Second-generation immigrants: Citizenship and transnationalism

Inmigrantes de segunda generación: ciudadanía y transnacionalismo

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Abstract

This article deals with a socio-historical approach of “second-generation immigrants” in France, a country which has a long story of immigration, but which has refused this historical past for a long time. Two tools of comprehension are used: On one hand, intersectionality of belongings, which puts all elements of them in competition (Arab, Muslim, French, segregated in poor districts); work, however, has ceased to be an identity of recognition. On the other, a transnationality that cuts through the frontiers and the walls by identity and plural relations. After an historical perspective of the phenomenon “second-generation immigrants” in France, the article examines the various factors of identification that are competing together.
**Key-words:** recond-generation immigrants; maghrebian immigration; France; Muslims; identity; discriminations; exclusion; citizenship; integration.

**Resumen**

El presente artículo se centra, mediante un enfoque socio-histórico, en los “inmigrantes de segunda generación” en Francia, un país con una larga historia de inmigración pero que ha rechazado por largo tiempo su pasado histórico. Se usan dos herramientas de comprensión: por un lado, la interseccionalidad de las habilidades, que conduce a la mutua competencia de todos aquellos (árabes, musulmanes, franceses, segregados en distritos de pobres); el trabajo, empero, ha dejado de ser un factor de identidad para el reconocimiento. Por el otro, la transnacionalidad, que atraviesa muros y fronteras por medio de la identidad y de las relaciones plurales. Tras dar una perspectiva histórica del fenómeno de los “inmigrantes de segunda generación” en Francia, el artículo examina los diversos factores de identificación que compiten entre sí.

**Palabras-clave:** inmigrantes de segunda generación; inmigración magrebí; Francia; musulmanes; identidad; discriminaciones; exclusión; ciudadanía; integración.

**Introduction:**

Second and third generations of immigration origin constitute a central debate in France. Most immigrants feel transnational, due to their double citizenship with their countries of origin, and due to their multiple allegiances (crossed with Islam and the solidarity with the Arab World). But perhaps their social origins, together with the discriminations they suffer —more than their supposed cultural or religious background- better account for their behaviours of violence and contest in the inner cities. The last debate on national identity in France in 2010, as well as the racist jokes from members of the government and the law of 2010 on the burka, have also contributed to define their identities, which are the result of multiple factors.

The article will examine the multiplicity of immigrants’ belonging with the aid of two tools of analysis. Intersectionality refers to the study of the simultaneous effects of factors which are interacting together, such as race, class, religion, and national origin as categories of difference. This article uses intersectionality as an analytical tool to explore struggles for institutional space in social policy processes in republican France. The tool of intersectionality forces us to confront the various belongings in a complex and heterogeneous way. In this case, how ethnicity, race, class, age, religion, citizenship interact in different ways is crucial for understanding their claims.
The transnationality of their belongings is another central key of comprehension of their position. Transnationality refers to the crossing of barriers of borders and states in order to activate networks beyond the national borders and express identities, links, allegiances and references which go beyond one unique national state with multiple identities.

France is the oldest immigration country in Europe. The immigrating process began in mid nineteenth century, due to the demographic decrease during the eighteenth century, and to the economic growth and industrialisation which was requiring a lacking labour force. The first migrants were neighbours from Switzerland, Germany, Belgium and then Italy. But immigration really grew after 1918 with 3 millions foreigners in 1932, mostly for the reconstruction period. A third wave occurred during the 1945-1975 period, called the “Trente Glorieuses” (“Thirty glorious years”), characterised by an uncontrolled migration. In 1974, France along with other countries in Europe facing economic crisis, decided to stop immigration flows of labour force. This decision provoked an unexpected effect: the acceleration of family reunifications, due to the difficulty for short term salaried workers to be commuters between France and their countries of origin and, progressively the long term settlement of immigrant families with their children (Wihtol de Wenden, 1988).

The phenomenon of second-generation immigrants emerged in public debates in France by the end of the seventies, when riots erupted in Lyon’s suburbs. The reason behind this early outburst of violence were police discrimination and the so called “double peine” (the faculty to expel to their countries of origin, condemned and imprisoned foreigners). The question is who are, and how to define these rebellious youngsters who were presented by the media as linked with urban riots, delinquency and Islamic fundamentalism. To be precise, the youth of immigrant origin is much more diverse than it was presented in the media. Although it is a generation difficult to define, still we can grasp their main characteristics, as we shall later see, and we can basically understand the reasons underlying their rebellious character.

Without question, the basic problem is that their claims against the Republic have not changed much since the end of seventies, and the reason is that apparently their basic concerns could hardy be coped by the French republican model of citizenship. In other words, while the government have undertaken political strategies to confront poverty, the basic identity problem, namely the gap between their collective identities and the republican myths of France were difficult to approach.

After defining the main features of this “second-generation immigrants phenomenon”, which arose in France before its European neighbours, and after raising the questions and the strategies developed, we will now focus on its specificity2 (Wihtol de Wenden, 2005).

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2 Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, La « seconde génération », in Rémy Leveau, Khadija Mohsen-Fi-
I. Historical background:

France, a country of immigration which ignores to be so

The second generation phenomenon is the result of the French decision to stop immigrant labour force of salaried workers on July 1974 on the one hand and the unexpected effect of family reunification since then on the other. France is an old immigration country, the oldest in Europe, which always hesitated between a policy of settlement and a policy of labour force.

At first, the shortage of workers and of future soldiers in the second part of the nineteenth century can be considered the underlying reason for the call of foreign workers. The government idea was “to make French persons out of foreigners” despite public debates which focussed on the risks of immigration for French identity.

However, despite that the government had not developing any coherent policy, yet issues of immigration were treated in a rather pragmatic manner, and were concretely led by employers and civil society organisations.

A turning point occurred in 1974, when France decides to stop the recruitment of salaried labour force. This decision put an halt on the mobility of foreigners between France and their countries of origin. At the same tome a new policy of integration was defined which was led by the State although also involving various partners such as municipalities and associations.

In the 1980’s, a strong politicisation of immigration and integration took place, with the rise of Le Pen at local elections of 1983. Immigration, formerly a non relevant topic in politics, becomes of high importance, leading to a reaffirmation of symbolic politics and reorientation of short term policies. The revival of republican values, largely forgotten in the past “trente glorieuses” has also changed the tone of the debate.

