

HASER

**REVISTA INTERNACIONAL
DE FILOSOFÍA APLICADA**

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Número 7, 2016

“Haser” combina los verbos “hacer” y “ser”. Su acentuación es aguda. El término apunta a la siguiente prescripción: “haz lo que eres y sé lo que haces”, es decir, una suerte de imperativo existencial: “haz de ser eso que haces” o, como sentenciaba Píndaro, “¡Hazte el que eres!”. Se funda en la evidencia de que toda acción se encuentra impregnada por el modo de ser de aquel que la realiza.

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ESTUDIOS

ARTICLES

DA FILOSOFIA APLICADA À FORMAÇÃO E DESENVOLVIMENTO PROFISSIONAL DE PROFESSORES EM PORTUGAL¹

FROM PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE TO TRAINING AND PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT IN PORTUGAL

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Resumo: Este artigo caracteriza o movimento da Consultoria Filosófica em Portugal. Identifica Jorge Humberto Dias como fundador do movimento, analisando a sua conceção de consulta filosófica. Sugere uma linha orientadora para uma investigação futura que nos permita conceber, a partir da Filosofia Aplicada, nos métodos e nas competências, na Orientação Filosófica, um programa de formação e desenvolvimento profissional para professores.

Palavras-Chave: Orientação Filosófica em Portugal, Jorge Humberto Dias, orientador filosófico, competência filosófica, método PROJECT@.

Abstract: This paper characterizes the movement of Philosophical Counseling in Portugal. Identifies Jorge Humberto Dias as the founder of the movement, analyzing its conception of philosophical consultation. Suggests a guideline for a future research that allows us to design, from the Applied Philosophy, in the methods and skills, in Philosophical Orientation, a program to teachers training and professional development.

¹ Este texto insere-se num projeto de investigação pessoal iniciado com a frequência do Nível I do Programa Individual de Formação e Certificação em Consultoria Filosófica - PIFEC na modalidade *e-learning* em março de 2012, ministrado por Jorge Humberto Dias, PhD, Diretor do Gabinete PROJECT@ - Consultoria Filosófica, Quarteira, Portugal. Podemos encontrar informação relativa ao Programa PIFEC na página web do Gabinete, a saber: <http://gabinete-project.blogspot.pt/> (último acesso em março de 2014). O presente texto fará parte do nosso livro sobre História da Filosofia Aplicada em Portugal, na especificidade da sua aplicação à pessoa em consulta, em preparação.

Keywords: Philosophical Counseling in Portugal, Jorge Humberto Dias, philosophical counselor, philosophical skill, method PROJECT@

Introdução

A pertinência da nossa investigação radica em dois vetores. O primeiro respeita à não existência de um texto que sintetize as ideias, os factos e os pressupostos da Consultoria Filosófica em Portugal e possa contribuir, filosoficamente, para a problematização epistemológica deste subdomínio no nosso país.

Em Portugal a Filosofia Aplicada emergiu em 2004, como projeto sólido e transdisciplinar, na consciência da importância significativa, da Filosofia, como um todo, para a vida pessoal e institucional, estruturado numa organização profissional associativa² que no momento atual mais se identifica com o

² A primeira associação portuguesa de Filosofia Aplicada nasceu em 2004: Associação Portuguesa de Aconselhamento Ético e Filosófico (APAEF). Os primeiros anos de atividade desta associação foram de grande ambição e fulgor, concretizados em vários cursos de formação pelo país e quatro congressos que trouxeram a Portugal profissionais e investigadores internacionais da área, para o debate aberto e crítico sobre o estatuto epistemológico da Filosofia Aplicada: o primeiro na Universidade Nova de Lisboa, em 2005, onde estiveram presentes como oradores José Barrientos Rastrojo e Gabriel Arnaiz (Universidade de Sevilla), Rayda Guzman (Universidade de Barcelona), Oscar Brenifier (Institute de Pratiques Philosophiques); o segundo decorreu na Universidade da Beira Interior e foi dedicado à Filosofia para Crianças; o terceiro decorreu na Faculdade de Economia e Gestão da Universidade Católica do Porto, onde esteve Lou Marinoff (City College of New York) e o quarto, realizou-se em Faro e, do estrangeiro, estiveram presentes, por exemplo, José Olímpio (Universidade Estadual do Maranhão) e Lara Ferraz (Universidade Católica de Petrópolis). Nos primeiros quatro anos de existência, a APAEF estabeleceu parcerias com várias instituições portuguesas, a saber: Instituto Piaget, Centro de Formação de Professores de Faro e Vila Galé Hóteis; foi patrocinada pela Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT), pela empresa Delta Cafés e, por um dos maiores grupos empresariais portugueses: SONAE, Modelo – Continente; foi apoiada pela Universidade Nova de Lisboa, pela Universidade da Beira Interior, pelo Instituto Português da Juventude, pela Faculdade de Economia e Gestão da Universidade Católica do Porto, pela Comissão nacional da UNESCO, pela Direção Geral de Inovação e Desenvolvimento Curricular, pela Editora Dinalivro, Editora Ésquilo, Editora Porto Editora, entre outros. As atas destes congressos realizados em Portugal estão publicadas

silêncio inoperante do que com o fulgor dos pioneiros. Este vetor traduz a nossa vontade para construir um caminho de aprofundamento teórico enquadrado, academicamente, do qual este artigo representa uma primeira aproximação.

O segundo vetor assera o reconhecimento da prática filosófica de Jorge Humberto Dias e, do mesmo modo, as múltiplas possibilidades da filosofia aplicada aos problemas e necessidades filosóficas da sociedade atual:

La aplicación de la Filosofía puede ser hecha en los más variados contextos: espacios sociales, sistema educativo, gestión empresarial, animación cultural, formación profesional, intervención comunitaria, administración política, liderato deportivo y tantos otros³.

O artigo compõe-se por uma secção única, dividido em duas sub-secções. Nesta secção: *Orientação Filosófica em Portugal* começamos por caracterizar o movimento no nosso país. Na primeira sub-secção: *Prática Filosófica profissional segundo Jorge Humberto Dias*, analisamos a conceção de consulta do filósofo e, em seguida: *Desvios à Filosofia como matriz fundante na Orientação Filosófica* discutimos os contributos que em nosso entender, são relevantes na área, porém incertos quanto a assentar na Filosofia o âmago da consulta. Em *Considerações Finais*, apresentamos as linhas orientadoras para uma investigação futura que possa definir um programa de formação profissional, a partir da Filosofia Aplicada, para professores do ensino básico e secundário, mostrando que traduzir competências filosóficas num programa educacional para professores significará, necessariamente, a legitimação da Orientação Filosófica como pedra basilar da pedagogia, num mundo pluridimensional, onde as

pela APAEF sob organização de Jorge Dias.

³ DIAS, Jorge Humberto: “La Consulta Filosófica Según Jorge Dias”, en RASTROJO BARRIENTOS, José e DIAS, Jorge Humberto: *Idea y Proyecto. La arquitectura de la vida*, Vision Libros, Madrid, 2010, p. 239

categorias clássicas de objetividade e generalidade perdem atenção de resposta.

Orientação Filosófica em Portugal

Nesta secção começamos por definir os conceitos de Filosofia Aplicada e Orientação Filosófica, segundo Jorge Humberto Dias, patriarca do movimento de Filosofia Aplicada em Portugal. Em seguida, apresentamos a sua conceção de consulta filosófica. Por fim, analisamos os contributos de autores portugueses que se nos afiguram como desviantes quanto à fundamentação da teoria e, da metodologia, da Orientação Filosófica na própria Filosofia.

