Los predicados psicológicos, edited by Rafael Marín, proposes a collection of contributions focused on psychological predicates in Spanish. As Marín notices, psychological predicates are predicates that refer to an emotion or a mental or psychological state experienced by an individual, and they have an experiencer argument in their thematic roles that can occupy more than a syntactic position. These statements can be expressed by verbs like preocupar (‘to worry’), adjectives like molesto (‘annoyed’) or nouns like indignación (‘indignation’). Although most of the contributions deal with issues relative to psychological verbs, other chapters also deal with psychological nouns, adjectives and even complex predicates.

The book, written completely in Spanish, is comprised of an introduction and seven contributions that analyse the topic of psychological predicates from different levels—not only syntactic and semantic aspects but also morphological aspects. The book also deals with different models, such as Neoconstructionism, Nanosyntax, Distributed Morphology. Likewise, not all of the chapters adopt the same perspective, since there are articles with theoretical approaches and others with empirical ones.

The Introduction, written by the editor, offers the reader an overview of the problems regarding the topic and clearly anticipates the content of the following chapters. First, Marín describes the traditional classification of psychological verbs (Belletti & Rizzi 1988; Pesetsky 1995), which is based on the syntactic position occupied by the experiencer argument. Thus, we can find psychological verbs with an experiencer subject (henceforth, PVES) like odiar (‘to hate’; (1a)), which is also known as Class I, or with an experiencer object. In the latter, we find psychological verbs with accusative objects that allow an alternation with dative objects (henceforth, PVEO) like preocupar (‘to worry’; (1b)), which is also known as Class II, and psychological verbs with dative objects and no alternation (henceforth, PVEDat) like gustar (‘to like’; (1c)), which is also known as Class III:

(1) a. Mortadello odia la nieve.
   [Exp] [Theme]

   b. La nieve preocupa a Mortadello.
   [Theme] [Exp]

I would like to thank Gonzalo Espinosa and Fernando Carranza for their valuable help and their feedback on previous versions of this review.
c.  A Popeye le gustan las espinacas.

The description of this classification becomes useful for the reader since almost all of the contributions in the book return to it. In this sense, although the authors who mention these classes explain them briefly, in this section, Marín provides the reader with a list of different types of verbs that could be valuable for the reader in order to make his own comparison.

Another subject explored in the introduction is the problem that psychological verbs arise for the Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (henceforth, UTAH), which was first proposed by Baker (1988). According to this hypothesis, thematic relationships are correlated with structural relationships in the D-Structure, but psychological verbs appear not to follow a syntactic hierarchy of the thematic roles. Marín not only introduces the reader to this topic, which is considered by some of the articles in this book, but he also reviews two of the possible solutions (Belletti & Rizzi 1988; Pesetsky 1995) and their problems.

Finally, Marín devotes the last sections of the introduction to the agentivity and aspectuality of psychological verbs. Regarding the former, the editor presents the hypothesis according to which the PVEO always have a non-agentive interpretation but only sometimes have an agentive one (Marín 2011). Also, he summarises the proof given in ? in which this idea is supported. Regarding aspectuality, the editor reports that linguists agree on the stative denotation of PVES, but there is no consensus about PVEO. The different positions regarding this issue can be found in this introduction. This entire summary is complemented with an overview of the different positions of these predicates belonging to the individual and the state levels (IL and SL). Here, the reader can find views related to verbs (Marín & McNally 2011; Marín & Fábregas 2015) as well as nouns (Sanromán Vilas 2012). This basic outline can be a good first approach for someone who is looking for an overview of the state-of-the-art.

In the first contribution, No es experimentante todo lo que experimenta o cómo determinar que un verbo es psicológico (‘It is not an experiencer everything that experiments, or how to determine that a verb is psychological’), Antonio Fábregas tries to determine whether the psychological verbs in Spanish are actually a grammatical class or if they comprise a conceptual class instead. To accomplish this purpose, the author not only contrasts the behaviour of the commonly recognised psychological verbs with the non-psychological ones, but he also tries to determine if all of the verbs traditionally considered as psychological behave in the same way.