Since the census of 1975, Europeans immigrants in France (Italians, Portuguese, Spanish and Yugoslavs) became outnumbered by non Europeans (while Algerians immigration declined, the numbers of Maghrebians, and especially Moroccans, Tunisians, Turkish, South Saharan Africans and Asians increased).

However, the halt of immigration of labour force in 1974 has developed the new phenomenon of family reunification among those who were practicing a “noria” (mobility between the place of departure and of arrival) between France and the Southern rim of the Mediterranean.

Instead of moving between the Northern and Southern rim of the Mediterranean, they have become permanent settlers with their families. This led to the settlement of families and to the appearance of second-generation immigrants earlier than in other European countries. Many of them have become


French, by birth or by naturalisation. The access to citizenship has remained stable, all categories included, around 150,000 per year during these last years.

In 1974, a new immigration policy was defined by the new State Secretary of Immigration Paul Dijoud who launched the term “integration”, a term that came as a substitution to the old concept of “assimilation”. It was decided to preserve the cultures of origin and lighter obligations of inclusion into the French republican model than assimilation. The law of 9 October 1981 on freedom of associations granted to foreigners, replaced the former authorisation of the Home ministry.

In 1990 a new initiative of “Town Policies”, founded on public intervention in selected zones of social exclusion, without referring to ethnicity, draws the landscape of most second-generation immigrants.

Furthermore, a new security approach has been introduced in the 1990’s, in a context of emergence of Islam in inner cities. The public space has also been marked by these debates, and the 1993 reform of nationality code by the Pasqua-Méhaignerie law which for the first time restricted the access to nationality by \textit{jus soli}, was replaced by the 1998 Guigou law which brings back the former equilibrium between \textit{jus soli} and \textit{jus sanguinis}.

These developments and debates prove the French regime hesitations when having to decide between an assimilative to the secular republican values approach, or accepting the development of collective identities. Indeed the French state had always have difficulties in considering itself as an immigration country. Although France has became the biggest immigration country in Europe between 1880 and 1970, this reality has first been unknown, and was hardly accepted by the public opinion. The reason is that the French republican model has been built on the myth of homogeneity of its population, on the philosophy of the social contract and the political myth of the Nation. Newcomers were considered as individuals having to melt into a predefined political model. Immigrants had to let their specificities at home.

However, in the late seventies, the second generation of Muslim immigrants, begin to express their grievances in the public space: riots in Lyons suburbs because of police discrimination and the “double peine” condemnation (penal fines and then repatriation to their parent’s country of origin.). This mobilisation, along with the freedom of association given to foreigners in October 1981, led to the march for equality of rights and against discrimination, recognized as the “Marche des Beurs” which gathered second-generation immigrants of Maghrebian origin. They walked from Marseilles with a triumphal arrival to Paris, on December 1st of 1983. The result of this march was that in in August 17 of 1984, the government accepted to grant by law a ten years residence card on criteria of residence, automatically renewable to some categories of foreigners (foreigners married with French, parents of French children, residents in France for more than fifteen years). This achievement has been considered as one of the
most successful ones, resulting from the associative movement.

However, several important challenges have put the identity of second-generation immigrants on trial.

First, the disturbances brought by the first Gulf war (1991) led the government to wonder on the allegiances of these young second-generation immigrants associated with civic “Beur” associations, who had led the associative movement that confronted the French Government involvement in the Gulf war. In this case the belonging to Islam has been less relevant.

Second, the emergence of terrorism. In 1995, Jacques Chirac, leader of the Right at is newly elected as President of the Republic. Under the government led by Alain Juppé, terrorism burst in Paris: two attacks killed travellers in the RER (regional express railway) and the Islamist Khaled Kelkal who had put bombs on the TGV tracks near Lyons was killed by policemen in 1995.

On May 2002, Jacques Chirac is successfully (86%) elected for the second time at the Presidency of the Republic. The Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin nominates Nicolas Sarkozy to head the Home Ministry, who immediately, engages into a wide reform of immigration laws. A law on entrance and stay of foreigners is voted on November, 26, 2003. The law includes a “Contrat d’accueil et d’intégration” for newcomers who are obliged to learn French and civic republican values.

Arguable this new attitude of the French government has led to increase tensions. Whether connected to this new attitude or not, hard riots arise from the feeling of police discrimination in Paris suburbs on November 2005. The actors erupting into the streets of the banlieues, burned the symbols of republican institutions (schools, kinder gardens, gymnasiums) or of racist employers (firms). They were second-generation immigrants of Maghrebian or sub-Saharan origin, demanding to be treated as French with equality of rights.

As a reaction to riots Nicolas Sarkozy, newly elected, at the presidential elections of May 2007, appoints his friend Brice Hortefeux, Minister of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development to develop a more draconic immigration policy. The title of this ministry, which introduces national identity in immigration affairs, was strongly criticised by intellectuals, leading finally to its abolition by November 2010.

Citizenship and French identity:

France distinguishes Nationality and Citizenship. Nationality is a legal term while citizenship is a philosophical notion. In France, the access to nationality has been early considered as a tool of its assimilation policy since the beginnings of the Third Republic, in 1875. For a long time, the French model of access to nationality has been built on a mix between jus sanguinis and jus soli. This is the result of the French long history of immigration and of its grappling with demographic and military needs beginning in the second part of the nineteenth century.

The French law on nationality was inspired by the civil code of Napoleon the 1st of 1804, which substituted the “jus sanguinis” to the former “jus soli” inherited from Ancient Regime (attachment of the peasant to the earth of his owner”). Decision makers tried to “make French out of foreigners” thanks to an enlargement by birth, the access to French citizenship. The rationale behind these new approach during 1851, 1867 and 1889 was to compete with Germany, whose population had rapidly grew during the nineteenth century. France had 300 000 foreigners in the first census of 1851 and one million in 1900. In 1889, an important reform of nationality law introduces more emphasis on jus soli to make French citizens out of those born in France. The legislator enlarges it with the ensuing reforms of 1927, 1945 and 1973, which include full access to full rights for the naturalised without any delay.

In the meantime, during the mid 1980’s, the National Front and its think tank the Club de l’Horloge launched a new debate on French identity with the slogans “Etre français, cela se mérite” (one deserves to be French) and “les Français de papier” (the French only by their identity cards but not in their minds). They hinted that French of foreign origin (the so called “second-generation immigrants”) were suspected not to want to be so (“Français malgré eux”). This notion originally referred symbolically to inhabitants of former Alsace-Lorraine during the two World wars who were enrolled in spite of themselves in the German army. At that time the question of nationality and citizenship rapidly became a high contested issue sparking debates on identity (what does it mean to be French?), and on allegiances and loyalty (specially focused on those that hold double nationality, specially people of Muslim or Jewish origin. It must be heed that France had agreements for military service with Algeria and Israël, among many other agreements).