Prática Filosófica profissional segundo Jorge Humberto Dias

A Filosofia Aplicada é a utilização do *corpus* teórico da história da filosofia para empreender projetos de âmbito social e pessoal⁴.

A consultoria filosófica, por sua vez, é uma valência da filosofia aplicada que se constitui para trabalhar a “compreensão na vida das pessoas com o objetivo de dissolver os seus problemas e/ou conflitos (...) todo o trabalho filosófico realizado na consulta baseia-se na exploração racional do pensamento consciente, sobre a perspetiva e/ou sobre a vida do consultante⁵

Para Dias a Orientação Filosófica tem um objeto: o problema do consultante. E, um meio, o caminho através do qual se procura compreender, racionalmente, em níveis de aproximação, por via do uso de determinadas técnicas e operacionalização de competências

⁴ DIAS, Jorge Humberto: *O contributo de Julián Márias para uma teoria da filosofia aplicada à questão da felicidade*, tese de doutoramento, Faculdade Ciências Sociais e Humanas, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2013, p. 299, no prelo

⁵ Idem

a “filosofia de vida” do cliente: um método. E, uma finalidade: a felicidade do cliente. Dias concebe um processo de fundamentação teórico da Orientação Filosófica, principalmente, na sua dimensão metodológica, baseada no estudo qualitativo, sistemático e crítico da obra de Julián Marías. Explora a filosofia de Julián Marías na consideração de um paradigma “raciofelicitário” personalista que na sua visão é adequado tanto para a fundamentação teórica da Orientação Filosófica, como para o método que orienta o trabalho do consultor e visa alcançar o principal objetivo da vida pessoal: a felicidade. Sublinha:

A prática filosófica profissional não é uma atividade subjetiva e caótica, realizada arbitrariamente e sem referências. Para que seja possível aplicar a filosofia a uma determinada situação, é necessário um método que permita ao consultor desenvolvimento sistematizado das técnicas/estratégias e dos recursos necessários para o alcance dos objetivos definidos⁶

Segundo Dias a maioria dos consultantes não evidencia preocupações epistemológicas ou metafísicas, mas antes preocupações que remetem à sua dimensão axiológica, pelo que, as técnicas lógicas do orientador filosófico não são um fim em si, mas instrumentos ao serviço da projeção da felicidade do consultante. Serve ao trabalho do orientador, a imagem kantiana do imperativo hipotético, pois que, trabalha com uma pessoa livre e autónoma. Este facto implica que o orientador trabalhe no sentido da felicidade do cliente de modo correto, quer dizer: ética e moralmente adequado⁷. Portanto, o objetivo da prática filosófica em consulta consiste na melhoria da situação inicial do cliente, pautado por uma lógica da complexidade que supera, por exemplo,

⁶ Ibidem

⁷ DIAS, Jorge: “La Felicidad como Objetivo de la Filosofía Aplicada a la Persona”, en BARRIENTOS, José: *Seminario Luso-español de Filosofía Aplicada a la Persona y a Grupos*, Edicions DOSS, Sevilla, 2008

a rigidez estática e a previsibilidade da ciência psicológica no entendimento do problema do cliente.

El asesoramiento filosófico surge como un servicio profesional que ayuda al consultante a: a) construir su “casa filosófica”, si aún no la tiene; b) si y la tiene, hacer su manutención y limpieza; c) cambiar de casa filosófica, por las más variadas razones⁸

Em Dias, o sujeito epistémico é um ser autónomo capaz de se reconstruir e reintegrar pela sua própria ação pensante, definindo e participando, efetivamente, no projeto da sua própria vida num contexto pessoal e social. E, por isso mesmo é, simultaneamente, um sujeito ontológico. O processo metodológico é uma trajetória de emancipação racional que dispõe a pessoa a apossar-se duma competência projetante, (des)envolvendo(-se) (em) projetos existenciais cuja concretização traduz a vivência de felicidade pessoal. Pelo que, a um tempo, a pessoa constrói-se a si mesma na concretização dos seus projetos que são o seu modo de ser. Neste sentido, o orientador filosófico presta um serviço individual, personalizado e inédito:

Cada proceso de Asesoramiento Filosófico constituye un sistema individual y personalizado que no puede, ser comparable, sustituible (por el de otros sujetos) o transmisible. Por encima del carácter instrumental, el asesoramiento filosófico pretende ofrecer al consultante un trabajo original de producción filosófica, como si la consulta fuera una auténtica obra de arte, motivada por la libertad individual que, con la utilización de metodologías propias de la disciplina, contribuye para la autonomía y para la felicidad del consultante. Si la consulta sólo tuviera un carácter instrumental, no tendría sentido pagar por un servicio que tuviera como finalidad un determinado objeto exterior, tanto al consultante como al proceso filosófico, el qual le es inherente

⁸ DIAS, Jorge Humberto: “La Consulta Filosófica Según Jorge Dias”, en RASTROJO BARRIENTOS, José e DIAS, Jorge Humberto: *Idea y Proyecto. LA ARQUITECTURA DE LA VIDA*, Vision Libros, Madrid, 2010, p. 189

por naturaleza. Tenemos que poner en perspectiva la consulta filosófica como una actividad que tiene un objetivo, como una planificación que tiene como fundamento la felicidad del consultante⁹.

Dias enfatiza o rigor na definição de habilitações mínimas para o exercício da profissão; defende que os profissionais em exercício possuam um Livro de Reclamações e a sua prática seja regulamentada por um código deontológico na base de uma Ordem Profissional de Orientadores Filosóficos. Por conseguinte, exige a publicação em Decreto-Lei de um Estatuto Profissional, à semelhança de outros profissionais. Considera fundamental a formação prática do orientador filosófico. Assim sendo, propõe um programa de formação para uma licenciatura com especialização em Orientação Filosófica. Vemos a proposta curricular de Dias para uma licenciatura na seguinte página.

A relação entre o filósofo orientador e, a pessoa em consulta, faz-se através do diálogo filosófico; o modelo de consulta desenvolve-se portanto, na base da linguagem falada ao estilo socrático. O orientador deve, por isso, possuir competências de consulta: estabelecer cordialidade ao pensamento do consultante, promover uma escuta ativa e, a reflexão filosófica no consultante. Dias distingue as competências do consultor em competências de consulta e competências filosóficas.

Cuando hablamos del Asesor Filosófico, es esencial que consideremos su formación práctica, metodológica, tanto como sus competencias de consulta. Apesar de su carácter instrumental, las técnicas del asesor no serán útiles si no vehiculan las competencias filosóficas esenciales, encontrándose la utilidad de la consulta filosófica en su capacidad para hacer que el consultante piense sobre su vida, sus acciones, conceptos, sentimientos, creencias, proyectos y tantos otros aspectos significativos¹⁰.