For the first of these tasks, Fábregas reviews proposals by, for instance, Landau (2009) or Franco (1990), who offer an analysis to distinguish transitive psychological verbs from other transitive verbs. Landau’s (2009) study of psycho-
logical verbs in other languages leads Fábregas to argue that these verbs introduce their experiencer argument with a special preposition that has the value ‘psychological’. This position is consistent with Franco’s (1990) proof of the impossibility of transforming the accusative experiencer of a psychological verb into the subject of its corresponding passive sentence—a fact that can be explained by the presence of the special preposition. In Spanish, a covert version of this element would also be what distinguishes the accusative arguments of psychological verbs from accusative arguments of other verbs.

As Fábregas closely examines what is traditionally considered psychological verbs, he notices that not all of the verbs in this class behave in the same way. Beginning with the verbs of Class II, the author adopts some tests given by Landau (2009) for differentiating those verbs from change-of-state verbs. This pattern distinguishes not only PVEO from change-of-state verbs, but it also provides a contrast between the verbs traditionally considered as PVEO. In this sense, although both are transitive verbs that express a mental process, a verb like enojar (‘to anger’) is different from a verb like ofender (‘to offend’) because the latter behaves like a change-of-state verb and the former does not. This contrast leads Fábregas to recognise that some verbs that are conceptually thought of as psychological verbs with an experiencer object are in fact change-of-state verbs whose internal argument allows processes forbidden by real psychological verbs given that the latter have a grammatical experiencer.

Fábregas follows a similar reasoning for dealing with verbs of Class III. After showing that some verbs called ‘psychological’ block clitic doubling when the dative argument does not precede it and that this property does not hold for non-experiencer datives, he assumes that this is what separates the dative experiencer from other dative arguments. In order to explain this, he takes the applicative structure for clitic doubling from Cuervo (2003) and relates it to Landau’s (2009) proposal. Although Fábregas recognises that this test is not productive because we cannot apply it to verbs of Class III in which clitic doubling is mandatory, he affirms that it allows us to distinguish two groups of verbs: the ones whose dative argument is conceptually conceived of as an experiencer but in fact it is a beneficiary, and others whose dative arguments are truly an experiencer in the grammatical sense.

Finally, regarding the verbs of Class I, Fábregas dismisses the idea that they could be truly psychological verbs since they do not seem to have a (covert) preposition in Spanish. Proof for this hypothesis is given in the article.

Thus, the author concludes that there are psychological verbs in Spanish, but not all of the elements that we can conceptually think of as members of this class belong to it in a grammatical sense. Additionally, Fábregas briefly proposes his own analysis within nanosyntax. Due to the schematic fashion in which it
is presented, although the analysis is in accordance with the article’s argumentation, it could be necessary for the common reader to become familiar with the representational system and the theoretical terms used by the author.

In their paper, *Los verbos psicológicos: raíces especiales en estructuras corrientes* (‘Psychological verbs: special roots in ordinary structures’), Víctor Acedo-Matellán and Jaume Mateu delve into the aspectuality of psychological verbs from a neoconstructionist approach, and they try to argue for the idea that the properties of those verbs come from their roots and not from the structures in which they occur. Three topics are developed regarding this issue. First of all, the authors explain their theory about stative and eventive readings of psychological verbs with accusative objects. After that, they compare the dative version of verbs of Class II with verbs of Class III and with psychological complex predicates with also a dative experiencer (Cuervo 2010). This comparison allows the authors to argue that although all of these predicates have stative readings, not all of them have the same behaviour. The third topic is related to the nature of stativity in these verbs. Also, at the end of the chapter, Acedo-Matellán and Mateu focus on the problem that psychological verbs represent for the UTAH and offer a solution according to the neoconstructionist framework.

After explaining that the alternation between accusative and dative in PVEO’s experiencers is due to the fact that the same root can be inserted in different structures, the authors of this chapter give examples to prove that a verb of Class II can have a stative reading when it has an accusative experiencer as well as when it has a dative experiencer. With this in mind, Acedo-Matellán and Mateu decide to investigate what distinguishes both interpretations in psychological verbs with accusative experiencers. According to these authors, the stative psychological predicates with accusative objects take a preposition of ‘central coincidence’ ($p_{cent}$). They assume the concepts of Figure and Ground from Talmy (1985) and propose that this preposition relates the Figure, conceptually understood as an experiencer, to the Ground, expressed by the verbal root, in a static fashion. The causativity, on the other hand, would be located in the functional verb ($v$). In eventive causative constructions of PVEO, a preposition would also be responsible for the aspectual reading. But, in this case, it is a ‘terminal coincidence’ preposition ($p_{ter}$) that relates the Figure to the Ground in a dynamic manner.