The Left however, responded to these questions with a book on Identité française (1985). The basic thing to bear on mind is that the Left refused to let the debate on French identity and citizenship to be canalized by the extreme right.

The impact on public opinion (the Figaro magazine had published an issue on November 1985 on: “Will we still be French in the next thirty years?” Serons-nous encore Français dans trente ans?), led the Chirac Government to appoint in 1987 a Commission of Wise Men (Commission des Sages) to design a reform of the French nationality code. However, the commission after at least hundred hearings finally did not arrive to any concluding point on the necessity of a reform. That happened at the eve of new presidential elections of 1988.

In any case, the debate provided arguments and consistency to the values advanced by second-generation immigrants civic associations who in opposition to the Commission of Wise Men were convinced of the necessity of redefining the concept of French citizenship. In some ways that criteria was also shared by a few left wing political and intellectual circles. Indeed, after several years of debates in left wing and liberal associations, the topics on a renewed citizenship were raised again.
During the celebration of the bicentennial of the French revolution (1989), a new law was voted on July, 22nd 1993 when the Right anew came back to power. The law suppressed the automatic access of French nationality to 18-year-olds born in France from foreign parents and having continuously lived in France for five years. Also naturalised children, who did not live with their parents were denied. The law introduced for the first time the expression of the will to become French. In other words, the young foreigners accessing French nationality at their 18th birthday, must address their demand to a judge.

The access to nationality was lengthened for those acquiring it by marriage, and the reintegration into French nationality was suppressed for former colonials whose parents had served in the army, the administration or had been elected, except for Algerians. The young people condemned to penal sanctions exceeding six months could not have access to French nationality. This law, inspired in the National Front, was basically welcomed by part of the Jacobin left, which was sensitive to republican ideals of a common social contract. For the first time since 1851, the *jus soli* lost a part of its weight in favour of *jus sanguinis*.

When the left came back to power in 1997 with Lionel Jospin as Prime Minister, a new law in 1998 (Guigou law) came back to resettle the former equilibrium between *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis*. The demand of the former law to show a will to become French when arriving to 18th years old was suppressed, restoring the automatic access to French nationality at 18 for those born in France from foreign parents. However, reintegration into French nationality became limited to Algerians. (Algeria was made of three French “départements” and had not the same status as other French colonies). There has not been any new reform of the nationality code since then (except for some restrictions introduced in the Sarkozy law of 2006 regarding access to nationality through marriage) while the politicisation of the debates on this topic had more or less ceased. The equilibrium between *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* seem to have reached a political consensus again.

Meanwhile, the debate on citizenship has been renewed by the “Beur” movement, with more emphasis on participation than on nationality. The “beur” movement demanded local political rights for foreigners, separating thus nationality from citizenship as was during the French revolution. At first sight it seems that Islam has also introduced a new component. Between the 1990s- and the early 2000s Islam has emerged in the public landscape, when the noted second-generation immigrants claimed to be French and Muslim, and some cases Muslims of France. In more sense than one it can be argued that the civic “beur” movement has contributed to introduce the topics of anti-discrimination and diversity into the citizenship debate.

However, France hardly recognizes multiculturalism as an official word defining ethnic components. Diversity is a new challenge for France, under the double pressure of Europe and ethnic groups who are also potential voters. Some civic associations of the beur movement, born with the “*marche des beurs*” of
1983 (SOS Racisme and France Plus, born both in 1984) attempt to advance an agenda defined as “the right to difference” (SOS racisme), and then to “indifference” (France Plus), something that some researchers denounced as the risk of enclosing ethnic claims into cultural and social determinisms.

The accent put on Islam gave some specificity to the French approach of integration: the scarf affair of 1989 and then the law of 2004 prohibiting wearing ostentatious religious signs at school, was conceived in order to stress secularism as a republican value to be shared by future citizens. This happened at the time that other emblematic values have disappeared, (the military service has been suppressed by Jacques Chirac in 1995) and when the concepts of “Égalité” and “fraternité” were seriously challenged by the “social gap” (“la fracture sociale”, a term used by Jacques Chirac during his presidential campaign in 1995) and by a growing ethnic discrimination at work, at school, in housing and police treatment.

In 2009 a new debate has emerged focused on the question on whether there is a need to include the ethnic origins in statistics reports. Nicolas Sakozy declared himself in favour of such a reform, along with positive discrimination, in order to improve the struggle against discrimination. However, the Constitutional Council in November 2007 decided negatively, considering that “All French were born free and equal in rights”. In 2008, the Simone Veil report promoting the introducing of the word diversity in the Constitution also concluded negatively. Another research report held by the demographer François Héran confirmed the trend, limiting ethnic statistics to research uses.

Urban Segregation

One of the consequences of not using ethnic based statistics is the fact that France treats differences at a territorial and social level. However, a first break with Jacobin ideology, has been the introduction of positive discrimination based on social criteria. The ZEP (“Zones d’éducation prioritaire”) were introduced in 1981 by a Left government, in districts where the children were suffering cumulated social discrimination at school. During the eighties, under pressures from several left wing mayors (Hubert Dubedout, a socialist mayor of Grenoble and Gilbert Bonnemaison, a mayor in Epinay-sur Seine, in Seine-Saint-Denis, the poorest department in France), some measures conceived to the prevention of violence were inserted in the program of urban social development (“développement social des quartiers”). Several districts were included in this territorial public intervention, leading to the so called “Town policies”. In 1990, a Ministry of the Town was created. Based on geographic zones of social poverty, state urban policies rely on social criteria. Ethnicity is neither mentioned, nor positive discrimination because these two words are still a taboo in France. In order to maintain social links and struggle to diminish urban violence, the government allocated subsidies to civic associations.

This policy also introduces a share of competences between the State
and local partners, mainly municipalities. Today, 750 “zones urbaines sensibles (“ZUS) representing 4.5 millions of inhabitants are included in the Town policy. We also count 911 ZEP which are schooling 20% of the pupils. In early 2008, the State Secretary of the Town, Fadela Amara, the former president of the association “Ni Putes ni soumises” launched a new plan (“Plan de relance pour la Ville”) stressing reinforced policing, monitoring at schools and aids in searching employment.

