

The Muslim Brotherhood and the Strategic Reframing of the Palestinian Cause in the Aftermath of October 7

Los Hermanos Musulmanes y el replanteamiento estratégico de la causa palestina tras el 7 de octubre

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Abstract

Since their ouster from power in Egypt and the exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) from the public and political arenas in 2013, the movement has suffered from a deep leadership crisis, exacerbated by internal divisions among three competing leaderships: the London Front, the Istanbul Front, and the Current of Change. The dramatic events of October 7, 2023, and the ensuing conflict between Israel and Hamas are perceived by the MB as a strategic opportunity to rehabilitate its image and reestablish its standing within the broader Islamist sphere. However, the politicization of the Palestinian issue has failed to mend the internal rifts, particularly given the stark differences in discourse regarding the appropriate stance toward Arab regimes allied with Israel. This article analyzes the discourse of the movement's three central leaderships concerning their positions on Israel and the Arab regimes, with particular emphasis on the Egyptian regime. It also examines the response of Egypt's Salafi movement to the Muslim Brotherhood's propaganda against the Egyptian state, in the context of the Brotherhood's efforts to craft a new narrative that blends civil resistance with emotional mobilization around the Palestinian cause. Through this analysis, the article offers an up-to-date perspective on the

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ideological, geopolitical, and intra-organizational factors shaping the Muslim Brotherhood's perceptions and actions in the post-October 7 era.

Keywords: Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt, al-Dawa al-Salafiyya, Current of Change, al-Aqsa Flood.

Resumen

Desde su derrocamiento en Egipto y la exclusión de los Hermanos Musulmana (HM) del ámbito público y político en 2013, el movimiento ha sufrido una profunda crisis de liderazgo, agravada por las divisiones internas entre tres facciones rivales: el Frente de Londres, el Frente de Estambul y la Corriente del Cambio. Los acontecimientos dramáticos del 7 de octubre de 2023 y el conflicto subsiguiente entre Israel y Hamás son percibidos por la HM como una oportunidad estratégica para rehabilitar su imagen y restablecer su posición en la esfera islamista más amplia. Sin embargo, la politización de la cuestión palestina no ha logrado sanar las fracturas internas, especialmente debido a las marcadas diferencias en el discurso sobre la postura que debe adoptarse frente a los regímenes árabes aliados con Israel. Este artículo analiza el discurso de los tres liderazgos centrales del movimiento en relación con sus posturas hacia Israel y los regímenes árabes, con especial énfasis en el régimen egipcio. También se examina la respuesta del movimiento salafista en Egipto frente a la propaganda promovida por los HM contra el Estado egipcio, en el contexto de los esfuerzos de los HM por elaborar un nuevo relato que combine la resistencia civil con la movilización emocional en torno a la causa palestina. A través de este análisis, el artículo ofrece una perspectiva actualizada para comprender los factores ideológicos, geopolíticos e intraorganizacionales que configuran las percepciones y acciones de los HM en la era posterior al 7 de octubre.

Palabras-clave: Hermanos Musulmanes, Egipto, al-Dawa al-Salafiyya, Corriente del Cambio, Diluvio de al-Aqsa.

For over a decade since the exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) from Egypt's public, political, and diplomatic arenas, the movement has been experiencing a profound leadership crisis. Despite its efforts to reorganize its ranks in the diaspora—particularly in Turkey—it appears to have failed to recover and mend internal divisions. The Palestinian issue, and the Israeli campaign against Hamas in Gaza following the October 7, 2023 massacre, presents a strategic opportunity for the MB's leadership to rehabilitate its image, strengthen its standing among members and other Islamist constituencies, and

attract a younger generation to its cause. Nevertheless, the movement's attempts to politicize the Palestinian issue have not succeeded in restoring its influence, primarily due to persistent internal fragmentation, which is reflected in the existence of three main leadership factions: the 'London Front', the 'Istanbul Front', and the 'Current of Change'.

This article aims to analyze the discourse of these three leadership factions of the MB regarding the Palestinian issue and the conflict with Israel, in the context of the post-October 7, 2023, war between Israel and Hamas. It also examines the movement's positions toward Arab regimes, with a particular focus on its stance toward the Egyptian government. The analysis is based on primary Arabic-language sources, including magazines, books, and online articles authored by prominent MB figures. Furthermore, the article explores the response of Egypt's Salafi movement to the Brotherhood's propaganda against the Egyptian regime.

The military coup led by Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi in 2013 resulted in the overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi's government and initiated a systematic purge of MB members and supporters from state institutions. This campaign involved mass arrests, executions, asset confiscations, the prohibition of Brotherhood-affiliated activities, and the official designation of the organization as a terrorist group. In addition to these state-led measures, the Brotherhood faced a coordinated propaganda effort spearheaded by religious authorities, including the al-Azhar institution, the political Salafi movement represented by the al-Nour Party, and various Sufi orders such as the al-Azmiya order—all of whom endorsed al-Sisi's hardline stance against the Brotherhood.²

In the wake of the MB's repression and exclusion from Egypt's political sphere, thousands of its members fled the country, seeking refuge in nations such as Turkey, Qatar, and various Western European states. According to Emirati and Turkish sources, approximately 30,000 Egyptian exiles are currently residing abroad, of whom around 20,000 are affiliated with the MB.³ It is important to note that, amid the ongoing reconciliation process between the Turkish and Egyptian governments since 2021, the Turkish authorities have begun imposing restrictions on the Brotherhood's activities. These measures have included the revocation of citizenship and limitations on political expression. Nevertheless, despite Ankara's attempts to accommodate Egyptian concerns, a significant network of MB members continues to operate within Turkey. Some have successfully integrated into academic and research

² Michael Barak, "Al-Azhar as a Key Player in Countering the Radical Ideology of Global Jihad" [in Muddassir Quamar (ed.), *Politics of Change in Middle East and North Africa since Arab Spring: A Lost Decade?*, N.Y.: Routledge, 2023], pp.54-69; Michael Barak, "Egypt's Sufi Al-Azmiyya: An Alternative to Salafism?", *Tel Aviv Notes*, Vol.8, No.8, April 27, 2014, available at: <<https://dayan.org/content/tel-aviv-notes-egypts-sufi-al-azmiyya-alternative-salafism>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

³ Tirmin Said, "Turkish Report: Erdogan Gives Refuge to 20,000 MB Members Who Fled Egypt [in Arabic]", *al-Marsad al-Misri*, August 23, 2020. <https://marsad.ecss.com.eg/38072>

institutions, which they have used as platforms to criticize Arab regimes—particularly the Egyptian government.⁴

The Split in the MB leadership

The decline of the MB's leadership within Egypt and the subsequent relocation of its primary operations abroad necessitated a strategic reassessment. The movement was compelled to adapt to a new geopolitical reality by reorganizing its ranks, addressing internal disputes, and formulating a cohesive strategy. However, these efforts have been significantly hampered by the fragmentation of its leadership into three competing factions: the "London Front," the "Istanbul Front," and the "Current of Change," each vying for authority and influence within the movement.