Arguing against Cuervo (2010) and exemplifying data from other Romance languages, Acedo-Matellán and Mateu affirm that there is not sufficient evidence for maintaining that verbs of Class II with dative experiencers as well as verbs of Class III and complex predicates with also dative experiencers are all inacusative predicates. With limited but solid evidence, they show that only psychological verbs with non-alternative dative objects are inacusative, while the other two predicates seem to instead behave like inergative verbs.
Regarding stativity, the authors of this article favour the idea that it does not only have a grammatical implementation. They apply different tests in verbs of Class II, verbs of Class III and complex predicates with dative objects in order to show that all of them are stative predicates. But, this aspectual interpretation, they maintain, does not correspond to the same cause—for example, it could be due to an inergative character with a dative experiencer or the presence of the $p_{ent}$ depending on the type of verb.

Finally, in regard to the problem that psychological verbs represent for the UTAH, Acedo-Matellán and Mateu support the idea that the structure is constructed by functional heads and not by the conceptual or encyclopaedic content of items. Thus, the arguments receive their interpretation depending on which position of the syntactic configuration they occupy. This proposal is coherent with the fact that the same verb can appear in different syntactic constructions, a property known as elasticity (Borer 2005).

Note that it could be useful for the interested reader to be familiar with phrase representations with square brackets from a neoconstructionist perspective, since it is assumed that the reader is familiar with these subjects and otherwise it could make the reading a slightly hard.

Mercedes Pujalte’s contribution *Hacia un análisis unificado de los verbos psicológicos estativos en español* (*To a unified analysis of stative psychological verbs in Spanish*) focuses on verbs of Class I and Class III in comparison with verbs of Class II that have a stative reading. As the author shows, these three predicates share a distinctive feature that distinguishes them from verbs of Class II with an eventive reading: their theme argument cannot be a bare noun. According to Distributed Morphology (Halle & Marantz 1993), Pujalte offers an analysis to explain this similarity based on the idea that the properties of the predicates depend on the syntactic structure in which they are inserted.

Following the classification proposed by Belletti & Rizzi (1988) and improving it with her own observations, the author establishes that the three types of verbs under study are transitive. Verbs of Class I are transitive verbs that have an experiencer subject and a theme-accusative object. In addition, proof is offered in order to claim that these verbs are also stative. In the case of verbs of Class III, Pujalte demonstrates, contrary to Belletti & Rizzi (1988), that these verbs do not behave like typical unaccusative ones—rejecting subjects without determiner, for example—and decides to adopt the perspective of Mendivil Giró (2002, 2012), who claims that these verbs follow an ergativity pattern. However, she later differs from this author by explaining the assignment of the dative case to the experiencer.\footnote{Following Pujalte (2012), it is claimed that the dative case is assigned to a Determiner Phrase (DP) when it is located in the specifier position of a defective category (a category without phi-}

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can be thought of as transitive, at least in an underlying form, since they do have an external argument. Regarding verbs of Class II, all of which are transitive, the author focuses on those with a theme subject and an experiencer object. These verbs also have a stative interpretation, and their properties are the same as the verbs of Class III, which is the reason why the same analysis could be applied for both of them.

Thus, Pujalte claims that these three types of verbs share an underlying syntactic structure. But, there are differences between them because of the head responsible for introducing the experiencer and the distribution of the phi-features on their functional heads—something that influences their case pattern. In verbs of Class I, the \( v \) involved has phi-features to assign an accusative case to the internal argument—in this case, the theme—and the experiencer is generated in the specifier of \( v \) as an external argument. Verbs of Class III and Class II (the stative ones) share the same structure with an upper applicative head (Cuervo, 2003), which is always defective, and a functional head \( v \) with no phi-features. The experiencer would be introduced by this \( v \), and then, it is in the proper position to receive a dative case.