⁹ Idem, p. 191

¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 155

Primeiro Ano	Segundo Ano	Terceiro Ano
Primeiro Trimestre	Primeiro Trimestre	Primeiro Trimestre
História da Filosofia Prática I	Trabalho de projeto I	Trabalho de projeto III
Noções básicas de Consultoria Filosófica	História da Filosofia Prática II	Práticas de Consultoria Filosófica
Competências de consulta do Consultor Filosófico	Metodologias e técnicas de consulta filosófica individual II	Metodologias e técnicas de consulta filosófica individual III
Competências filosóficas do Consultor Filosófico	Questões de direito e fiscalidade em CF	Marketing e publicidade em Consultoria filosófica
Segundo Trimestre	Segundo Trimestre	Segundo Trimestre
Trabalho de Projeto I	Problemas filosóficos II	Práticas de Consultoria Filosófica II
Metodologias e técnicas de consulta filosófica individual I	Consultoria Filosófica nas organizações	Tecnologias aplicadas à Consultoria Filosófica
Deontologia do Consultor Filosófico	Trabalho de projeto II	Problemas filosóficos III
Questões empresariais em consulta filosófica	Filosofia Aplicada à formação	Trabalho final

Figura 1- Estrutura disciplinar para uma Licenciatura em Orientação Filosófica (adaptado de Dias)

Elenca treze competências principais de consulta que o orientador filosófico deve possuir: saber receber; atenção: escutar valorando o discurso do consultante; formalidade (sem emitir juízos de valor); indicar o relevante; demonstrar compreensão (resumir usando as palavras do consultante), sintetizar (facilita o trabalho racional); procurar objetividade (levar o consultante à definição clara e rigorosa); realizar perguntas abertas (em via do desenvolvimento do assunto); realizar perguntas fechadas (procurando objetividade no discurso); confrontar (relacionar aspetos do discurso do

consultante em busca de incoerências); motivar (promovendo o discurso através de interjeições que mostrem receptividade); explicitar (demonstrar ao consultante os objetivos do trabalho realizado) e utilizar o silêncio (podem ajudar à reflexão mais profunda).

As competências filosóficas visam promover a reflexão filosófica no pensamento do consultante. Segundo Dias já em 1995 Ad Hoogendijk considerava serem seis as competências filosóficas essenciais: (1) análise conceptual, (2) reflexão entre redes conceptuais fundamentais, (3) pensamento crítico, (4) exame de pressupostos, (5) diálogo, (6) pensamento utópico.

A análise conceptual permite evidenciar através dos conceitos mais utilizados os problemas quotidianos do consultante; deve procurar-se, através desta competência, o sentido que o consultante atribui aos conceitos que utiliza. É, portanto, necessário usar a técnica de registo de modo a arquivar as definições principais do consultante. A reflexão sobre as redes conceptuais considera as visões de mundo do consultante. Exigirá a técnica de construção de mapas conceptuais de modo a evidenciar com clareza e inteligibilidade a rede de pensamento do consultante. Através da competência de pensamento crítico pretende-se a análise da verdade dos argumentos apresentados pelo consultante; a sua posição relativamente ao problema que coloca. Exame de pressupostos: o consultante tem sempre preconceitos que toma como relevantes para si mesmo. Cabe ao orientador filosófico analisar estas ideias prévias e evidenciar o rigor das suas articulações. Aqui é útil uma atitude formal que permita o distanciamento crítico fundamental para concretizar este trabalho.

Segundo Dias, Ad Hoogendijk considera que o pensamento do consultante pode revelar dimensões imaginativas em relação a ideias ou desejos, pelo que, cabe ao orientador filósofo, analisar esse material e enquadrá-lo na existência concreta da pessoa em consulta.

Para além destas competências, cita Tim Lebon que acrescenta àquelas competências gerais: (1) competência fenomenológica: compreensão dos acontecimentos e dos objetos tal como aparecem ao consultante e a sua experiência imediata; (2) pensamento criativo: competência de complemento ao pensamento crítico, por influência de Edward de Bono. Refere, também, o trabalho de Óscar Brenifier na área da Filosofia com Crianças que, de modo geral, apresenta competências no âmbito da conceptualização, dialética e problematização. Na obra de Brenifier sobre a prática filosófica podemos encontrar um contributo válido sobre a “ciência da pergunta”. Considera Dias que se trata de uma tarefa complexa para quem se inicia neste trabalho, pois que, estamos sempre no seio da questão sobre a “pergunta perfeita” para determinadas questões-problema. Brenifier apresenta cinco critérios para apreciar a qualidade de uma pergunta. Por exemplo, segundo Dias: “as perguntas que formulamos devem obrigar a pessoa a «dar à luz» novos conceitos”.

Mais importante do que competências gerais é as competências específicas, a saber: (1) relacionar a definição do consultante com a sua vida pessoal concreta e real, (2) relacionar as definições do consultante com teorias filosóficas sobre o mesmo tema, (3) confrontar o pensamento do consultante com definições distintas apresentadas sobre o mesmo tema, no processo de consulta, (4) solicitar a fundamentação das opiniões do consultante e (5) promover a análise do tópico filosófico com rigor. Sublinha Dias que estas competências são operacionalizadas ao longo dos diferentes níveis do método PROJECT@. Esta metodologia foi apresentada, pela primeira vez, em 2006, no IX Congresso Internacional de Prática Filosófica, em Carloforte – Itália. Elaborou-o com base em leituras sobre a existência humana, a felicidade, o amor, a vida, salientando duas influências fundamentais: *A Felicidade Humana* de Julián Marías e *Sete Cartas a um jovem filósofo* de Agostinho da Silva. Afirma: No caso

específico do método PROJECT@, quando aplicado na consulta filosófica individual, fundamenta-se na obra de Julián Marias e, também, no horizonte da felicidade pessoal do consultante.¹¹ Vejamos a síntese da prática filosófica de Dias no que concerne à metodologia:




Figura 2 – Prática filosófica em Jorge Humberto Dias

A conceção metodológica de Dias não é uma praxiologia instrumental que uma leitura apressada pode, eventualmente, sugerir e que, poderia transformar-se, perigosamente, num processo burocrático de catalogação linear da vida da pessoa em consulta. Por outro lado, não é, ainda, qualquer coisa que se fundamente na empatia ou amizade entre filósofo e cliente e que faça, simplesmente, decorrer daí, a validade da ajuda prestada para a resolução do problema inicial. Ainda que, seja necessária a competência empática e simpatizante no orientador, ela não é, em

¹¹ DIAS, Jorge Humberto: *O contributo de Julián Mariás para uma teoria da filosofia aplicada à questão da felicidade*, tese de doutoramento, Faculdade Ciências Sociais e Humanas, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2013, p. 297, no prelo

si, suficiente para o sucesso da consulta. Neste sentido, a consulta filosófica, pela sua intrínseca racionalidade, é um processo «dialógico» de cariz maiêutico que resgata a pessoa consultante à fragmentação dolorosa, inquietante e/ou errante e a re-coloca, através da orientação, no transcurso «felicitário» da sua vida. Dias entende por felicidade do cliente a sua autonomia, quer dizer, as normas que o indivíduo traça para si mesmo, para a sua vida em sociedade, são as pedras com que construirá ele próprio a sua morada felicitaria. Por conseguinte, a prática filosófica é um processo educativo que, necessariamente, transforma, porque instaura uma competência projetante que emerge da narrativa pessoal que *pré-ocupa* e se vai aprofundando, na experiência do filosofar, por via de determinadas técnicas e processos metodológicos. Quais são as implicações de relevar a felicidade como um fundamento da prática filosófica? Este fundamento implica considerar que o conceito de felicidade da pessoa consultante determina a sua filosofia de vida. Quer dizer, o modo como a pessoa vive, como organiza o seu quotidiano, o modo como se autoanalisa é determinante para a sua conceção de felicidade. Assim pois é, impreterivelmente, necessário compreender a filosofia de vida do consultante, para a projeção de si, nos projetos que concretiza.