The major schism within the Brotherhood's historical leadership emerged in 2016, with the formation of two principal factions: the 'London Front' and the 'Istanbul Front'. The division was triggered by a leadership dispute following the arrest of Mahmoud Izzat, then the Supreme Guide of the MB, by Egyptian security forces. In the aftermath, Ibrahim Munir—who had served as Izzat's deputy—was legally appointed as the new General Guide. His appointment, however, was contested by Mahmoud Hussein, the Brotherhood's Secretary-General, who openly called for Munir's dismissal. In response, Munir expelled Hussein from all official positions and ordered the removal of his supporters from the movement's offices, branding them as defectors intent on fostering division.⁵ The conflict between the two fronts continued to intensify. A key escalation occurred when the London Front established a "Supreme Administrative Body" to replace the Brotherhood's traditional Guidance Bureau. This move was preceded by the formation of a new Shura Council by the London Front, which simultaneously dismissed the members of the Istanbul-based Shura Council from their posts. These developments underscored the deepening institutional rift and the growing inability of the movement to maintain organizational unity.⁶

It was only after the death of Ibrahim Munir in November 2022 and the subsequent appointment of Salah Abd al-Haq as the new Supreme Guide of

⁴ Michael Barak, "Is the MB losing Turkey and Qatar in the light of the rapprochement with Egypt?", *TAU Notes*, Volume 15, Number 6, July 14, 2021. <https://dayan.org/content/muslim-brotherhood-losing-turkey-and-qatar-light-rapprochement-egypt>

⁵ Muhammad al-Hadi, "The [Muslim] Brotherhood leadership is writing the final chapter of its life after splitting into two groups" [in Arabic], *al-Majala*, December 26, 2021, available at: <<https://tinyurl.com/y5wkr2pw>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

⁶ Walid Abd al-Rahman, ""Document dispute" ignites divisions within Egypt's MB" [in Arabic], *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, October 18, 2023, available at: <<https://tinyurl.com/2kz934xb>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

the MB on March 19, 2023, that the London and Istanbul fronts-initiated reconciliation talks. However, these efforts have yielded limited results. Hilmi al-Jazzar, deputy to Abd al-Haq, characterized the ongoing conflict within the Brotherhood leadership as a bureaucratic dispute rather than an ideological one, suggesting that the divisions stem primarily from organizational and administrative disagreements rather than fundamental differences in doctrine or vision.⁷

Notably, as early as 2019, a group of MB-affiliated youth in Egypt initiated reconciliation efforts with the Egyptian regime. A total of 1,350 imprisoned members of the movement submitted a formal letter to government authorities requesting amnesty. In this appeal, they expressed a willingness to renounce the ideological positions they had previously held during their involvement with the Brotherhood, to forswear violence, and to withdraw from all forms of public engagement, including *Dawa* and charitable activities. Furthermore, they offered to make a financial contribution as a gesture of goodwill in support of the Egyptian economy.⁸

The ‘Current of Change’ – the Radical Faction in the MB

In 2020, a further split occurred within the MB leadership with the formal establishment of the “Current of Change” in Turkey, comprised primarily of Egyptian exiles who had sought refuge there. This faction had begun to coalesce as early as 2015 under the name “General Bureau Front” and is widely regarded as the radical wing of the MB due to its support for armed resistance against the Egyptian regime. Critics often refer to it as the “Al-Kamalyun Movement,” named after its founder, Muhammad Kamal—the former leader of the Brotherhood’s post-2013 military wing, which included groups such as Liwa al-Thawra and Hasm that were implicated in terrorist attacks targeting military, economic, and civilian sites in Egypt.⁹

In 2016, Kamal resigned from the mainstream MB following deep disagreements with the organization’s leadership, particularly concerning the issue of political prisoners. His departure was precipitated by the dismissal of Muhammad Muntasir, the Brotherhood’s spokesperson and Kamal’s close

⁷ “MB messages in an interview with Dr. Al-Jazzar, Head of the Political Department” [in Arabic], *al-Dawa*, Experimental Issue, October 2023, pp.18-19.

⁸ Ashraf Abd al-Hamid, “The MB sends a message to Egypt: We seek reconciliation, we will abandon politics” [in Arabic], *al-Arabiya*, August 24, 2024, available at: <<https://tinyurl.com/5bf2vawp>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

⁹ Michael Barak, “The 7/10 Massacre of Hamas as an Inspiration Model for the “Change Stream” (“Tayyar al-Taghyir”) in the MB”, *ICT*, December 2023, available at: <<https://ict.org.il/the-7-10-massacre-of-hamas-as-an-inspiration-model-for-the-change-stream-in-the-muslim-brotherhood/>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

associate.¹⁰ Later that year, Kamal was targeted by Egyptian security forces, significantly weakening the General Bureau Front. Leadership subsequently passed to Muhammad Muntasir. By the end of 2020, the faction rebranded itself as the “Current of Change,” signaling both its desire to reform the movement and its continued identification with the broader MB,¹¹ despite its rejection of the traditional leadership’s strategies.

On October 15, 2022, the ‘Change Current’ published its ideological manifesto during a conference held in Istanbul. The movement reaffirmed its adherence to the path of Hassan al-Banna, its commitment to overthrowing the Egyptian military regime, and its support for continuing the popular revolution against what it described as tyrannical forces. It also endorsed the inclusion of various political groups in Egypt—including the MB—in shaping the country’s future. Nonetheless, the manifesto emphasized that the envisioned regime should be Islamic in nature and grounded in Sharia law. Furthermore, it pledged to safeguard Egypt’s Islamic and Arab identity from what it described as Western influences, which it claimed pose a threat to the cohesion of Egyptian society. The manifesto also called for the liberation of Muslim lands from foreign domination and authoritarian rulers.¹² Later that same month, the Change Current launched a new satellite channel, Freedom 11/11, designed to serve as a propaganda outlet opposing the Egyptian regime.¹³

In January 2022, members of the ‘Change Current’, under the leadership of Reza Fahmy, established the ‘Square Association’ (Jama’at al-Maydan), a platform dedicated to propaganda, mobilization, and the promotion of activism against the Egyptian regime.¹⁴ The association places particular emphasis on the role of the Egyptian diaspora in shaping negative public opinion toward the regime. This is pursued by exposing its repressive policies to the international community through demonstrations in front of embassies, parliaments, and international organizations, as well as by building alliances with global political figures to facilitate regime change. Additional efforts include providing financial support to political prisoners and their families in Egypt.¹⁵