Apart from the assumption that the theme role can only be a bare noun when it receives an inherent partitive case from the root, this analysis allows Pujalte to defend the hypothesis that these predicates cannot have a bare noun as their theme argument because they do not assign an inherent case to it; instead, they only value the structural case, either nominative or accusative. In order to appropriately receive a structural case, this argument must be a Determiner Phrase.

This proposal is complemented with a description and examination of the behaviour of these predicates in their nominal uses, where the theme arguments cannot be bare nouns either. Also, in the nominal use of these verbs, nothing allows the theme to be introduced by the \( de \) (‘of’) preposition, which is in contrast to what happens with other theme arguments. These two observations constitute a valuable contribution of this article.

Berit Gehrke and Cristina Marco’s paper is dedicated to Las pasivas psicológicas (‘Psychological Passives’) in Spanish. Here, the authors offer the reader a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the constructions formed with verbs \( ser \) or \( estar \) and a participle derived from psychological verbs. Thus, they evaluate if these constructions are interpreted as verbal passive and adjectival passive constructions, respectively, or if they have other characteristics that differentiate them from these types of passive phrases.

The general hypothesis establishes that the participial constructions with \( ser \) features) in the argument clause domain, and no functional head can satisfy its case.

\(^3\)Ser (‘to be’) indicates permanent characteristics/attributes/states, while \( estar \) (‘to be’) refers to temporary states/characteristics or locations.
are verbal passive constructions, and those with estar are adjectival passive ones. Despite that, in this chapter, Gehrke and Marco evince that the difference between both types are not so clear since there are constructions with ser that admit adjectival modifications (e.g., *Juan es muy distraído* [‘John is very distracted’]). The authors also take into consideration the traditional characterisation according to which the possibility of introducing an external argument with a prepositional phrase por (‘by’) is something that distinguishes verbal passive constructions. As they show in this article, some adjectival passive constructions also allow this process.

The fifth chapter of this book presents a reflection on different positions about the psychological predicates and their abilities to derive a passive construction. Gehrke and Marco contrast the proposals made by Belletti & Rizzi (1988), who state that PVEO cannot form verbal passive constructions but only adjectival ones, as well as the proposals by Pesetsky (1995) and Arad (1999), who hold that PVEO can form verbal passive constructions when they have an agentive reading. Also, in order to present a deeper analysis, the authors consider stances related to the aspectual feature of psychological predicates—for example, Meltzer-Asscher (2011), Rapp (1996) and Gehrke (2015). From these proposals, Gehrke and Marco derive various groups of predictions—some of them are even contrary to others—and then try to confirm or deny them based on a quantitative analysis of the occurrence of the constructions under discussion in a corpus of the 20th century that they extracted from different sources.

This chapter turns out to be remarkable not only because it is the only one in the entire book that offers a quantitative analysis, but also because it clearly shows the deductive procedure of taking assumptions, making some predictions and testing them with empirical data. Nevertheless, one aspect worth mentioning is that some of the reflections about the data and their implications for confirming or denying the predictions may not be transparent for the beginning reader. This is because, although the general predictions are well explained and tested in this article, the authors draw conclusions from their analysis that seem to test a group of implicit predictions as well, which are derived from the theories in question. As part of this argumentation remains tacit, it could be useful for the reader to become familiar with the proposals studied in this article in order to take full advantage of it. Also, at the end of the chapter, the authors mention some conclusions that utilise the results shown in Tables 5 and 6, yet they cannot be found in the text. This part could be confusing to some extent.

With the aim to discover what defines a predicate as psychological, Ángela Di Tullio’s contribution *Variantes sintéticas y analíticas de los predicados psicológicos* (‘Synthetic and analytic variations of psychological predicates’) presents a descriptive analysis where synthetic and analytic constructions
are studied. Here, the author observes that a psychological predicate can be expressed by a verb like *asustar* (‘to frighten’) but also by an analytic construction, such as a semilexicalised expression with a psychological noun like *dar miedo* (‘to scare’) or with a lexically empty term like *dar cosa* (‘to feel strange’ or ‘to give someone the creeps’).