However, since 1990 the political shift from left to right has led to a drastic reduction of public subsidies to civic associations. This led many associations to build partnerships with municipalities with a new focus on localism and social care against exclusion. Some activists also encouraged local participation and a citizenship of residence. The problem with this political project rooted in participative democracy however, its that it did not help to socioeconomic mobilization. Indeed those policies did not help populations to get rid of what seemed to be a determinisms that linked to the their ‘territory’ in inner cities.

Anti-discrimination policy should be based in a public policy promoting equality of rights. The definition of the citizenship model built on formal equality embedded in the Declaration of 1789 (“Tous les hommes naissent libres et égaux en droits”) however, could not close the gap produced by effective inequalities, produced by years of ethnic and religious discriminations. The article 13 of the Amsterdam treaty of 1997 forced France to implement a public policy against discrimination. Two laws have been adopted. In 2001 a law on discrimination at work, and in 2002 on racist practices by employers. The law obliges them to give proof that they have not practiced any indirect discrimination.

As for political inclusion, after 30 years of debates, local voting rights to foreigners have not been granted despite that 54% of the public opinion approved such a measure. Since 1975, some leftist associations, followed since 1980 by the Communist party, by President François Mitterrand in 1981 and by the League for Human Rights in 1985, advanced a demand for local voting rights and eligibility for all foreigners settled in France. They encouraged municipalities (mostly leftist) to set Local Consultative Commissions of immigrants, appointed or elected, in order to develop deliberative forms of citizenship in municipal councils. The most well-known of these councils were Mons-en-Baroeul, and les Ullis and Amiens, in where foreigners were elected; and Grenoble, and Strasbourg in the past and currently Paris, in where the representatives are appointed. A left wing progressive program advanced by the socialist candidate François Mitterrand in 1981, had promised local voting right and eligibility to all foreigners along with the freedom of association, granted in 1981. François Mitterrand often repeated during his long mandate (1981-1995) that he was personally in favour of such a reform but that the public opinion was not ready for it. In order to achieve such a reform, change was needed in article 3 of the Constitution which foresees that voters to local elections would participate in the designation of the electoral group, which proceeds the election of senators. So, foreigners would be included into the idea of national sovereignty which is...
associated to the French people, according to the Constitution (“La souveraineté nationale appartient au peuple français”).

However, after years of internal debate within the socialist party, the Jospin Government (1997-2002) decided to abandon the project because of fear of the increasing electoral of the extreme right.

In 2002, another bill was proposed by the Green party at the National Assembly, however, it was not voted by the Senate. Still we must stress that the bill had been formally advanced by many civic associations which since 1981 were stressing on the legitimacy of the concept of ‘citizenship of residence; based on the length of stay, on the payment of taxes, and on the necessary involvement in “grass root” issues. This main reason for that initiative was to respond to the challenges of local extreme right trends in the ‘inner cities’. The inspiration for that initiative however, is rooted in the revolutionary constitution of 1793 who granted citizenship to foreigners who were sharing the revolutionary ideals and who had demonstrated solidarity even without being nationals, such as Thomas Paine and Anacharsis Clootz. This shift in the debate has been backed by the Maastricht treaty of 1992 which defines European citizenship in its article 8 and grants local voting rights and eligibility to Europeans when they are settled in another country than that of their nationality. This pressure however, led to a backlash reform of the French Constitution which stipulates that European voters do not participate in the nomination of senators and cannot be elected as mayors. Since then, leftist associations, which endorsed the democratic deficit argument, kept working on, claiming for local voting rights based on socialisation by residence. (The League for Human Rights, SOS racisme, MRAP and many others). Some rightist leaders (such as Yves Jego, the former mayor of Amiens, Gilles de Robien) are pleading for such a reform, considering that current polls show that the argument that says that including European non-French voters, would boost an ethnic vote has been weakened. Polls show that a wide variety of people claim that these “foreigners” are “French alike the others”.

In reality however, France is among the last European countries of immigration to give so little access to political mandates to French of non-European immigrant origin. There is no MP at the French National Assembly, two senators, 2 or 3 MPs at each mandate of the European Parliament and local councillors ordinarily dedicated to “Town policies” recognized as “Arabes de service”.

Compared with the United Kingdom, the Netherlands or Germany, political inclusion is low and illustrates the indecisiveness of French policy. During the recent riots in autumn 2005, most of the rioters had the feeling that they were not considered fully French, that republican values of equality and fraternity did not related to them. They did not demand collective recognition, based on Islamist belongings. They only requested equality of rights.
Islam

The recognition of Islam is another pillar of French integration policy. France is the country of Europe with the highest number of Muslims. Most of them are of Maghreb origin (Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians), including 500,000 harkis and their families (who fought on the French side during the Algerian war) and second or third generations of French.

The presence of Islam began to emerge in the French public space in the mid eighties when Muslims started to advance some collective claims. Strikes in the car industry in 1984 were the result of a mixing between working class demands and religious mobilisation. These demands were collective housing for foreign workers who asked for prayer rooms, specific areas in the churchyards, visible mosques in the urban landscape, and Hallal meat slaughtering places and markets. However, the act that opened the debate on the compatibility of Islam with republican values was the conflict about the scarves at school in 1989.

Islam is portrayed in France as the religion of the poor, of the colonised deprived of political elites. It is not exaggerate to say that Islam is trapped into different forms of rejection in public opinion.

In order to settle some dialogue with religious leaders and to manage Islam within secularised rules, two Home Ministers have tried to set structures of dialogue and representation. The first was Pierre Joxe, who created in the 1989 the CORIF (Conseil de réflexion sur l’islam en France). The second was Nicolas Sarkozy who settled in 2002 the CFCM (Conseil français du culte musulman). The question of legitimacy around the CFCM, one of the main associations of Islam in France is a matter of controversy, because the criteria have been the square meters of prayer rooms granted by associations. This decision has given more influence to big associations subsidised by Saudi Arabia such as the UOIF (Union des Organisations Islamiques de France) or by Morocco, like the FNMF (Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France), than to smaller associations financed by Muslim families. For years, the French tradition of Home ministries has been to have a privileged partnership with the Rector of the Great Mosque of Paris, built in 1926 as a way of acknowledging Muslim fighters of the First World War, who conquered the Douaumont Fort in 1916, near Verdun. This mosque originally depended on the French Government in Algiers and, after independence, Algeria appointed its former rector: Hamza Boubaker.