¹⁰ Tariq Abu al-Saad, “5 Factions and 3 Fronts Competing with Each Other: The Paths of the “Civil War” Within the [Muslim] Brotherhood” [in Arabic], *Al-Ain Al-Akhbariya*, October 17, 2022, available at: <<https://al-ain.com/article/brotherhood-ideas-reunification-group>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

¹¹ “The Current of Change: A New Split Strikes the [Muslim] Brotherhood” [in Arabic], *al-Marsad al-Masri*, October 18, 2022, available at: <<https://marsad.ecss.com.eg/73510>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

¹² “The First Document - The Political Publication” [in Arabic], Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, October 15, 2022, available at: <<https://tinyurl.com/9arkb5d3>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

¹³ “Two [Muslim] Brotherhood TV channels... Why now?” [in Arabic], al-Sharq Al-Awsat, October 23, 2023, <<https://tinyurl.com/mve5mw22>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

¹⁴ “‘Maydan’ a new arm of the [Muslim] Brotherhood for raising terrorists and committing violence” [in Arabic], *Sky news arabia*, October 16, 2022, <<https://tinyurl.com/y7evdxbp>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

¹⁵ “The Nation Voice in the Diaspora – The Egyptians Program Abroad” [in Arabic], Maydan,

Moreover, the Maydan Association seeks to cultivate an alternative leadership capable of assuming power following the anticipated collapse of the military regime. This is pursued through educational and ideological initiatives targeting youth in mosques and students in academic institutions.¹⁶ According to Omar Farouk, a researcher of Islamist movements, the Maydan project is designed to attract fundamentalist and Islamist political factions, particularly members of Salafi movements who currently support President al-Sisi and confer religious legitimacy upon his regime. Farouk notes that members of the Maydan initiative are actively working to establish ties with students—especially those at Al-Azhar University—through encrypted communication platforms, with the goal of developing a grassroots infrastructure to support anti-regime activism.¹⁷

Internal Tensions and Rivalries Within the MB Leadership

Tensions and rivalries among the three factions within the MB leadership are particularly evident in their differing approaches to the issue of political prisoners in Egypt. In July 2022, Ibrahim al-Munir initiated reconciliation talks with the Egyptian regime aimed at securing the release of political detainees. Subsequently, on September 18, 2022, the ‘London Front’ released a document outlining its stance on the matter. The document identified three primary objectives: resolving the issue of political prisoners in Egypt, fostering social reconciliation, and establishing a broad-based national partnership. Hilmi al-Jazzar, head of the MB’s political bureau, stated that the movement would be willing to suspend its political activities for a period of 10 to 15 years in exchange for the release of its imprisoned members and the granting of amnesty.¹⁸ However, the ‘Istanbul Front’ categorically rejected this reconciliation initiative, asserting that it did not represent the position of the broader MB. According to the ‘Istanbul Front’, the Egyptian regime remains illegitimate.¹⁹ The ‘Change Current’ also opposed the reconciliation proposal, maintaining that only a revolutionary movement could secure the release of political prisoners. In November 2024, the movement went further, calling on

March 2, 2025. <<https://tinyurl.com/4rksv6ce>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

¹⁶ “Symbols... Society Pegs, a social icon creation project”, [in Arabic], Maydan, March 2, 2025. <<https://tinyurl.com/2ntryt96>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

¹⁷ Amr Farouk, Facebook, April 11, 2025. <https://tinyurl.com/2eh62dt6>

¹⁸ Ashraf Abd al-Hamid, “The MB sends a message to Egypt: We seek reconciliation, we will abandon politics” [in Arabic], *al-Arabiya*, August 24, 2024, available at: <<https://tinyurl.com/5bf2vawp>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

¹⁹ “Statement by the MB on the political scene in Egypt” [in Arabic], *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*, September 23, 2023, available at: <<https://www.ikhwanonline.com/article/259936>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

its supporters to draw inspiration from Hamas and its offensive against Israel on October 7, 2023, as a model for storming Egyptian prisons and securing the release of detainees.²⁰

Another indication of the rivalry between the ‘London Front’ and the ‘Istanbul Front’ of the MB was Mahmoud Hussein’s directive to halt financial support to certain families of MB detainees held in Egyptian prisons. Hussein, the leader of the ‘Istanbul Front’, justified this decision by claiming that these families were affiliated with the London Front. According to Tariq al-Bishbishi, the ‘London Front’ maintains financial dominance due to its control over investments and revenue generated by international projects affiliated with the MB, as well as financial support from movement-aligned businessmen in Europe—most notably the philanthropist Youssef Nada. Ibrahim Munir, the head of the London Front, reportedly held shares in 17 MB-owned companies operating across Europe and Asia.²¹

The internal rift within the MB leadership and its failure to deal with a series of issues such as the prisoners issue led to the departure of many young people from the movement. At a conference organized by the ‘London Front’ leadership in Istanbul in the summer of 2024, Hilmi al-Jazzar, head of the MB’s political department, admitted that his movement had suffered from a serious crisis that was manifested in the departure of many young people due to dissatisfaction with the leadership’s way of functioning and dealing with issues such as the prisoners issue, and the weak relationship with influential regional powers. In light of this, the leadership outlined a new general vision in 2021 with the aim of pulling the movement out of stagnation. For example, the movement invested resources in restoring advisory and administrative institutions, improving the group’s image, in informational means, and in mediating internal disputes.²²

Many researchers concur that the MB is currently undergoing one of the most critical and destabilizing periods in its history. According to researcher Tharwat al-Kharabawi, the MB’s leadership is grappling with a profound crisis, both in terms of governance and financial stability, which threatens to fragment the movement. He attributes the decline in external funding primarily to the heightened oversight imposed by various regimes on the MB’s financial

²⁰ Michael Barak, “The 7/10 Massacre of Hamas as an Inspiration Model for the “Change Stream” (“Tayyar al-Taghyir”) in the MB”, *ICT*, December 2023, available at: <<https://ict.org.il/the-7-10-massacre-of-hamas-as-an-inspiration-model-for-the-change-stream-in-the-muslim-brotherhood/>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

²¹ Tarek Al-Bashbishi, “The internal struggle of the MB in Egypt descends from the leadership to the field” [in Arabic], *al-Arab*, September 1, 2022, p. 3; Muhammad Al-Hadi, “The [Muslim] Brotherhood leadership writes the last chapter of its life after splitting into two groups” [in Arabic], *Al-Majalla*, December 26, 2021, , available at: <<https://tinyurl.com/y5wkr2pw>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

