s” interpretation of self-affection in genetic phenomenology. Furthermore, this confrontation takes place against the background of the naturalizing phenomenology debate and the new paradigm introduced by affective sciences in the core of cognitive sciences.
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