Apresentamos em seguida uma síntese esquemática do Método PROJECT@:

1. Identificar Projetos na vida do consultante
2. Analisar a estrutura de um projeto
3. Relacionar o projeto com a vida do consultante (valores e sentido)
4. Reunir projetos e definir aplicações
5. Explorar a filosofia de vida do consultante
6. Comprovar a realidade e importância na filosofia de vida do consultante




Figura 3 - Método PROJECT@ de Jorge Humberto Dias

Os seis níveis do Método PROJECT@ representam diferentes fases de trabalho filosófico para compreender o enquadramento do pensamento da pessoa consultante na sua própria filosofia de vida, estabelecendo conexão com os seus projetos e ajudando a solucionar o problema ou questão que o leva à consulta. “Projetar” pode ser visto como uma necessidade humana constituída por múltiplas dimensões: ontológicas, antropológicas, metafísicas, estéticas, éticas, sociais ou políticas que remetem a necessidades humanas que impelem a uma busca.¹²

Procuramos, em seguida, explorar o Método PROJECT@. O primeiro nível é o início da consulta filosófica, baseado num diálogo compreensivo que visa obter informações necessárias ao processo de orientação.

¹² DIAS, Jorge Humberto: “La Consulta Filosófica Según Jorge Dias”, en RASTROJO BARRIENTOS, José e DIAS, Jorge Humberto: *Ideya e Proyecto. LA ARQUITECTURA DE LA VIDA*, Vision Libros, Madrid, 2010, pp. 151-296




Figura 4 - Nível 1 - Método PROJECT@

Procura-se a clarificação do problema/questão, contextualizando o problema. A partir das dimensões filosóficas do problema/questão encontradas, deve procurar-se a existência de alguma relação entre este e um projeto de vida do consultante. Jorge Humberto Dias alerta para a possibilidade de estar aqui em causa a própria vida do consultante como projeto fundamental. Será preciso indagar sobre a interioridade da pessoa consultante, percebendo o que está em causa, aquilo que a move ou - *pro-jeta*-. Por conseguinte, o

consultor deve ter presente que a ação particular é sempre contextualizada, num projeto de vida, num sentido pessoal, conectada com a riqueza múltipla de outras ações. Será necessário isolar o problema/questão, porém, não se deter, estaticamente, nesse isolamento, pois que, o sujeito consultante é uma realidade global e globalizante, maior e mais profunda que aquele problema/questão concreto. Resulta deste aspeto um necessário enquadramento teórico com a teoria da complexidade de Edgar Morin, no sentido de um “complexo” como algo que é “tecido em conjunto” e que não se deixa apreender, simplesmente, pela verdade da parte.

O nível dois respeita à análise da estrutura do projeto. Permite a passagem ao nível seguinte de relacionamento do projeto com a vida da pessoa consultante, pelo que, exige atentar nas fases de elaboração, na dimensão temporal; indagar se o consultante possui alguma teoria sobre a vida e seus componentes, enfatizando estratégias que visem a sua felicidade.




Figura 5 - Nível 2 - Método PROJECT@

O método PROJECT@ baseia-se numa estrutura formal e antropológicamente enquadrada. Afirmar que a vida è um projeto significa que o ser humano é um problema para si mesmo e, simultaneamente, a solução para esse problema que é (para si mesmo). Um ser que projeta continuamente e esse é o seu modo de ser aí: viver. Porém, a experiência do filosofar em consulta não é uma mera técnica de ajuda, mas uma ação teleológica, pois que, se constitui na procura da *ratio* do problema e, a partir dele, determina o sentido para a vida. Também não é apenas um processo de pensar a vida, mas antes um pensamento em ação que cria significados. Ainda que, muitos aspetos possam ficar por clarificar, o labor da orientação em consulta filosófica traduz-se num processo pleno de conexões e intersubjetividades livre e aberto, onde o filósofo se assume como orientador da reflexão e, nesse sentido, ajudando à clarificação e tomada de consciência e, nesta aceção, de alguma forma, ele é um educador: um investigador-reflexivo (no âmbito da consulta) que busca potenciar no consultante a possibilidade transformadora da filosofia. No nível 3 do método PROJECT@ relaciona-se o projeto com a vida do consultante.

Esta trajetória supõe uma abertura necessária para escutar o cliente, mesmo de modo inesperado. A atitude do orientador filosófico não pode ser dogmática, mas disposta à construção de um caminho reflexivo comum que possa contribuir para a autonomia da pessoa consultante; cuidando que não se transforme a consulta numa aplicação instrumental de procedimentos lógicos, pois que, ela impõe-se como meio através do qual se opera o crescimento racional do consultante. A orientação filosófica, sustentada na análise crítica dos projetos de vida do consultante foca, precisamente, a sua visão pessoal e concreta, muitas vezes, enclausurada num relativismo redutor e exclusivista que lhe causa um mal-estar, possível de ser eliminado pela amplitude que essa orientação promoverá. Por conseguinte, a experiência do filosofar labora com a cosmovisão do sujeito consultante, a forma como

entende o mundo; não é um processo que se formaliza com vista à mudança radical dos modos de vida do sujeito, é antes, um caminho dialógico de ensimesmamento aprofundado que visa a expansão amadurecida do consultante.




Figura 6 - Nível 4 – Método PROJECT@

Vejamus a síntese esquemática relativa ao nível 4 do método PROJECT@:




Figura 7 - Nível 4 – Método PROJECT@

Neste momento sabemos da hierarquia de projetos do consultante e, sendo o caso, já se fez uma nova análise de identificação dos projetos relevantes, pelo que, convém, agora desenvolver metodologia que permita reforçar a filosofia de vida do consultante. O último nível é semelhante ao terceiro, mas com maior grau de profundidade em termos de reflexão filosófica. Agora, o orientador conhece a filosofia de vida do cliente, pelo que, o trabalho racional é mais específico. Será possível dar continuidade a uma consulta anterior ou se necessário retornar à primeira etapa para trabalhar outro problema/questão. Atentese, em seguida, no nível 5.




Figura 8 - Nível 5 – PROJECT@

Segue-se o nível 6:




Figura 9 - Nível 6 – PROJECT@

O limite principal deste método está na relação que estabelece com a filosofia de vida do consultante. Dificilmente se pode aplicar a uma pessoa que não tem para si a vida como um projeto ou que não vê sentido na própria vida. Para superar esta limitação epistemológica e com o objetivo de desenvolver um método mais completo e útil para os problemas filosóficos, Dias criou o método IPSE. Esta metodologia baseia-se na ideia de autodescobrimento orientado por um consultor que não conhece, também, o caminho e, por isso, está ao mesmo nível que o consultante, mas possui certas competências e conhece muitos outros caminhos e aí radica a fecundidade desta aplicação metodológica.

Vejamos a síntese esquemática relativa ao método IPSE:




Figura 10 - Método IPSE de Jorge Humbererto Dias

O trabalho do consultor através deste método é dirigido ao *ipse*, ou seja, ao consultante visto como uma pessoa capaz de se comprometer com as suas próprias afirmações e responsabilidades. Remete, por isso, à noção de «agente» em Paul Ricouer. O Método PROJET@ é um trabalho de análise numa linha temporal e o Método IPSE apresenta-se como um trabalho interpretativo sobre a própria pessoa: “o «quem» do eu”. Qual é o objetivo do Método IPSE? O objetivo centra-se na possibilidade de desenvolvimento da filosofia de vida pessoal do consultante; na ideia de que possa estabelecer conexões conceptuais sólidas e coerentes entre as várias dimensões do pensamento pessoal. Uma das vantagens deste método, defende Dias, é a sua possibilidade de aplicação numa consulta de uma hora.