His son, Dalil Boubaker, the current Rector, who is a French and Algerian bi-national, was appointed by Algeria. He shares republican values with the Home Ministry and he is considered a man of dialogue and compromise. However, this institutionalised dialogue has not prevented France from falling into hard conflicts with Muslims, especially about scarves at school.

After a first decision of the State Council prohibiting the wear of ostentatious signs of religious belonging at school, a law prohibiting them was voted on March 15th, 2004 (what has changed in 15 years has been the shift of the
terms “ostentatious” to “ostensible” and from a decision of justice to a law). The law seems to have ended the debate.

The result however, is that the reluctant girls must follow private courses or education at distance, which brings them back to very traditional ways of life. As a way of contrast, we can trace the will of the President of the Republic and of ministers to give some visibility to people of Muslim culture in the sphere of decision-making. In 2004, a “Muslim” préfet (a high civil servant representing the state’s authority in a “département” or a region) and a “Muslim” rector were appointed. This openness towards exhibition of religious belongings may appear strange in a secularised republic such as France. Other Ministers of immigrant origin have also been appointed, in order to heed potential new voters of Muslim origin. Tokia Saïfi was nominated as French Secretary of State in charge of Sustainable Development development 2002, Azouz Begag to delegate minister for equal opportunities in 2005, Rachida Dati, to Justice from 2007 to 2009, Rama Yade, State Secretary for Human rights and from 2007 to 2010 Minister of Youth and Sports, and Fadel Amara as Secretary of State for Urban Policies, from 2007 to 2010. Interestingly all of them have been appointed by the Right. However, few French of Maghreb origin hold important positions in the headquarters of the main political parties. Only the Socialist Party and the Green were blessed by MPs of Maghreb origin at the European Parliament. In this sense it should not be surprising that the appointment of a non-Muslim but Black journalist at the 8 p.m. TV broadcast at France 2 in 2006 has been considered as a very important event.

Most immigration policies in France have been decided at national level, with a strong impact on Republican values, partially influenced and negotiated with the most influent immigrant group, the Maghrebians and their sons, who gave the tone. During the “beur” movement integration policy was bargained at the Elysée with civic associations. During the first Gulf war, these civic associations were approached by State summits to ensure the loyalty of their militancy and also at the eve of each presidential election, because politicians began to pay attention to the phantom of an ethnic vote. Despite exclusion and discrimination, they are the most important ethnic actors in this game, and they know how to play the citizenship and secularist card.

II. The “second-generation immigrants” phenomenon:

A population difficult to name, to count and to define

After the immigration of the sixties and seventies, which were considered as temporary migrations, the “second generation” phenomenon has revealed the settlement of “visible” nationalities in French society: in housing, at school, in local life, in cultural practices and at work. This generation was portrayed as a generation without any reference and without any identity, that refuse to take
the place of their parents in manual work. However, what is certainly clear is
their aim at having a place as mere citizens. Many stereotypes were stuck to
the representation of this population, mostly built around inner cities: violence,
drugs, unemployment, communities, Islam, ethnic ghettos. Many contradictory
trends are blurring integration processes: identity constructions around religious
fundamentalism, victimisation from colonial past, visibility of ethnic belongings
and skin colour, hyper assimilation to republican values in order to find a place
as “Arabe de service” in local public policy and politics. The second generation,
which is sometimes the third or the fourth generation has been successively
qualified as “zero generation”, “illegitimate children” (Sayad, 1985), “following
generation” (Juliette Minces, 1985), “generation from foreign origin”.

This generation is difficult to define due to its juridical diversity (some are French if they were born in France, others are still foreigners if they were born abroad and came with their parents). Many of them have now acquired double
citizenship due to the extension of jus soli facilities in western immigration countries and to the permanence of jus sanguinis in Islamic countries of departure (Weil, 2004). The most represented foreign nationalities are Algeria and Morocco and recently sub Saharan countries such as Senegal and Mali. The sons of Portuguese
are rarely defined as “second generation”, as well as the grandsons of Italians and Spanish, who have become invisible in the French social landscape. Self
definitions are also very common and several have been used for these last thirty years: “beurs” in the eighties (from the slang language of inner cities consisting in the reverse of the syllabic order of words: “arab” becomes “rebe”and “beur”), “potes” was referring to the slogan of SOS racism “Touche pas à mon pote”, an anti-discrimination symbol, “jeunes” without any other mention also refers to young of Maghreb or Sub Saharan origin living in poor inner cities. In the public and political discourse, the term of “sauvageons”(wild young people) practicing “incivilités” has been used by Jean-Pierre Chevènement, a leftist Home Minister on duty in 1997 to refer to their practices of small delinquency in the streets and the term “racaille” was used in 2005 by Nicolas Sarkozy, then Home Minister and later President of the Republic since 2007 alluding to their outlaw behaviours, adding the necessity to “clean” the suburbs (“zones de non droit”, a no man’s land) with a strong cleaning product, the “kärcher”.

Integration, a false debate

Second generation is often linked with integration: However the question
is whether are they integrated? How can we measure their integration? There
is a permanent debate about “integration” of the second-generation immigrants.

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The term itself has varied considerably: from assimilation, used between the 1880’s to the 1960’s, fitting with the republican model of the social contract with a total public adhesion to French values, to insertion, briefly used in the 1970’s (a functional approach for short term workers) and integration, launched in mid 1970’s, but formerly used in Algeria for indigenous populations. Integration refers to “social cohesion”, a term used by President Jacques Chirac in 1995 and political community. The term “community of citizens” was proposed in 1996 by the sociologist Dominique Schnapper (Schnapper, 1985). But nobody can define the criteria of integration: who is integrated, comparatively with whom? Integration is an old debate in France, discussed for over thirty years around a very unclear concept borrowed from colonial times and reintroduced in 1974 by the first State Secretary to Immigration, Paul Dijoud.

The “Second generation” phenomenon has emerged in French politics during the period 1981-1990, due to the mobilisation against racism and for the ten years residence card. The freedom of association granted to foreigners has given visibility to the so called “génération beur”. It answered to the pressure of the extreme rightist National Front hinting at their lack of allegiance (“Français malgré eux”, “Français de papier”) by new expressions of citizenship (Wihtol de Wenden, 2001). Logics of exclusion as a spiral of inequalities and discriminations have been the result of concentration in inner cities built in the sixties and seventies for middle and working class, rapidly abandoned by the French, then granted to large families from Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa, ghettoised at the margins of big towns. Drug smuggling is the main source of “second generation” delinquency in France, coupled with urban delinquency (riots with policemen in the streets, neighbourhood robbery). There is a strong discrimination from policemen due to the frequent identity controls in inner cities and public spaces (trains, roads) which often end at the police night jail (Body-Gendrot, 2003).