²² Hilmi al-Jazzar, “The opening speech of the second political forum of the group” [in Arabic], *al-Dawa*. Issue 1, October 2024, pp.22-25.

operations. This increased scrutiny has intensified internal discord, as leaders trade accusations of financial mismanagement and attempts to seize control of the organization's resources. In light of these developments, al-Kharabawi asserts that "the group has lost all real influence over the years, both in Egypt and in the region".²³

The MB's position towards the Egyptian regime

The leadership of the MB opposes the continued existence of the Egyptian regime under Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on three distinct fronts, each adopting a different approach to regime change. The 'London Front' advocates for a conciliatory stance, calling for the renouncement of terrorism and the establishment of a diplomatic channel with the Egyptian regime. In contrast, the 'Istanbul Front' adopts a more ambiguous position, refraining from taking a definitive stance on the use of violence against the regime. Meanwhile, the 'Change Current' espouses a more militant approach, actively supporting the continuation of a revolution against the Egyptian government.

All three factions of the MB leadership consistently accuse the Egyptian regime of perpetrating the massacre of Brotherhood activists in Al-Rabi'a Square in July 2013. For example, in July 2023, the 'London Front's' Information Bureau and Youth Department organized a conference to mark the tenth anniversary of what they termed the "Al-Rabai'a Massacre," with the aim of commemorating the victims.²⁴ In addition to condemning the regime, the Brotherhood also directs criticism at Egypt's religious authorities, whom they accuse of legitimizing the regime's actions. Notably, Hamza Zuba, a Brotherhood member, labeled the Mufti of Egypt, Shawki Allam, the "Mufti of Blood," citing his religious endorsement of the regime's execution of prisoners accused of terrorist activity.²⁵ In his book 'The Straight Path: Milestones to Islamic Liberation', Muhammad Ilhami,²⁶ a member of al-Maydan (affiliated with

²³ Tarwat al-Kharabawi, "The differences between the Brotherhood reflect the collapse of the organization and its loss of any political future", *al-Arab Mubashir*, March 11, 2025, available at: <<https://tinyurl.com/325fyuaw>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

²⁴ "The Information Bureau and the Youth Department Organize a Campaign to Mark the Tenth Anniversary of the Rabaa Massacre" [in Arabic], *Al-Dawa*, Experimental Issue, October 2023, pp. 16-17.

²⁵ The Mufti of Disgrace and not the Mufti of the [Egyptian] Land" [in Arabic], *Hamza Zuba's YouTube*, August 17, 2024, available at: <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ct16OyOXQIA>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

²⁶ Ilhami defines himself as a historian, responsible for the Islamic Movements Research Department at the Egyptian Research Institute, which was established in Istanbul in 2014 by Egyptian exiles from the MB movement. "Erbakan Hodja changed the historical course, Egyptian historian says", *Mili Gazete*, March 16, 2021, available at: <<https://tinyurl.com/3h33jj9a>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

the ‘Change Current’), asserts that the Egyptian regime has lost both religious and popular legitimacy. He contends that the regime no longer represents the interests of the Islamic nation, but rather serves external powers while actively repressing internal opposition. According to Ilhami, the regime’s collaboration with foreign actors—particularly Western governments—aims to preserve its authority at the expense of national and Islamic interests. Consequently, he calls for the Islamic nation to awaken and resist by strengthening Islamic identity, challenging corrupt elites, and empowering the populace to reclaim their freedoms.²⁷

In Western Europe, a pattern of collaboration has emerged between the MB and radical left-wing activists, particularly with the aim of pressuring Western politicians to advocate for the release of political prisoners held by the Egyptian regime. For instance, MB activists in Austria have engaged in cooperative efforts with Michael Probsting, an Austrian leftist who identifies as a Marxist-Leninist. On August 30, 2020, Probsting appeared in an interview on Al-Watan TV, a media outlet affiliated with the MB, to commemorate the anniversary of the “Al-Rabi’a Massacre.”²⁸

Politicization of the Palestinian issue and the 7/10 massacre

All three wings of the MB place significant emphasis on the Palestinian issue, motivated by ideological commitment, the belief that the conflict constitutes a religious struggle against the West, and the strategic objective of expanding political influence. On October 8, 2023, Hilmi al-Jazzar, a representative of the ‘London Front’, announced the formation of a central committee tasked with monitoring developments related to the Palestinian cause—specifically the Tufan al-Aqsa war—with the aim of providing support to the Palestinian people across political, grassroots, financial, media, and cultural domains.²⁹ Similarly, Suhayb Abd al-Maqsud, the MB’s media spokesperson affiliated with the ‘London Front’, declared at the Islamic World Youth Forum in Istanbul (October 18-20, 2024) that the movement bears a duty to support Palestinian resistance against Israel through the provision of weapons, financial resources, and even personnel.³⁰

²⁷ Muhammad Ilhami, *The Straight Path: Milestones to Islamic Liberation* [in Arabic], Istanbul: Maydan, 2025.

²⁸ “International conference entitled ‘The Rabia and Nahda Massacres: A Crime Awaiting Investigation’”, *Watan TV Youtube*, August 20, 2020, available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pNy2Y_5RoBg> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

²⁹ Hilmi al-Jazzar, “The opening speech of the second political forum of the group” [in Arabic], *al-Dawa*. Issue 1, October 2024, pp. 22-25.

³⁰ Suhayb Abd al-Maqsud, “Speech of the [Muslim] Brothers at the Islamic World Youth Forum” [in Arabic], *Al-Dawa*, Issue 1, October 2024, pp. 26-28.