Desvios à Filosofia como matriz fundante na Orientação Filosófica

Consideramos desviantes todos os contributos que, nos métodos e nas competências, na orientação filosófica utilizem e/ou procurem explorar, sistematicamente, áreas do conhecimento fora do campo da própria filosofia para deles se servirem para uma fundamentação da teoria na orientação filosófica. Este entendimento não se encerra num postulado dogmático e, menos ainda, numa atitude de *naive* superioridade da Filosofia face às diferentes áreas do conhecimento; este entendimento diz a nossa crença na possibilidade de atender ao pensamento consciente, pela via de uma racionalidade filosófica com quase três mil anos de existência. Racionalidade esta que, pela sua própria natureza problematizante e problematizadora é antidogmática logo, aberta e questionante. Representa, também, o reconhecimento de não ser hoje possível refletir sobre problemas humanos sem os contributos que as ciências nos proporcionam, mas sobretudo, um compromisso pessoal de saber justificar as possibilidades da filosofia aplicada para relativizar e contextualizar o papel da ciência e da técnica para

a compreensão de um sentido humano de ser no mundo. Seguidamente vamos analisar dois contributos portugueses que consideramos desviantes à Filosofia como matriz fundante da prática filosófica em consulta.

Diniz Lobato¹³ terá sido o primeiro filósofo português a abrir uma consulta na Baixa de Lisboa, em 1989. O filósofo define o seu percurso assente na vontade de aplicar a filosofia como algo dinâmico, pelo que, segundo a sua própria narrativa, construiu um percurso baseado entre a Filosofia Antiga, enquanto arte de viver que contrasta, defende, com a filosofia moderna, reservada a especialistas. Afirma-se ligado à “Sabedoria chinesa” e conhecedor da Logoterapia de Viktor Frankl ou “Análise Existencial” de influência heideggeriana, bem como as linhas terapêuticas da Fenomenologia. Diniz Lobato afirma ter criado o consultório como uma “terapia alternativa”, interpretado como o “renascimento da antiga noção de Logos”. Os seus procedimentos metodológicos consistiam, num “modus operandi fluido” adaptado à pessoa, consoante a sua formação, o caso específico, os motivos e, desmontando processos mentais, interpretações da realidade.

Nos anos 90 o consultório de Diniz Lobato ganha projeção através de uma entrevista ao jornal Expresso num texto assinado por César Avó. Afirma Diniz Lobato que a exposição lhe valeu o confronto com psicólogos e psicanalistas que o advertiram acerca dos perigos em usar a Filosofia para os fins a que se propunha. Em 2002 deslocou o consultório para a Rua do Salitre onde permaneceu um ano. No ano de 2003 aplica os mesmos princípios da consulta filosófica num colégio particular na Vila de Azeitão, distrito de Setúbal, apoiando alunos e pais. Aí lecionou Filosofia para Crianças sem qualquer relação à teorização de M. Lipman. Entre 2004 e 2006 regressa a Cascais, onde retoma a Consulta

¹³ LOBATO, Diniz: “Consultório de Filosofia”, disponível online em http://issuu.com/filosofalando/docs/filosofalando_01 (último acesso em 28 de março de 2014)

Filosófica. Desde 2006 possui um Consultório Filosófico em Oeiras, distrito de Lisboa e disponibiliza, também, consultas ao domicílio.

A prática de Diniz Lobato parece descentrar a matriz filosófica que reconhecemos à Filosofia Prática. Assim, na nossa perspectiva, centralizadora da Filosofia como *alma mater* da Orientação Filosófica, o contributo de Diniz Lobato, sendo original na sua contemporaneidade, afigura-se-nos como marginal face à Filosofia como núcleo fundante na prática de Orientação Filosófica.

Na Universidade de Coimbra, Filipe M. Menezes possui uma consulta filosófica gratuita¹⁴ com propósitos de investigação empírica, porém sem resultados públicos até ao momento. Menezes defende num artigo¹⁵ recente aquilo que designa por “A “anti-teoria” do chamado “aconselhamento filosófico””.

Afirma o autor:

Na sua autonarrativa, o “aconselhamento filosófico” apresenta-se como nascido em contraposição a um excesso de teorização da Filosofia e grande parte da sua produção literária deixa transparecer a aspiração de uma prática filosófica capaz de se libertar desse excesso para mirar directamente o mundo, a sociedade, as pessoas e, assim, apreender os seus mais ingentes problemas, com o duplo objectivo de sobre eles intervir e de preparar os indivíduos e a sociedade para uma “atitude filosófica” em relação aos seus males¹⁶

A partir desta visão acerca da génese do “aconselhamento filosófico”, Menezes propõe-se reconstruir aquilo que designa por “teoria implícita” para que venha a ser possível avaliar uma técnica de ajuda filosófica independente dos pontos de vista dos autores.

¹⁴ Veja-se a página da internet <http://viafilosofia.blogspot.pt/> (último acesso maio 2014)

¹⁵ MENEZES, Filipe M. : “A “anti-teoria” do chamado “aconselhamento filosófico””, em *Leituras da Sociedade Moderna. Media, Política e Sentido*, 1ª Edição, Coimbra, 2013, Págs. 205-222

¹⁶ Idem, Pág. 206

Menezes defende que se tem pretendido fundar a consulta filosófica “sobre o que de modo nenhum pode ser observado”:

tem-se pretendido fundar a “consulta de Filosofia” como encontro dual entre sujeitos realizando um exercício de racionalidade em que um ajuda o outro a descobrir a sua verdadeira verdade e a tornar-se autónomo como agente de uma vida autêntica. Ou seja, tem-se pretendido fundá-la sobre o que de modo nenhum pode ser observado¹⁷

Na nossa análise, Menezes sustenta a sua argumentação em dois elementos chave que nos parecem, intencionalmente, movidos para ancorar a orientação filosófica numa matriz marginal à própria Filosofia: (1) o conceito de “mal-estar” como origem do “Aconselhamento Filosófico” e (2) a impossibilidade da experiência do filosofar, independente, da análise psicológica. Ainda que, ao longo do seu texto, não defina, com rigor e clareza, o conceito de “mal-estar”, sustenta que o “Aconselhamento Filosófico” padece de uma desatenção das “possibilidades de observação de tudo quanto apenas se pode dar na linguagem, em circuitos de comunicação baseados na linguagem”. Neste seguimento, acrescenta:

jamais são questionadas as possibilidades de o indivíduo coincidir consigo mesmo nas histórias que de si é capaz de dar, assume-se a sua unidade e identidade como algo incontestável. Tal identificação tácita entre história e biografia é estabelecida num plano ideativo em que não é reconhecido qualquer papel ao aparelho psíquico e de que o corpo está completamente ausente¹⁸

Assim se funda, defende Menezes, a consulta filosófica, numa “perspectiva factícia”, porque se elabora na convicção da total transparência entre as palavras e as coisas e no “desprezo pelo psiquismo e pelas ciências que se lhe dedicam torna-se

¹⁷ Ibidem

¹⁸ Ibidem

particularmente áspero quando a assunto é a psicanálise. Ora, se “o indivíduo não pode encontrar-se a si mesmo por meio da reflexão racional”, em última análise, resultaria desta incursão de Menezes a transmutação do filosofar numa mera técnica ao serviço de um processo terapêutico psicológico; a jusante toda a experiência do filosofar padeceria de uma falta de sentido que teríamos de procurar num alicerce psicológico, sob pena de ser a atividade do filósofo um *non sense*.