However, most field studies, such as the extensive one led by Michèle Tribalat in 1992 (Tribalat, 1995) among 13 000 interviewed, show that despite stereotypes, the Algerians and French of Algerian origin are the best integrated, based in criteria of competence in the French language, low practice of Islam, mix marriages, success at school, mix housing while the Turkish would be the least integrated, because of their late arrival in France and community behaviours. Several indicators have been proposed to measure integration, but they have been also strongly criticised by scientists arguing that the focus put on the origins brings some determinism in the approach of integration, while other criteria such as the social, economic and cultural background are perhaps more important. The

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Ghettoisation of some inner cities leads to an accumulation of inequalities where poverty is coupled with ethnicity: the department of Seine Saint Denis (the so-called 93) is the poorest one in metropolitan France and the most “coloured” one, in spite of a very active policy of inclusion led by the municipalities. Usually, the educational performance, the mix of social relations and marriage, the use of French language at home, mix housing, access to jobs are considered as the most common criteria of integration. In secularised France, the low practice of Islam is also regarded as an indicator of integration. Access to employment is the most crucial discrimination for the young of Arab origin, coupled with institutional racism practiced by policy and administrations. Some of them are claiming for ethnic quotas in politics and in civil service. But integration in France is largely a false debate, because most “second-generation immigrants” are culturally integrated even if they are economically excluded. There is also a social promotion of ordinary young boys and girls of foreign and working class origin accessing the middle class in spite of unemployment and racism. Perhaps the French model of “exception française” is less inclusive for these new French than it was in periods of economic growth for Italians, Portuguese, Polish and Spanish.

The Government responded by cultural managements of collective identities at local level, delegated to urban mediators of Arab or Black origin, showing that the republican model is on the move. A kind of “communautarisation par défaut” is emerging, thanks to delegation of responsibilities from top to bottom at local administrative level. The French experience, closely connected first with the assimilation approach, is now rather called “living together”, a word launched by the French Minister of Social Affairs Georgina Dufoix in 1983, with its main tool, the policy of the Town. Experienced since 1990, it is conceived as a struggle against social exclusion in selected areas (750 to-day) reinforced by public intervention (school, social support, free of charge possibilities of settlement for firms, help to find jobs, associations). The French model of citizenship focussed on the declaration of equality of rights may be an obstacle to the recognition of such positive discrimination policies. The concept of “égalité des chances” has begun to emerge, with other positive discrimination measures. A ministry, entitled Secretary of State for Urban Policies, was designed for this purpose. Azouz Begag was in exercise from June 2005 to May 2007, and then Fadela Amara, from 2007 to 2010.

Identities and self exclusion

Political strategies led by “second-generation immigrants” wave between the hyper assimilation of a republican elite which aims at entering in politics in a bottom-up approach and dissent behaviour (Salafist Islamism as an alternative way of life and violence on the streets). But anomie is more frequent. Political participation is very low and abstention is high, because these new French are young, less educated than many other French, little socialised and feel far from national political debates.
Some associations, such as France Plus, “Motivé(e)s in Toulouse in 2002, and some parties such as the weak Muslim party of Abdelkader Latréche in 2002 have attempted to attract these potential new voters, also courted by all political parties including the National Front.

The issue of terrorism can not be overlooked. Dubious allegiances have been raised regarding street terrorism. The case of Khaled Kelkal in Lyons in 1995, and more recently, the French supposed twentieth terrorist of 9/11 attacks, Zacharias Moussaoui, together with some other young French Muslims who have been trained in Algeria and Afghanistan and are currently jailed in Guantanamo, are cases in point. However, we must stress, that even if social disintegration may lead to radical Islamism, the abandonment of some inner-city places to local “caïds” rarely leads to terrorism. Most of the young are well integrated into social groups to which they belong even if they feel discriminated.

In general terms field studies are showing that most of these second generation Muslims feel French, holding an additional identity at the private and individual level. However, external factors, such as the Palestinian question and the first and second Gulf war had provoked feelings of open dissent.

It should be stressed however, that the visibility of Islam is often viewed by the public opinion as a failure of integration. However, from the perspective of these young Muslims it represents a claim for recognition and legitimation.

The will of political leaders to address the feeling of insecurity felt by the public opinion (measured by the second place of the National Front at the first turn of the presidential elections in 2002) has reinforced controls in public spaces and the issue of fines for collective gatherings. It is difficult though to evaluate their efficiency in dissuading from delinquency and preventing violence.

A permanent questioning around loyalty:

For a long term, the so called “second generation” has been forgotten in immigration policies, focussed on border controls, work and asylum. For several observers it reveals the failures of republican institutions to reach the ideals of freedom, equality and fraternity. The French definition of citizenship, expressed in the Declaration of Human Rights of 1789 says that “All men were born free and equal in rights” and the Constitutional Council often reminds that the French nation is free from any ethnic or cultural belonging because it is the political project of an homogeneous people having exclusive allegiances to French values. This philosophical definition of citizenship has long delayed the recognition of minorities and discriminations in public spheres.

However as we have stated below, associative mobilisation of “second generation” mainly and then Europe have change this trend at certain levels. As noted the Parliament vote anti discrimination laws, in 1972, 2001 and 2002 and positive discrimination policies implemented at school to settle more equality, based on social criteria, together with the ZEP (zones of priority education, in
early 1980’s) and in inner cities are a prove of it. Yet, police discrimination is hardly recognised by the authorities, despite the fact that specific institutions such as the HALDE (Haute Autorité pour la Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l’Égalité, born in 2002) and the CNDS (Commission nationale de déontologie de la sécurité, created in 2000) are permanently fighting against it. Public policies have supported the adoption of a Chart on Diversity in 2007 in order to incentive big firms to employ young people from diverse origins. The term “Diversity” is now used for school and universities, public housing, local and national political representation as an objective to reach. We must stress through that in France, it refers more to the fight against social exclusion than to ethnic recognition. France is among the countries in Europe where diversity is the most scarcely represented in politics, in national and European political assemblies10 (Wieviorka, 2008).