Regarding analytic constructions, the author first focuses on those which are semilexicalised—that is, formed with a light verb like *tener* (‘to have’) or *dar* (‘to give’) and a psychological noun. Di Tullio shows that nouns derived from PVEO form complex predicates with *dar*, while nouns derived from PVES form them with *tener*. In this section, the reader will find a good description of these complex predicates that includes characteristics of their argument structure and their aspectual interpretation. Also, this part serves as a general approach for the next section, where more singular constructions are considered.

The crucial constructions that allow Di Tullio to answer the main question in this study are those that are lexicalised (i.e., *dar no sé qué* and *dar cosa* [‘to make someone feel uneasy’]). The author notices that none of these objects—*no sé qué* and *cosa*—names a concrete entity equivalent to something; *no sé qué* cannot be followed by a noun, and *cosa* does not refer to an object like it does when it is preceded by a determiner and has a countable reading. In these constructions, in which a dative experiencer is present, *dar* does not respect the argument structure of a transference verb, and the objects form a complex predicate with it, acquiring a psychological interpretation. Unlike what happens with the semilexicalised constructions, Di Tullio concludes that what allows this interpretation is not the inherent meaning but the construction in which the objects are inserted with the presence of a dative experiencer and a non agentive subject. As Di Tullio observes, these lexicalised phrases do not form real idioms since they do not permit morphological variations. Other intriguing constructions, which are in the middle between the semilexicalised and the latter ones, are those that belong to specific dialectal variations and that are formed with a noun resulting from a lexical creation or with a noun that requires a metaphor process. Examples studied in this article for the former are the Peninsular *dar repelús* (‘to give repugnance’), the Mexican *dar ñáñaras* (‘to fear’) and, with the same meaning, the Rioplatense *dar cuíqui* (‘to scare’); for the latter, examples include the Peninsular *dar dentera* (‘to produce an unpleasant feeling’) and the Rioplatense *dar calor* (‘to cause shame’). The examination of these data and the fact that the nominal element included in them does not have its own lexical content or argument structure lead Di Tullio to affirm that it is not a condition for the psychological interpretation that the lexical item involved is an inherent psychological noun. A concrete noun can be lexicalised as a ‘psychological thing’ through other processes.

The description and reflections presented in this chapter are complemented
with an examination of verbs derived from nouns and adjectives and their causative paradigms. After proving that the same root can derive both causative PVES and PVEO, Di Tullio arrives at the conclusion that the roots do not define the psychological interpretation of a predicate, nor do they determine its belonging to a particular class.

Without complex technical terms, this short chapter is not only easy to read, but it is also original since it takes under consideration dialectal constructions hardly mentioned in the literature.

The chapter Los nombres psicológicos: propuesta de análisis en términos sub-léxicos (‘Psychological nouns: a proposal for an analysis in sub-lexical terms’), written by Elena de Miguel, aims to offer an analysis of certain combinations of verbs with psychological nouns and their restrictions within the model of Generative Lexicon (Pustejovsky 1995). This framework assumes that words have sub-lexical features that express their minimal content and affect their syntax behaviour. Thus, a word can only combine with others when their sub-lexical features agree; otherwise, the combination is poorly formed, unless an accommodation process takes place and rescues it from the interpretative crash. The latter is what occurs, for example, in metaphors. In this article, De Miguel argues that the generation of both constructions—the ones with a ‘canonical’ interpretation and the ones with a ‘metaphoric’ reading—obeys the same process.

The author affirms that psychological predicates may be grouped according to the sub-lexical features they contain. She especially considers the approach of Marín & Sánchez Marco (2012), which proposes a [+/-CONTAINER] sub-lexical feature for differentiating psychology predicates. According to this proposal, the VPES’s subject is a container, and these verbs denote stative predicates. On the other hand, in PVEO, the container is either the experiencer, who is filled with the emotion, or the emotion itself, which is a place through which the experiencer moves. Although De Miguel recognises that counter examples of this classification can be found, she adopts the [+/-CONTAINER] for her own analysis and proposes that psychological nouns denote events or relations in which there is always an experiencer argument with a [+CONTAINER] feature without considering whether the nouns come from PVES or from PVEO. Through metonymy, this feature also allows a verb to recover another feature (i.e., the [+/-CONTENT] feature) from inside the noun.