Menezes parece recusar o clássico exemplo de Ran Lahav, sobre a possibilidade de compreendermos o jogo de xadrez, pela interpretação e análise das jogadas, sem recorrermos, necessariamente, à análise da mente dos jogadores. Ou seja: a recusa da consulta filosófica como lugar de experiência do filosofar consciente entre duas pessoas. Uma que tem um problema que só pode ser apreendido no contexto total da sua história de vida – para isso é preciso que se narre – e, outra, que a orienta utilizando a Filosofia para a compreensão dessa biografia que é a sua e de ninguém mais. Por contraponto afirma ser estranho o “desprezo pelo psiquismo” subjacente ao “Aconselhamento Filosófico”:

sem qualquer menção às reflexões psicanalíticas sobre o assunto, quando, na verdade. Desde Sigmund Freud e, em particular com Jacques Lacan, o tema da “alienação do sujeito” foi efectivamente central, tendo sido desenvolvida a noção de que apenas o vencimento da resistência que está na base da convicção da unidade e da identidade da subjectividade pode conduzir à definição de um processo terapêutico¹⁹

Com efeito, se o propósito do autor consiste na definição de uma “técnica de ajuda filosófica”, haverá um procedimento metodológico que lhe sirva de sustentáculo e, por seu turno, uma teoria que a enquadre. Ou: tratar-se-á de uma “técnica de ajuda filosófica” desmembrada? Ou: uma técnica ajustada para

¹⁹ Ibidem

subalternizar a orientação filosófica ao “inconsciente psicanalítico”, pois que, segundo Menezes, não pode compreender-se a filosofia de vida do consultante na sua discursividade consciente?

Esta discussão ganharia, certamente, se enriquecida na sua aproximação, por exemplo, à filosofia da mente que não cabe agora nos objetivos deste nosso trabalho. Porquanto, no seio concetual da filosofia aplicada encontramos posições claras que elucidam sobre a natureza da racionalidade filosófica na sua aplicabilidade aos problemas concretos das pessoas e que superam essa mirada como simples técnica. Quer dizer: a Filosofia (aplicada) não se nos afigura no movimento nacional e internacional como “técnica de ajuda”. Mas como um *corpus* milenar que se defende ser útil em múltiplas aplicações, sendo a orientação filosófica individual uma dessas aplicações. Nessa razão de aplicação debate-se, por um lado, a necessidade de uma teoria específica que justifique os procedimentos metodológicos, nas competências do filósofo orientador e, nos métodos, que se operacionalizam por via de determinadas técnicas. A orientação filosófica não é uma técnica, mas antes a promoção no pensamento da pessoa consultante aquilo que os filósofos fazem e, o que os filósofos fazem é filosofar: discutem ideias, problemas, teorias, concepções de vida, apresentam, defendem ou contra argumentam. Por isso, a experiência do filosofar em consulta, não se compromete com a normalização do indivíduo, mas antes com a sua filosofia pessoal de vida.

Vejamos alguns exemplos do debate epistemológico internacional que mostram, claramente, não ser a prática filosófica uma simples “técnica de ajuda”. Roger Paden, por exemplo, numa análise da orientação filosófica, por analogia a outras profissões de ajuda, diferencia filósofos de psicoterapeutas. Para Paden, a orientação filosófica não se compromete com a “doença mental”, não se baseia num “modelo médico” e rejeita a “saúde” como normativo ideal. Desta feita, não trata “desvios” nem coloca os

clientes num determinado nível de normalidade. Não é, portanto, como afirma Diniz Lobato uma “terapia alternativa”, ainda que, no processo de racionalidade clarificadora dos problemas do cliente possa o filósofo atender a determinadas técnicas de análise, auto-reflexão e discussão. Paden defende que o orientador filosófico não pode, em verdade, reivindicar senão estas técnicas que se enquadram já na prática da filosofia tradicional. O fazer filosófico em matéria de racionalidade, procura o entendimento das crenças (irracionais), não prescruta processos internos psicológicos, nem trata problemas mentais.

Ran Lahav defende que ao orientador filosófico compete oferecer ferramentas de pensamento, mas o crescimento filosófico do indivíduo, faz-se a partir dele próprio, sem imposição de qualquer solução pré-concebida. Por analogia à metáfora da parteira em Sócrates diríamos que o conselheiro/consultor filosófico ajuda a “dar à luz”, à compreensão do “problema em si”. A investigação fenomenológica filosófica pode contribuir, segundo Lahav, por um lado, para a compreensão do problema em si e, por outro, para a produção de “insights” sobre o assunto, dotando o cliente de ferramentas que possam ajudar à articulação e expressão da sua realidade fenoménica. A orientação filosófica parte do mundo vivido do consultante e procura analisar as suas crenças, principalmente, aquelas que tem como certas para si e, em relação ao mundo, visando o aprofundamento crítico e expansão da sua visão de mundo. Por conseguinte, o conselheiro/consultor/orientador filosófico centra-se na superfície – o fenómeno – na conceção do si mesmo e do mundo do consultante e não na busca duma causalidade psicológica remota e oculta nas profundezas do inconsciente.

A visão de mundo é a “teoria” que a pessoa expressa sobre si e o mundo, sobre aquilo que a vida é, a moralidade, as relações interpessoais etc. Não se trata de um estado psicológico, consciente ou inconsciente, mas uma noção interpretativa; um modo de

classificação, organização e atribuição de significado. Neste sentido, o papel do conselheiro/consultor/orientador é ajudar a pessoa a interpretar-se, a compreender a sua própria estrutura e implicações das suas visões de mundo, detetar incoerências, questionar, observar a problemática e formular alternativas possíveis. Vejamos esta aceção na visão de José Barrientos Rastrojo:

Processo de conceptualização e/ou clarificação acerca de questões relevantes (significativas e /ou essenciais) para o consultante cujo objetivo é a melhoria do ato efetivo de pensamento e consecução de depuração de conteúdos verdadeiros e cujo resultado costuma ser o bem-estar do indivíduo.²⁰

De forma geral a orientação filosófica na teorização de Barrientos contempla duas dimensões: (1) A materialidade com os conteúdos e sua formalidade e (2) a disposição que compreende: amizade; investigação comum; fenomenologia; abertura ao inesperado.

Ao propor o modelo do ensaio filosófico como método para a filosofia aplicada à pessoa, Barrientos afirma que este promove um labor cujo eixo é o de filosofar, pensar e re-flexionar sobre um assunto. Por conseguinte, o ensaio e a consulta coincidem em (1) propósito e (2) meios e, em grande medida (3) com o processo. Tanto num como noutro, trata-se de aprofundar conteúdos, analisá-los, clarificá-los e alcançar uma visão mais ampla que pode induzir a uma resposta concreta. O objectivo geral do método é a ampliação do caudal e/ou clarificação de conhecimentos infundidos num espírito de aprofundamento graças à «sim-patia» com o consultante. Para quê? Para a criação de uma vida mais profunda, livre, crítica e autónoma do consultante. O método exige

²⁰ BARRIENTOS RASTROJO, José: “La Orientación Filosófica Según José Barrientos”, en BARRIENTOS RASTROJO, José e DIAS, Jorge Humberto: *Idea y Proyecto. La arquitectura de la vida*, Vision Libros, Madrid, 2010, pp. 23-150.

compromisso, uma parcela de dedicação diária e, se for aplicado com outra pessoa, um mínimo de seriedade.

Barrientos apresenta o modelo do ensaio filosófico em três dimensões, ao longo de três grandes capítulos do livro *Idea y Proyecto*. No capítulo dedicado à materialidade do modelo, desenvolve uma reflexão sobre os conteúdos do método, caracterizando as diferentes etapas do ponto de vista da relevância filosófica na orientação. O modelo formaliza-se através da teoria do pensamento crítico: "Critical Thinking". Segundo Robert Ennis como uma teoria que nos ajuda a decidir e a pensar o que fazer. O conteúdo material do método de Barrientos, segundo o modelo do ensaio filosófico, aplicado à pessoa consiste num procedimento que se desenrola por quatro fases, a saber: (1) compreensão e escuta, (2) aprofundamento e expansão, (3) avaliação e conclusão e (4) o feedback vital.