Although the debate on introducing ethnic statistics in censuses has been abandoned in 2007 by a decision of the Constitutional Court, many qualitative field studies can give extensive approaches on “intégration”, allegiances, loyalty and multiculturalism “à la française”. Ethnicisation of identity is growing in France in relegated districts, along with the rise of feelings of humiliation and escape behaviours as a challenge to failed policies of inclusion and to permanent discriminations in the streets, in housing, at school, at work and in politics. “Visible” populations have progressively built constructivist approaches of new identities around local citizenship in mid eighties (the “beurs”), ethnicity (“Arabs”, “Blacks”) in the 1990’s, islam (the (“brothers”) since mid eighties, and more recently post-colonial specificity (the “indigenous of the republic”).

It is of no doubt that the events of September 11th, 2001 have brought the topic of Islam as a security issue on sharp relief, linking it with terrorism and reinforcing border controls. Although few terrorists were directly connected with immigration, most of them being tourists or students with legal residence status, the amalgamation in the public opinion between Islam, delinquency, illegal stay and terrorism has been often largely spread, using the terms of “threats”, “challenges” in strategic terms. The “securitisation” of immigration reinforces the stereotype of the failure of integration, transnational networks, urban violence and radical Islamism: all situations which exist at the margins.

Furthermore, the question of multiple allegiances questions security approaches, considering immigration and second-generation immigrants as a stake. Still although the overwhelming majority of them are claiming to be French and Muslim and are recognised as such.

The fight for “dignity” and “respect” is very present in the youth discourse and also expressed in their cultural expression such as novels, music, theatre, films. Ethnicity and post-colonial belonging, questions republican France, even if the country has been for a long time a multicultural one which refuses to accept it as such: regional belongings, odd and local or overseas traditions have

been sometimes maintained, as well as local dialects and former laws (such as in Alsace-Moselle). The berberian language has been recognised as a language of France. Many young of foreign origin have plural identities, built according to their life experience of exclusion, discrimination, social promotion and foreign or religious offers (double citizenship, policy of countries of origin towards them and transnational links, religious training). Many girls are torn between several behavioural models. During several football matches some boys expressed their refusal of the French flag or the French song “la Marseillaise” and disqualified them. The adhesion to Palestinian fight and flag as well as Arab broadcasts messages (such as the qatari one, “Al Jazeera”) is very common, expanding forms of anti-semitism and sometimes anti-whites feelings.

But the so called “second generation” is also conscious that it represents an economic, political and cultural market. Their culture preferences entices firms, parties and elections, media, which are becoming aware of the necessity to introduce diversity, pluralism and social openness in their image. Integration (despite its unclear definition) progresses and most “second generation” members are definitely part of French society, inspiring a young and mix popular culture. The legitimacy of their presence is more important than the complacency towards the promotion of emblematic cases of successful stories hiding the majority which seeks for mere and ordinary life in France, as French (Brouard, Tiberj, 2005)11.

III. Urban riots: an inclusion or exclusion index?

The riots that France experienced in its inner cities, mostly surrounding Paris (in the so called departements “93” and “95”) but also other big cities such as Lyons, Toulouse, Grenoble, have been violent (Clichy-sous-Bois 2005, Grenoble 2010) and coupled with several anti-Semitic expression (Fofana affair in February 2006: death of a young French of jwesh culture by a Black, blogs of the “Indigènes de la république”). The violence has refocused the public debate on “second generation” youngsters who faced the challenge of the French model of integration. This has to be added to the 70.000 cases of urban violence perpetrated since January 2005, to the many conflicts with policemen in the streets and to the many young of Maghrebian and black origin being detained in jails.

The roots of the crisis are deep, and we must underscore the failure of the settlement policies for population of immigrant origin, which has led to an ethnicisation of social exclusion.

Inner cities

In the early 60s, the prolonged post-Second World War crisis in housing, coupled with the massive arrival of immigrants that took part in France’s

reconstruction, has led to the emergence of slums surrounding Paris, Lyons and Marseilles, which have become a no man’s land often referred to as the “zone”. Working class inner cities were yet existing at the margins of Paris and Lyons which are now multi-ethnic and poor, but they were more the result of an absorption of former villages than the expression of “ready made” urban projects.

In 1969, the Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas decided to get rid of the so called “bidonvilles”. It led to the building of towers in the country side, far from the city centres, deprived from public transportation (primarily because it was the period of the promotion of the private car). They were inspired by the ideals of the architect Le Corbusier, which were implemented by many young architects aiming at changing the town in the hope of shaping the behaviours of inhabitants.

A functional approach to town policies (defining places to sleep and shopping) which in any case lacked planning of sport and green areas for financial reasons, was preferred to sociability. This established bare towers, deprived from access to the towns in a period when all was planned for car drivers. Sarcelles has become an emblematic example of such urbanism (the “sarcellite”).

The social housing project (HLM) first sheltered French working classes who have had access to private housing in the seventies and then progressively to large immigrant families who became stuck into these places in a context of unemployment (due to desindustrialisation).

In 1974, the French decision to stop economic migration from non-EC countries had the effect of accelerating family reunification, most notably among North Africans who decided to settle in France. In the end of the seventies, the so called “second generation” began to mobilise itself in order to protest against its way of life. But the leaders soon became attracted by the summits of the State who tried to transform their activism in a recruitment of voters for political parties (at the left as well as at the right), in the false hypothesis of an ethnic or Muslim vote. They failed, increasing the frustration of the youngest who did not benefit from the social promotion offered by politics and associations and who had the feeling of having been the tools of politics.

New riots emerged in early nineties (namely in the suburbs of Lyons) and many experiments to fight against urban violence were focussed on prevention more than repression (the so called DSQ, Développement social des quartiers, initiated by the mayor Gilbert Bonnemaison). In 1990, a public policy tried to give an answer to this question in terms of prevention to delinquency and social treatment. This so called “Politique de la Ville” (Town Policies mainly dealt with inner cities and tried to define areas of state intervention in order to deal with social exclusion, delinquency, and unemployment.) As noted this was a form of positive discrimination applied to specific neighbourhoods. Immigration was not quoted as such because France uses social and non ethnic criteria but it was de facto included in this policy dealing with social problems. Led in partnership with mayors and other public powers, a municipalisation of urban policy was mostly focussed on the improvement of social housing (renovations) and on a

cultural and social support, with the help of civic associations and mediators who had appeared in the late eighties to resettle peace in urban places. An emphasis put on places rather than on individuals and family trajectories featured these policies.