Salah Abd al-Haq, leader of the ‘London Front’, asserted that the war in Gaza has revealed what he described as the inherent injustice and cruelty of Western civilization, in contrast to the values of justice and mercy that characterize Islam. He urged Muslim nations to provide support to the Palestinian people and emphasized that the eventual fall of Israel is inevitable, framing it as a divine promise articulated in the Quran.³¹

In its 2022 ideological manifest, the ‘Change Current’ identified the Palestinian issue as a central cause for the Muslim nation. The manifest emphasized that every Muslim bears a religious obligation to participate in the jihad and resistance against Israel, with the stated goal of liberating the Al-Aqsa Mosque, other Islamic holy sites, and all of historic Palestine—from Nahariya to Eilat. It further asserted the need to protect Palestinians from Israeli policies, particularly efforts to Judaize Jerusalem. Additionally, the ‘Change Current’ called for an end to normalization between Israel and Muslim-majority regimes in any way, advocating for the MB to play a central role in mobilizing Islamic and Arab communities worldwide in support of the Palestinian cause.³²

The October 7 attack carried out by Hamas was described by the ‘Current of Change’ as a heroic act of resistance against Israel, one that should persist until the entirety of Palestine is liberated. According to the group, while Palestinians face isolation, their faith in God and hope for victory can shift the balance against the Zionists, despite limited resources and severe hardship. The group drew a parallel to the companions of the Prophet Muhammad in Medina, noting that they too endured adversity but ultimately prevailed. It further asserted that “armed resistance is the only viable path to liberate the land and the sacred sites [in Palestine] from an adversary that understands only the language of war and responds solely to force. We urge all Muslims to continue supporting the resistance and to strengthen their resolve against aggression by every possible means.”³³

Muhammad Ilhami, a figure affiliated with the ‘Current of Change’, additionally argued that the West—particularly the United States—is using Israel to pursue colonial objectives and reinforce Western hegemony in the Middle East. He contended that these so-called “Crusaders” are actively bolstering Israel and seeking to displace Arab inhabitants from Palestine.³⁴

³¹ Salah Abd al-Haq, A televised address by Dr. Salah Abdel Haq to the peoples and rulers of the Islamic nation: The Gaza Call, *al-Ikhawn al-Muslimin* [in Arabic], March 29, 2024, available at: <<https://ikhwan.site/p-222860>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

³² “The First Document - The Political Publication” [in Arabic], Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, October 15, 2022, available at: <<https://tinyurl.com/9arkb5d3>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

³³ Barak, “The 7/10 Massacre of Hamas as an Inspiration Model for the “Change Stream” (“Tayyar al-Taghyir”) in the MB”.

³⁴ Muhammad Ilhami, *A Short Story of Palestine and Zionism: From the Roots of Zionism to the Al-Aqsa Flood* [in Arabic], Istanbul: Maydan, 2025, pp. 287-292.

On December 23, 2024, the ‘Istanbul Front’ convened a conference in Istanbul to commemorate Youssef Nada, a prominent philanthropist and influential figure within the MB. The event was attended by senior members of the MB as well as representatives from the Hamas movement. During the conference, Muhammad Nazal, a member of Hamas’s political bureau, suggested that the Syrian rebels’ efforts to liberate Damascus from the Assad regime could foreshadow the impending liberation of Jerusalem. He drew a historical parallel to the Muslim military leader Saladin al-Ayyubi, who, after liberating Jerusalem from the Crusaders, used it as a strategic base to advance toward the liberation of Damascus two years later.³⁵

The Battle of Al-Aqsa Flood (Tufan al-Aqsa) as a Strategic Turning Point

In October 2023, the ‘London Front’ relaunched its magazine *al-Dawa*, which had originally been published in Egypt from the early 1950s until it was banned by the regime of Gamal Abd al-Nasr. The timing of the magazine’s revival is notable, given its proximity to the Hamas-led attack on October 7. In the opening article, the editor-in-chief emphasized that the magazine’s mission is to defend Islamic identity and values against perceived distortions and attacks on the Islamic faith, continuing the work previously undertaken on behalf of the “Generations of Islamic Awakening.”³⁶

The leader of the ‘London Front’, Salah Abd al-Haqq, dedicated his article in the first issue of *al-Dawa* to the Palestinian issue. In his view, the October 7 massacre was justified and should be seen as a natural response to the siege and oppression imposed by the Zionists on Gaza.³⁷ In another article published in *al-Dawa* a year later, in October 2024, he described the al-Aqsa Flood operation as “a turning point in the jihad against the Zionist enemy, and in the nation’s capacity for renewal—emerging from weakness into strength and determination. [The operation] serves as an educational model of faith, action, jihad, and preparation, embodying an inspiring path that revives the way of the believing generation [...]”³⁸

According to him, the campaign in Gaza reflects a global process of

³⁵ “Speech by Mohammed Nazzal, member of the Political Bureau of Hamas, at the funeral of Professor Youssef Nada, may God have mercy on him” [in Arabic], *The Muslim Brothers’ YouTube*, January 1, 2025. available at: <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lpbTTYt2xgY>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

³⁶ “The Magazine *al-Dawa* is renewed with a new vision [in Arabic], *al-Dawa*, Experimental Issue, October 2023, pp. 4–5.

³⁷ Salah Abd al-Haqq, “On al-Aqsa Flood”, *al-Dawa*, Experimental Issue, October 2023, pp.6-7.

³⁸ Salah Abd al-Haqq, “Al-Aqsa Flood... Landmarks and Obligations” [in Arabic], *al-Dawa*, Issue 1, October 2024, pp. 4-8.

cultivating a new generation of Muslim activists—committed to resisting the Israeli narrative, identifying with the Palestinian cause, and willing to sacrifice themselves for their ideals. He believes that the continuation of this trend will contribute to undermining Israel's relations with other states and to severing the foreign aid it receives. Considering this, Abd al-Haqq argues that efforts must be made to escalate the resistance, intensify demonstrations, and increase grassroots pressure on governments to act against Israel.³⁹

Hamza Zuba, a member of the MB and former spokesperson for the Freedom and Justice Party, identifies four key insights derived from the ongoing campaign in Gaza:

1. First, he asserts that the conflict is a war of survival rather than a dispute over borders. According to Zuba, the Flood operation represents the most significant disaster experienced by the Zionists since the Holocaust, successfully dismantling the myth of the Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) invincibility.
2. Second, he argues that the campaign demonstrates the superior effectiveness of popular resistance compared to traditional state armies in the struggle against Israel. The Flood operation, he claims, revealed that Arab armies are limited in their capabilities, functioning primarily in economic and political domains, and lacking the capacity to respond to public outrage. He describes this as an existential conflict between Palestinians and Zionists dating back to the 1930s, in which he believes ultimate victory for Muslims is assured. Zuba emphasizes that the resistance has managed to inflict substantial losses on the enemy using relatively simple means—comparable to the actions of the Houthis against Saudi Arabia.
3. Third, he maintains that the resistance has outperformed the Zionist enemy in the realm of propaganda. Israeli efforts to frame the narrative surrounding the events of October 7 have, in his view, failed, while the slogan "Long Live Palestine" has gained global resonance. He contends that the resistance's messaging has successfully shifted international public opinion, particularly within Western societies, influencing discourse in institutions such as the White House, the U.S. Congress, and major universities in both the United States and the United Kingdom.
4. Fourth, Zuba claims that the Flood operation has exposed and discredited religious scholars aligned with political rulers, highlighting what he sees as their hypocrisy and moral fragility.⁴⁰

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Hamza Zuba, "Year of Al-Tufan.. The Four Most Important Facts" [in Arabic], *al-Dawa*, Issue