Barrientos elabora uma reflexão sobre a importância da "escuta" a partir da teorização de Peter Raabe e do Grupo E.T.O.R., desde as diferenças significativas entre um mero "ouvir" à semântica essencial do "escutar". Escutar requer "sair de si", "abandonar-se" para se deixar inundar pelo pensamento do consultante. Como no conto árabe das Mil e Uma Noites, o Príncipe deixa-se penetrar (chegar ao íntimo) pelo ouvido, pela narrativa de Scheherazade e daí resulta uma empatia (entre ambos). A escuta será, portanto, um «pathos» imprescindível à compreensão do outro. A escuta do orientador, afirma, não deve ser uma pseudoescuta que ouve um discurso somente para falar depois; também não deve ser uma escuta focalizada, intencionalmente, naqueles pontos que interessam ao orientador; convém que não seja uma escuta seletiva que põe de parte aqueles elementos que se julga não serem importantes. E, não deve ser uma escuta defensiva, no sentido em que o orientador escuta o discurso do cliente como um ataque a si próprio. E, por fim, também, não deve ser uma

escuta insensível em que se toma o que se disse, somente no sentido literal.

A compreensão e a escuta na orientação filosófica têm os seguintes propósitos: descobrir a questão ou assunto “real”; destacar os conceitos e termos essenciais implicados; assinalar o marco filosófico pessoal do consultante e o autoconhecimento do consultante desde o assunto que o «pré-ocupa». O primeiro momento da escuta consiste na promoção da palavra precisa: trata-se de patrocinar o discurso do consultante evitando digressões e circunloquios desnecessários. Ou seja: criar-se uma ideia mais completa possível da situação. Barrientos Rastrojo enuncia algumas técnicas de escuta: (1) análise por meio dos “Q” (Que foi?, Quando foi?...); (2) estudo de situações desproporcionadas do passado (relacionadas ou não com o foco do problema); (3) analogias experienciais correlacionadas; (4) analogias vitais e (5) relato autobiográfico. Em seguida, destaca-se a importância de entender o significado das palavras usadas pela pessoa em consulta. O orientador deve atender mais à semântica subjetiva do que ao significado e sentido literal dos conceitos e termos. Barrientos releva a importância de "picos vivenciais linguísticos" que podem contemplar uma espécie de "acidentes geográficos linguísticos". A metáfora remete a alterações na linguagem mediada pela emoção próxima ou distante ao centro do sujeito. Neste sentido, o orientador deve atentar a todas as mudanças na paisagem linguística do consultante quando o discurso se vincula com a vida própria do sujeito. Distingue entre "palavras cofre" e palavras filosóficas. As primeiras são o próprio discurso da pessoa que deve expressar-se na sua própria linguagem, com confiança e liberdade que deve resultar da intimidade da relação dialógica num espírito de amizade. As palavras filosóficas exigem que o orientador possua conhecimento profundo das teorias filosóficas mais vinculadas à vida. A sua utilização no discurso do consultante encerra sentidos e significados que não podem deixar de ser desocultados pelo

orientado. Com efeito, defende Barrientos não existir um mundo de branca assepsia, porque o olho lhe dá a coloração e esse olhar determina o curso da nossa ação. Assim, ao orientador interessará compreender não “a realidade”, mas antes “a realidade minha”, a representação pessoal e individual do consultante.

O caminho da orientação filosófica é o de dar um passo atrás para se acercar do autoconhecimento do consultante, não tanto para operar mudanças na direcção idiossincrática, no “olhar” pessoal, antes para descobrir o que esse olhar diz acerca do seu possuidor. Desta feita, a orientação filosófica busca a compreensão do “si mesmo” do consultante, através das suas representações. Assim, a filosofia assume-se como factor de aprendizagem e, como elemento cuidador, porquanto auxilia/ajuda à compreensão precisa. Aprender o “olhar” da ação é fundamental, porque aquilo que vemos e pensamos determina o que fazemos. O labor do orientador consiste em alcançar as re-presentações, a partir das ações do consultante.

Por conseguinte, o aprofundamento expansivo faz-se em espiral ao redor da questão. Cabe ao orientador fomentar a ampliação do cliente. Será necessário sucessivos momentos de reflexão e, por isso, o método deve adquirir a forma de uma espiral. Em Barrientos a teoria da espiralidade sustenta o aprofundamento e a expansão com o objetivo de alcançar as “palavras cofre” e as palavras filosóficas. A teoria da espiralidade que sustenta o aprofundamento do “olhar” e das ações compreende a complexidade do próprio conceito “espiral”, porque cada um dos conceitos radiais (da espiral) podem supor subespirais. A teoria da espiralidade assume um duplo desafio: (1) aprofundamento progressivo em cada conceito e (2) transito ao foco comum, o eu acoplado à situação presente. Após alcançadas as “palavras cofre” e filosóficas se procure apreender o seu significado, ampliando-o. Para este efeito, sugere a utilização de dicionários de sinónimos, semânticos e etimológicos. As palavras em uso adquirem o

significado e sentido de um discurso próprio. O orientador deve promover uma atividade de hipertextualidade, visto que, existem conexões entre os conceitos, um pode levar-nos a outro e este a um terceiro; esta ação fomenta a semântica das palavras nos seus múltiplos sentidos e, sugere a abertura do sujeito em consulta que pode encontrar-se encerrado na cláusura das suas visões restritas. Assume, portanto, a forma do pensamento crítico. A técnica de análise linguística, através do uso de dicionários converte-se, assim, num exercício revelador das "palavras cofre" e filosóficas que podem, deste modo, ser confrontadas com outros significados e sentidos. Uma alternativa ao uso de dicionários, sugere Barrientos, é o uso de imagens. Os conceitos devem ser analisados, filosoficamente, pois que, a filosofia permite a abertura intelectual que vai além dos possíveis âmbitos existenciais no sentido do aprofundamento metafísico. Para Barrientos, a orientação filosófica não é uma teorização sobre a vida, é um cuidar reflexivo acerca da anatomia dessa mesma vida, através dos conceitos vertebrais com os quais se estrutura. O seu objetivo é fomentar a consciência do vivido e promover uma vida reflexionada/examinada. A analogia metodológica ao ensaio filosófico acrescenta um novo elemento que o ensaio filosófico, propriamente, dito não comporta: a fase de retroalimentação vital. O ensaio filosófico terminaria quando se fez a crítica de todas as soluções alternativas. Para o consultante não é suficiente uma análise abstrata e ideal, precisa de um contraste fáctico do ideal com o real.

Neste sentido, quando o consultante, coloca um dilema quando é que termina a consulta? A consulta termina, afirma Barrientos, no momento em que se localiza a "melhor alternativa". Não será necessário viver a vida com filosofia, mas a sua presença trará um valor primordial a essa vida. Há que dar ganas de viver à vida, sublinha Barriento, para que que a *filo- sofia* nos leve, a níveis de verdade cada vez mais profundos da realidade circundante.