De Miguel connects this proposal with the classification of nouns assumed in Sanromán Vilas (2003, 2009), where nouns are sorted into internal-cause nouns and external-cause nouns. The former express a feeling that is located within a container, while the latter express a feeling that goes from the outside into an experiencer container. Finally, the author applies her approach to empirical data to demonstrate the combinations of verbs and nouns that are allowed in Spanish.
The thoughtful organization of ideas and explanations in this chapter makes it pleasant and easy to read. Nevertheless, it is inevitable to note that the article has many footnotes, which may prevent a fluent reading. Despite that, these footnotes are necessary for the enthusiastic reader who is looking for a more complete view of the topic under discussion.

In the last chapter, Los adjetivos psicológicos (‘Psychological adjectives’), Begoña Sanromán Vilas studies psychological adjectives and analyses their characteristics from different perspectives (i.e., morphologic, syntactic, semantic-aspectual and combinatorial) to discover whether it is possible to establish a correspondence between them and the psychological nouns from which they originate.

Using the term psychological adjective, Sanromán Vilas intends to refer to qualities or properties of the participant of a prototypical emotional situation. In this particular study, she focuses on those adjectives that bear not only a semantic relation with a noun but also a morphological one, such as miedoso (‘fearful’) from miedo (‘fear’) or triste (‘sad’) from tristeza (‘sadness’). This includes adjectives in a strict sense as well as participial adjectives and adjectival participles.

The author adopts the Explicative and Combinatorial Lexicography (Melčuk et al. 1995) and specially the semantic derivation concept, which is used as a criterion in order to determine whether there is a relation between an adjective and a noun. The hypothesis defended in this article claims that the characteristics present in psychological adjectives are inherited from the nouns from which they were derived.

Sanromán Vilas reviews the classification of psychological nouns proposed in Sanromán Vilas (2003), where these nouns are divided into three groups: internal-cause nouns, external-cause nouns and ambivalent nouns. With this in mind, the author proposes a categorisation for psychological adjectives that is based on two criteria: (1) the characterised element (i.e., the subject or the object of the psychological event) and (2) the potentiality of the characterisation. These two criteria lead to four classes: (i) A1, which characterises the experiencer of the feeling (admirador [‘admirer’]); (ii) A2, which refers to the object or cause of the feeling (apreciado [‘appreciated’]); (iii) Able1, which denotes a tendency to have a particular feeling (asustadizo [‘jumpy’]); (iv) Able2, which refers to the possibility of being the object of a feeling (despreciable [‘despicable’]). The aspectual, combinatorial and morphological properties of these classes of adjectives are compared with those of the psychological nouns from which they were derived. As a consequence, some correlations are found between them.

Given the diversity of the proposals addressed, this book can be of considerable interest for advanced students in linguistics as well as for beginners. As it was shown in this review, the seven contributions included in this volume deal with psychological predicates from different theoretical frameworks, offering various
analyses of the data and presenting corresponding arguments. Since the majority of the chapters, except for the ones noted in this review, are short and easy to read, this book could serve as a good introduction to the topic for the beginning reader who does not want to start with traditional handbooks. The articles collected here consistently return to the main recognised proposals or descriptions of these predicates, improving or discussing them from new perspectives. Because of this, a more advanced reader can also find this volume particularly useful given that it not only offers a contemporary state-of-the-art of psychological predicates, but it also provides information and inspiration for further research.

Especially noteworthy is the conscientious introduction that initiates this book. It might seem slightly overwhelming at first, since it is extensive and compiles many theories about psychological predicates, but it can be read as an independent chapter, where connections between the diverse proposals are established. It is undoubtedly essential material for the unfamiliarised reader or the beginning student in linguistics. However, a minor weakness can be made to the contributions included in the volume. Each contribution contains its own well-detailed introduction, which allows the interested reader to focus on a particular chapter without reading the rest of the book. Nevertheless, the introduction of many articles might seem too extensive or reiterative, considering that the book’s introduction already offers an elaborated presentation of the same topics.

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