Wasfi Ashur Abu Zayd, affiliated with the ‘London Front’, contends that the Flood Operation significantly improved the global standing of the Islamic movement, enabling it to emerge from a prolonged period of crisis triggered by the aftermath of the Arab Spring, military coups, and broader geopolitical developments such as the Russia–Ukraine war. According to him, the Flood Operation marked a turning point, halting the decline of the Islamic movement. It revitalized the Palestinian cause—which had been relegated to the periphery of international attention—and reinforced a sense of unity and religious obligation among Muslims regarding the Palestinian struggle. In his view, the Flood Operation also highlighted a global decline in popular support for Israel, as reflected in student-led protests across Western countries. He suggests that this shift may pave the way for a new generation of political leadership aligned with the interests of Muslims and Islam, while the older generation of leaders who have historically supported Israel is losing influence. Another key achievement, according to him, is the interruption of efforts toward normalization with Israel and the prevention of the Judaization of Jerusalem.⁴¹

Arab regimes as an obstacle to the liberation of Palestine

Since October 7, the leadership of the MB has increasingly accused Arab regimes of abandoning the Palestinian people and leaving them vulnerable to Israeli actions in pursuit of narrow, utilitarian interests. In doing so, they challenge the legitimacy of these regimes—particularly Egypt and Jordan, which maintain peace agreements with Israel—and aim to raise public consciousness within Arab societies about the perceived need for regime change as a prerequisite for strengthening the Muslim world.

While both the London Front and the Istanbul Front criticize Arab governments for their neglect of the Palestinian cause, the ‘Current of Change’ adopts a more radical stance, explicitly advocating for the violent overthrow of these regimes.

In March 2024, Salah Abd al-Haqq, leader of the ‘London Front’, expressed disappointment over the limited involvement of Arab states—particularly Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan—in the war in Gaza. He specifically urged Egypt to open the Rafah crossing to alleviate the humanitarian suffering of Gaza’s residents and called on Muslim nations more broadly to support the Palestinian cause. According to Abd al-Haqq, the downfall of Israel is only a

1, October 2024, pp. 29-31.

⁴¹ Wasfi Ashur Abu Zaid, “The Great Civilizational Meanings Achieved from the al-Aqsa Flood” [in Arabic], *al-Dawa*, Issue 1, October 2024, pp. 36-40.

matter of time, as it is, in his view, a divine promise articulated in the Quran. Therefore, he argues, Muslims should be encouraged to participate in the struggle against Israel.⁴² Wasfi Ashur Abu Zayd, affiliated with the ‘London Front’, emphasized that the Arab countries neighboring Israel should have been the first to support their Palestinian brothers. However, he argued, not only did these countries fail to provide such support, but they also betrayed the Palestinians and conspired with the enemy against them.⁴³

Hamza Zuba, a MB member mocked President al-Sisi after the latter suggested that Israel evacuate Gazans to the Negev, stating: “This reflects the superficial thinking of a man who is supposed to be a military leader, yet believes that the strength of the enemy’s army can defeat the resistance”.⁴⁴ In February 2025, the ‘Istanbul Front’ accused Israel of planning to forcibly evacuate Palestinians from Gaza and relocate them to Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. According to the group, this alleged strategy is part of a broader effort to destabilize Egypt by creating financial strain, displacing local Sinai residents, and obstructing the region’s reconstruction efforts.⁴⁵

In April 2025, the ‘Istanbul Front’ criticized the Egyptian regime for its apparent willingness to accept Israel’s conditions to end the fighting in Gaza in exchange for the disarmament of the Palestinian resistance. According to the group, such an agreement revealed the “ugly face” of the Egyptian regime and posed a threat to Egypt’s national security. The ‘Istanbul Front’ asserted that the Egyptian people could only remove the dishonor brought upon the country by actively working to overthrow the regime, which, in their view, continues to undermine national interests and sell off the country’s resources. Only then, they argued, could Egypt regain its stature and reclaim its role as a leading force in the liberation of Palestine.⁴⁶ In December 2024, Mahmoud Hussein, published a manifesto condemning Arab rulers for their alliance with Israel. He argued that salvation for the Palestinians would come not from these regimes, but from the Arab and Muslim peoples, who, in his view, have become increasingly aware of their leaders’ betrayal and abandonment of the

⁴² Salah Abd al-Haqq, “A televised address by Dr. Salah Abdel Haq to the peoples and rulers of the Islamic nation: The Gaza Call” [in Arabic, *al-Ikhawn al-Muslimin*], March 29, 2024, available at: <<https://ikhwan.site/p-222860>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

⁴³ Wasfi Abu Ashur Abu Zayd, “After the ceasefire agreement was announced... Did Gaza win?” [in Arabic], al-Shuhud Al-Hadhari Center, January 19, 2025, available at: <<https://tinyurl.com/2ftscnym>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

⁴⁴ Hamza Zuba, “Year of Al-Tufan.. The Four Most Important Facts” [in Arabic], Al-Dawah, Issue 1, October 2024, pp. 29-31.

⁴⁵ “MB: The Palestinian people and our Islamic nation will not pass the Deal of the Century!” [in Arabic], *al-Ikhawn al-Muslimin*, February 25, 2025, available at: <<https://ikhwanonline.com/article/266751>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

⁴⁶ “MB: Passing the occupation’s demands to disarm the resistance is a crime against the nation” [in Arabic], *al-Ikhawn al-Muslimin*, April 15, 2025, available at: <<https://ikhwanonline.com/article/267866>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

Palestinian resistance. Hussein called on the public to provide unwavering material and moral support to the resistance, to raise awareness of the Palestinian cause across all forums, to exert pressure on governments to halt normalization efforts with Israel, and to intensify economic boycotts against all those who support the occupying entity.⁴⁷

According to the “Current of Change,” the battle in Gaza has exposed the true nature of Arab regimes, revealing their willingness to cooperate with what the group refers to as the “Jewish-Crusader alliance” in the destruction of the Palestinian people—evident in their silence and failure to provide meaningful assistance. The movement specifically accused the Egyptian regime of complicity in what it characterizes as a Palestinian genocide, citing Egypt’s refusal to open the Rafah crossing to refugees from Gaza. On November 14, 2023, members of the Current of Change, led by Muhammad Muntasir, held a demonstration in front of the Egyptian consulate in Turkey to demand the opening of the crossing and the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip. In the movement’s view, a necessary precondition for the liberation of all of Palestine is, first and foremost, the overthrow of the authoritarian, pro-Western Arab regimes. To this end, it asserts that Muslims are religiously obligated to reignite revolutionary movements across the Islamic world.⁴⁸