The second utopia was the civic ideal of participation and empowerment of the city by residents involved in collective actions to force them to self appropriation of their places. Led by former ideals of local democracy (namely in Grenoble in mid seventies under the auspices of the mayor Gilbert Dubedout), this policy emphasized citizenship at grass root level. However, nothing was foreseen to help the population (and mostly the youth) to leave their cities, and to have a chance to go to another school in Paris, in order to meet other youngsters and to favour mobility (geographic, cultural and thus social).

The territorial policy of housing determines the compulsory public school ("carte scolaire"), the college, the peripheric university and the local opportunities to find a job. In short, democratization at the local level and the densification of inner cities has been preferred to the opportunity to abandon these places. The progressive decrease of the subsidies to civic associations during the nineties, the general feeling of "no hope" among the youth, the persistence of unemployment and the degradation of the situation of many families has led to despair. Many young of inner cities feel that Paris is another world. They never cross the highways separating the "banlieues" from the main city because they fear that other world. In that sense they are deterministically stuck to the walls of their "cités" (they are named the "hittistes").

Another negative factor is the stress put on the idea of the social contract rather than ethnicity in the integration model. The model as noted presupposes the homogenization of the population through citizenship, equality of rights, social contract and secularism. However, it has put little interest in the effectiveness of the implementation of such values on the ground. In August 2005, some newspapers such as Le Monde asserted that the reasons why there had not been any recent terrorists attack in France compared with London, was the strength of the integration model which was very cohesive and which succeeded in fighting communitarism. At the same time however, on November 2005 some inner cities burnt namely in the "93" (Seine Saint Denis) and "95" (Val d’Oise). The integration question thus is still an opened wound. As noted most of the second generation Muslims are confident in the values of the French ideals of equality of rights and citizenship and they feel French and Muslim without contradictions.

But at the same time they also think that French values are not fulfilled because they meet many institutional discriminations in daily life; they are facing inequalities of treatment at school, segregation in housing and discrimination in the access to employment. Overall they suffer to be considered as members of an ethnic community when they have struggled to escape from such determinism. All these assertions are confirmed by the results of researches and field studies conducted during recent years. Most of the youth are mainly claiming for more
recognition, more equality and less discrimination, a true implementation of the French values of equality and citizenship to them. The designation of them as bad citizens worsened their relations with the institutions. No answer has been given by the public powers to the request of respect and equality. They do not want to change the republican values, they want that they apply to them. There is no claim for more collective identity, but for more respect, recognition of them as citizens of France in a pluralistic view.

Transnational and segmented influences

Another factor to be heed is that the recourse to violence is related to the situation in Israël or in Middle East in general. Indeed most of the Muslim youth is influenced by Al Jazeera TV channel and other national satellites of their countries of origin. They introduce transnational influences in their private life, at home. So, some youngsters shouted “Vive Saddam” during the first Gulf war in 1991 when policemen patrolled in their districts. They reiterated that attitude during a friendly football match in 2002, insulting the French flag and singing the Algerian hymn facing the Prime Minister Lionel Jospin and the Minister of Solidarity Elisabeth Guigou. They hinted at the “occupied territories” during the riots of November 2005 against policemen. It does not mean they do not feel French. They want to be French but in another manner, with the Palestinian flag such as during their support to Jacques Chirac at the presidential elections of 2002 against Jean-Marie Le Pen. Islam seems to have had no impact during the riots. Many young Blacks were also part of the riots, and half of them are Christians. Some Muslim associations proposed to local mayors to intervene as pacificators during the struggles. Most of the young are occasional practitioners of Islam, which explains the success of radical trends to make conversions of those who have a small knowledge of their own religion. They mostly suffer of the few hopes offered by school and employment. All the more remarkable given that they are segregated, all the more they do not move from their localities. Only the most successful have the opportunity to leave their segregated inner cities. A few of them are looking for another way in life in fundamentalist islam.

The “Seine Saint Denis” (93) where many riots burst is the poorest “département” in France with many single families (the mother being alone in charge her children), drug business, some violations of girls and retaliations of those considered as too liberal (which gave birth to the association “Ni putes ni soumises” by young women who wanted to express their difficulties with men and their will to struggle). There is some lack of political will to solve the “inner cities” problem because richer localities do not accept to have social housing and “heavy” families.

Another factor is the ritual of youth demonstrations. For twenty years, the young of Maghrebian and black origin have been protesting against police discrimination. Civic associations, theatre bands, “Beur” novels and films have been inspired by the tough reality in which children and teenagers got killed by
policemen or French neighbours. In the end of the 70s, the protest movements in Lyons and suburbs burst around such incidents, demanding equality and respect. Therefore, it has become a tradition among the youth to protest in their inner cities and join activities such as walks and hunger strikes. The shared feeling of injustice convinced them that they were not treated as French due to their “visibility”. The game and the feast dimension have been factors of extension of violence. The will to perform a show in the televisions is also part of the ritual. They enjoy becoming actors and to be on the scene. It is a way of being considered as heroes among themselves, even if a life in prison is looming. The riots did not reveal any social movement: no leaders, no slogans and no organisations emerged. It has only been an expression of revolt. In a sense, the existence of riots is a sign of health of the “second generation” because it shows their preference to appear in public life to express collective disillusion as a game, rather than disappearing in violent actions.

**Conclusion:**

The “second-generation immigrants” phenomenon is the result of the convergence of several factors which occurred after the end of the so called “trente glorieuses” (thirty glorious years) in France in 1975. The halt of migration flows have reinforced family reunification as a unique flow of newcomers along with asylum seekers. This process had settled immigration in France, during a stage when the country was reluctant to recognise itself as an immigration country. In the meantime, discrepancies regarding urban policies, unemployment and the construction of identities of youth on a mix of national and trans-national belongings inspired from Muslim countries, have segmented their processes of inclusion into the French society. Several approaches have been used in order to analyse the “second-generation immigrants” phenomenon. These analysis relied on ethnic profiles of delinquency (Lagrange, 2010), autonomy of urban ghettos (Lapeyronnie, 2010) or failure of republican values (Dubet, 2009). However, the political responses wave between policies consisting in social mixing (diversifying and densifying the urban areas in inner cities) with an active local participation without leaving the places they dwell, and without providing the elites of the neighbourhoods the opportunity to overcome their life horizons thanks to meritocratic ideals. All of these approaches belong to the French republican myth, but one stresses the group and the other the individual.

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