Muhammad Ilhami, a member of al-Maydan—an organization affiliated with the ‘Current of Change’—accused Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE of betraying the Palestinian cause. He alleged that these countries assisted Israel in transporting goods by sea and land in the wake of Houthi attacks on merchant vessels in the Red Sea. Ilhami further claimed that these regimes were not even hesitant to publicly express their desire to see Hamas eliminated, while Egypt and Jordan, in particular, were actively working to secure and protect Israel’s borders.⁴⁹

According to Ilhami, Arab regimes—particularly that of Egypt—represent a significant obstacle to the liberation of Palestine and must therefore be removed from power. He argues that normalization between Israel and the Arab world significantly slowed during the twentieth century due to the assassinations of King Abdullah of Jordan and President Anwar Sadat of Egypt. In his view, if Muslim populations fail to act against what he describes as traitorous rulers, they will face severe consequences: the fall of Gaza, the potential destruction

⁴⁷ Mahmud Hussein, *al-Ikhawn al-Muslimin* [in Arabic], December 1, 2024, available at: <<https://ikhwanonline.com/article/265653>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

⁴⁸ Barak, “The 7/10 Massacre of Hamas as an Inspiration Model for the “Change Stream” (“Tayyar al-Taghyir”) in the MB”.

⁴⁹ Muhammad Ilhami, *A Short Story of Palestine and Zionism: From the Roots of Zionism to the Al-Aqsa Flood* [in Arabic], Istanbul: Maydan, 2025, p. 272.

of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the continued expansion of Israeli control over Muslim lands, and the spread of humiliation and poverty to such an extent that Muslim women may be reduced to servitude under Islam's adversaries. Ilhami concludes that if it is not possible to depose a Muslim ruler through peaceful means such as elections, or through violent means such as coups and revolutions, then alternative, more sneaky methods must be employed to reach and remove those in power.⁵⁰

Ilhami argues that the key to the liberation of Palestine lies in regime change in pivotal Arab states—specifically Jordan, Egypt, and Syria—and in the establishment of an Islamic state that would actively support this goal. However, he acknowledges several significant obstacles to achieving this objective, including Israel's advanced weaponry and superior air power. To counter these challenges, he advocates for the resistance to acquire deterrent capabilities, including the development or acquisition of chemical warheads for use with missiles, drones, and mortars, which he claims could inflict substantial damage and have a significant psychological and strategic impact on the enemy.⁵¹

In April 2025, the 'Current of Change' accused the Jordanian regime of having forfeited its honor, capitulated, and aligned itself with the enemies of Islam following its decision to outlaw the MB movement in Jordan. This decision came in the wake of the arrest of several MB activists, who were accused of endangering national security by attempting to smuggle weapons into the country. According to the movement, the primary obstacle to the resistance and the liberation of Palestine is the Arab regimes themselves. As such, it argues that "confrontation with these regimes has become an inevitable strategic necessity," asserting that the youth of Islamic movements—particularly in Jordan—must take on the responsibility of opposing the ruling authorities.⁵²

"The War of Fatwas"

Since October 7, there has been a marked increase in the issuance of religious rulings (fatwas) by clerics affiliated with the MB, providing religious justification for Hamas's armed struggle against Israel. These rulings assert

⁵⁰ "The way to save Gaza is to overthrow the treacherous regimes" [in Turkish], *Mepa News*, February 19, 2024, available at: <<https://www.mepanews.com/gazzevi-kurtarmanin-yolu-hain-rejimlerin-devrilmesinden-geciyor-14203yy.htm>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

⁵¹ Muhammad Ilhami, *A Short Story of Palestine and Zionism: From the Roots of Zionism to the Al-Aqsa Flood* [in Arabic], Istanbul: Maydan, 2025, p.299-301.

⁵² *The Current of Chang's Facebook*, April 24, 2025, available at: <<https://www.facebook.com/ikhwanalexandria.official/posts/pfbid0kdxB3QX9REY8TtBHoVJYz32xiw7aTLHKz7dNTAA7sCKZZniQkqH2be6suTtAYAWPI>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

that the obligation of jihad against Israel constitutes a personal religious duty (*fard 'ayn*) for every Muslim worldwide, particularly for those residing in neighbouring countries. Notable in this context are the World Association of Muslim Scholars,⁵³ affiliated with the MB and based in Qatar, and the Palestinian Scholars Association, linked to the Brotherhood's network in Turkey.⁵⁴

On April 26, 2025, Wasfi Abu Zayd, affiliated with the 'London Front', in collaboration with the Palestine Scholars Committee, announced the establishment of a religious charter intended to articulate the religious obligation of Arab regimes and Muslims to support the Palestinian armed struggle. The charter emphasized the duty to participate in jihad against Israel until the Islamic holy sites in Palestine are liberated.⁵⁵ Members of the 'Istanbul Front' also voiced their support for a religious ruling (fatwa) issued by the World Association of Muslim Scholars, which called upon the militaries of Arab and Muslim-majority countries—particularly those neighbouring Israel, including Egypt—to engage in defensive jihad against Israel.⁵⁶

In Egypt, such religious rulings are poorly received and are perceived as a threat to the stability of the regime, particularly since they are issued by institutions and scholars affiliated with the MB. In response, religious authorities aligned with the regime promote an apologetic discourse aimed at defending its policies.

On April 7, 2025, Dar al-Iftaa, an official Islamic legal authority in Egypt responsible for issuing fatwas, strongly criticized a recent ruling issued by the World Union of Muslim Scholars—without explicitly naming the organization—asserting that it contradicts the principles of Sharia. Dar al-Iftaa emphasized that only a legitimate ruler or state has the authority to declare war, not an unauthorized entity such as the aforementioned union. It further stated that Islamic law cautions against hasty decisions that disregard

⁵³ The World Union of Muslim Scholars is a radical Islamic organization based in Qatar with branches in Turkey and Tunisia. The organization was founded in 2004 by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who is considered a leading and influential Islamic jurist in the Muslim world. The organization brings together religious scholars affiliated with Muslim gods and other sects such as Salafists. For the organization's website, see: <https://iumsonline.org/>

⁵⁴ The Palestine Scholars Committee is a religious umbrella organization, founded in 2009 and located in Istanbul, Turkey. Although it is not an official organization of the MB, it maintains ideological and personal ties with members of the MB and Hamas. For the organization's website, see: <https://palscholars.org/>

⁵⁵ "Announcement of the Launch of the Sages of the Nation's Scroll on the Al-Aqsa Flood and Its Implications." [in Arabic], Hayat al-Ulama of Palestine, April 26, 2025 <<https://tinyurl.com/2pp8p5bf>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

⁵⁶ "Fatwa of the Ijtihad and Fatwa Committee of the International Union of Muslim Scholars regarding the continuation of the aggression on Gaza and the cessation of the truce", *International Union of Muslim Scholars*, March 28, 2025, available at: <<https://www.iumsonline.org/ar/ContentDetails.aspx?ID=38808>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025]; "The International Union of Muslim Scholars issues a fatwa urging the mobilization of Islamic armies to rescue Gaza.", *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*, April 4, 2025, available at: <<https://ikhwanonline.com/article/267693/>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

the public interest and risk causing significant harm to the nation and society. The statement concluded by underscoring that “whoever calls for jihad must, first and foremost, lead from the front lines [of the fighters], just as the Prophet Muhammad led his battles”.⁵⁷

Al-Dawa al-Salafiya, one of the largest Salafi movements in Egypt—led by Sheikh Yassir al-Burhami and traditionally considered a rival of the MB—also strongly condemned the religious rulings issued by the World Union of Muslim Scholars. Al-Burhami has repeatedly asserted that a war between Egypt and Israel is religiously prohibited due to the peace treaty between the two states. He criticized the Qatari-based jurists affiliated with the MB, suggesting that if they wish to implement their rulings on jihad against Israel, they should relocate to Lebanon or Syria—states that do not maintain peace treaties with Israel.⁵⁸

Sheikh Sharif Taha, a Salafi scholar and member of al-Dawa al-Salafiya, similarly ruled that Egypt is forbidden from engaging in jihad against Israel so long as the peace agreement remains in effect. According to him, although Israel has violated the treaty by deploying military forces along the Philadelphia axis, this violation is partial, and Egypt too bears responsibility for its implementation. Therefore, the treaty remains valid and binding. He further emphasized that maintaining the peace agreement serves Egypt’s national interest.⁵⁹ Taha also rejected the Muslim Brotherhood’s campaign of delegitimization against the Egyptian regime, arguing that it is both religiously impermissible and politically destabilizing. He stated that labeling the regime as infidel for not providing military support to the Palestinian cause reflects a radical and uninformed stance. In his view, such rhetoric manipulates the Palestinian issue to advance internal political agendas and incite unrest in Muslim-majority states. He concluded that Muslims must recognize the paramount importance of preserving the security and stability of their countries.⁶⁰

Similarly, Abd al-Mun‘im al-Shahhat, another senior figure in al-Dawa al-Salafiya, argued that Jordan is likewise religiously prohibited from engaging in military action against Israel due to its peace treaty. He criticized the MB in

⁵⁷ The Egyptian Dar al-Iftaa – Media Center’s Facebook, April 7, 2025, available at: <https://www.facebook.com/EgyptDarAlIftaMedia/posts/pfbid09naqtQL5RW3VKuZuBkqM23omS3Mc1VrGeeG3QsnQkTUDUWsRfgoN1zDiaMK4GAjj8l>, [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

⁵⁸ Yasir Burhami’s Facebook [in Arabic], April 6, 2025, available at: <<https://www.facebook.com/reel/1375484626978091>>, <<https://www.facebook.com/yasserborhamy/videos/1040890864572849/>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

⁵⁹ Sharif Ta, “A calm discussion on the Camp David Accords, support for Gaza citizens, and some recent issues,” [in Arabic]. *Ana Salafi- al-Dawa al-Salafiyya’s Facebook*, April 15, 2025, available at: <<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1219496879776842>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

⁶⁰ Ahmed Said, “Sharif Taha warned against exploiting the Palestinian cause and said: ‘The silence of some scholars regarding the truth, for fear of a public backlash, brought disappointment and disaster to the Islamic movement’” [in Arabic], al-Fatah, April 7, 2025. available at: <<https://tinyurl.com/2f7bzbyy>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

Jordan for launching drone attacks and other operations in compliance with the Qatari International Union of Muslim Scholars's rulings, contending that such actions violate the peace agreement and contravene the principles of Sharia.⁶¹

Conclusions and Summary

The Muslim Brotherhood's leadership suffers from internal divisions and a lack of cohesive direction. Nevertheless, this organizational weakness does not prevent the movement from advancing a narrative that portrays the Islamist camp as victorious over the perceived enemies of Islam, including Israel and the West. This portrayal is often framed through the emergence of a new Islamist generation, characterized by strong religious conviction, dedication to jihad, and a willingness to sacrifice for the sake of Islam.

Wasfi Ashur Abu Zaid, a MB member associated with the 'London Front', has acknowledged that the war of October 7 rescued the Islamist movement after years of stagnation. He notably crowned the "Al-Aqsa Flood" as one of the most significant and commendable campaigns in Islamic history, comparing it to seminal Muslim victories such as the Battle of Badr against the Quraysh and the Battle of Hittin led by Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi against the Crusaders.⁶²

The propagation of this narrative casts Arab regimes in a negative light, depicting them as utilitarian, self-serving entities that neglect the Palestinian cause and cooperate with external actors to suppress the Hamas movement. Furthermore, these regimes are accused of failing to recognize the shifting geopolitical landscape that has emerged in the aftermath of the October 7 events. Consequently, from the Muslim Brotherhood's perspective, these regimes constitute a major impediment to the liberation of Palestine, and the proposed solution lies in their replacement.

While factions such as the 'London and Istanbul Fronts' reject the use of violence to achieve political change, the so-called "Change Current" promotes a radical Qutbist ideology. This approach advocates for the assassination of Arab rulers and the establishment of alternative governance structures that would ostensibly reflect the will of the Muslim people.

It remains uncertain whether the Muslim Brotherhood can rehabilitate its image and regain influence, despite its unwavering support for the Palestinian cause. The movement's internal fragmentation, alongside opposition from

⁶¹ "Jordanian Events in Light of the Statements of Al-Dawa Al-Salafiya - The International Union of Muslim Scholars - The [Muslim] Brotherhood in Jordan" [in Arabic], *al-Fatah*, April 17, 2025, available at: <<https://tinyurl.com/4xdwbh97>> [Last accessed 30 April 2025].

⁶² Wasfi Ashur Abu Zaid, "The Great Civilizational Meanings Achieved from the al-Aqsa Flood" [in Arabic], *al-Dawa*, Issue 1, October 2024, pp. 36-40.

other religious authorities—such as Egypt’s Salafist movement, which challenges both its religious and political legitimacy—continues to undermine its cohesion. Moreover, as long as the Brotherhood is perceived as serving the interests of foreign powers such as Turkey and Qatar, it will likely face ongoing difficulties in restoring its relationships with Arab regimes and reclaiming its standing within the broader Arab political sphere.

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