Considerações finais

Neste artigo procurámos caracterizar o panorama da orientação filosófica em Portugal, afim de sustentar nele a nossa investigação futura. Com uma existência de dez anos, há nele uma evidente assimetria; em geral, não se afirmou como resposta, socialmente, reconhecida nem legitimou o seu espaço nuclear na própria Filosofia. Em particular, é claro o percurso profissional e académico de Jorge Humberto Dias que procurou, primeiro, a legitimação por via do associativismo profissional e, em seguida, desenvolveu um processo de investigação académico que culmina na proposta de fundamentação teórica na filosofia de Julián Márias. A partir deste contexto, propomo-nos desenvolver uma investigação enquadrada, academicamente, que aproxime a Filosofia Aplicada à Formação Profissional de Professores e responda à seguinte questão:

- Como é que a Filosofia Aplicada na sua especificidade, nos métodos e nas competências, na Orientação Filosófica, pode proporcionar a todo/a o/a professor/a a experiência do filosofar, de modo a que se perfile como profissional autêntico/a ao longo de toda a vida?

Orientada para a concretização dos seguintes objetivos gerais:

- Propor a Filosofia Aplicada como arquétipo de competências e processos metodológicos na Orientação Filosófica, no campo da Formação Profissional de Professores.

- Definir um programa disciplinar que explore a dimensão existencial da orientação pedagógica e profissional de adultos.

O nosso propósito mais amplo consiste na exploração da dimensão existencial da orientação pedagógica e profissional de adultos na sua consideração à formação e desenvolvimento profissional de professores do ensino básico e secundário. As respostas à pergunta sobre o que, efetivamente, se faz numa consulta de filosofia, como vimos na secção anterior, podem não ser unívocas. Porém, das

conceções que apresentámos é possível reconhecer elementos comuns: atender, escutar, questionar, compreender, interpretar, aprofundar, refletir, consciencializar, são elementos e técnicas que se movem no encontro dialógico na prática filosófica. Conclusão similar obteve Peter Harteloh num estudo que empreendeu sobre as competências de orientadores filosóficos. Nesse estudo, os orientadores entrevistados mencionaram: atenção, ouvir, questionar, interpretar, compreender e a reflexão como ferramentas comuns no diálogo em consulta filosófica. Qualquer uma destas ferramentas pode ser reconhecida, sublinha Harteloh, como elemento de uma conversação, sem que se lhe reconheça especificidade filosófica. Contudo, sublinha Harteloh, na prática filosófica, cada um desses elementos concorre para uma ênfase filosófica. Por exemplo, ouvir, questionar e interpretar não servem somente à manutenção de uma conversa; baseiam-se na tradição filosófica e possuem em contexto de consulta uma aplicação filosófica. Por conseguinte, é a ênfase nessa tradição filosófica que determina as competências do orientador. Assim sendo, não podemos falar das competências do orientador, sem falarmos dos conteúdos filosóficos. Daqui resulta ser condição necessária o sólido domínio dos problemas, teorias e argumentos da história da filosofia. Harteloh destaca três competências básicas para a prática filosófica: a técnica de interrogar; a arte de interpretar; a arte de compreender. O “fazer” do orientador filosófico consiste em questionar e interpretar afim de compreender a vida da pessoa consultante. Segundo, Harteloh, os orientadores filosóficos realizam a potencialidade, no quadro teórico de Aristóteles, na prática. Assim, diferentes estilos de prática emergem, tanto quanto acentuam mais ou menos uma das três competências básicas. Harteloh exemplifica: o radical questionamento de Oscar Brenifier; o estilo interpretativo de Marinoff e a compreensão de vida de Achenbach.

Na linha da investigação que nos propomos levar a cabo, Finn Thorbjørn Hansen sugere que a formação profissional não atenda somente à profissão atual, mas inclua a vida pessoal do profissional, bem como os seus valores pessoais, numa perspectiva holística, pois é com eles que a profissão se exerce, se tomam decisões, se age no quotidiano. Trata-se de um “espaço para a autenticidade”, definida como um “agir de acordo com os nossos valores pessoais” que não descarna a pessoa do profissional.

Finn Thorbjørn Hansen refere o “aprender a ser”(Learning to be) como competência em falta na aprendizagem ao longo da vida (Lifelong Learning). Hansen considera demasiado instrumental a abordagem da OCDE quando concebe e promove a aprendizagem ao longo da vida. Acrescenta a necessidade de uma formação alargada, onde a orientação filosófica tenha um importante contributo, pois que, uma pedagogia de adultos vai além da mera aquisição de conhecimentos por via de mais experiência profissional. Uma pedagogia de adultos tem de ser considerada um problema existencial fundamental, onde a orientação filosófica poderá assumir-se como forma crítica de apreensão dessa dimensão existencial e de valores no complexo processo de aprendizagem. Hansen sugere que a formação profissional não atenda somente à profissão atual mas inclua a vida pessoal do profissional, bem como os seus valores pessoais, numa perspectiva holística, pois é com eles que a profissão se exerce, se tomam decisões, se age no quotidiano. Trata-se de um “espaço para a autenticidade”, definida como um “agir de acordo com os nossos valores pessoais”.

Para Dias, como observámos, as competências filosóficas têm como principal objetivo a promoção da reflexão filosófica no pensamento do consultante. Ora, há de ser aqui que se poderá enraizar um programa de formação profissional para professores, afim de proporcionar essa assunção de modo tal que o fazer profissional do professor seja potencialidade, atendendo ao que Julián Márias designa, segundo Dias, por competências como

“técnicas vitais”. Neste sentido, a teorização de Dias sobre consulta filosófica fornece um elemento chave para o propósito da nossa investigação que poderá assumir-se como elemento formativo essencial, a saber: a competência projetante. Deste modo, pretendemos alargar o perfil do orientador filosófico, sustentando a pertinência da sua assunção como orientador profissional.

Com toda a certeza será esta aplicação da filosofia que assumimos como projeto pessoal e profissional de investigação.

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SOCRATIC DIALOGUE AS A WAY TOWARD WONDER AND ALETHEIA IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH AND ACTION RESEARCH

EL DIÁLOGO SOCRÁTICO COMO CAMINO HACIA LA ADMIRACIÓN Y LA
ALETHEIA DENTRO DE UNA INVESTIGACIÓN-ACCIÓN CUALITATIVA

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Abstract: In qualitative and action research, through Socratic dialogue, the researcher can help participants past a cognitive approach to the phenomenon, into a community of wonder (*thaumazein*), past observation of lived experience to foreboding and finally to openness. This openness serves as a ground for truth (*aletheia*). Researchers who try the Socratic approach may find it rewarding in the journey and in the research produced.

Keywords: Socratic, Dialogue, Hermeneutic, Phenomenology, Qualitative Research, Action Research.

Resumen: En la investigación-acción de carácter cualitativo el investigador puede, por medio del diálogo socrático, ayudar a los participantes a transitar desde un acercamiento cognitivo a uno fenomenológico si se ubican en el seno de una comunidad de admiración (*thaumazein*), desde observación de las experiencias de vida a la intuición y al estado de apertura. Esta apertura es la base de la verdad (*aletheia*). Los investigadores que usen el enfoque socrático encontrarán recompensas tanto en su trabajo como en los resultados de sus indagaciones.

Palabras clave: diálogo socrático, hermenéutica, fenomenología, investigación cualitativa, investigación-acción.

Introduction

While qualitative and action research will always vary somewhat in goals, methods, and outcomes, in both kinds of research dialogue between the researcher and participant can be a key part of the research process. Through dialogue, both the researcher and the participants – or co-inquirers – can come together in wonder, opening themselves up to better allow the phenomena under study to reveal themselves. Following up on earlier works on Socratic dialogue in philosophical practice¹, and after years of working with

¹ DINKINS, Christine Sorrell: "Shared Inquiry: Socratic-Hermeneutic Interpretive", in: IRONSIDE, Pamela (ed.): *Beyond Method: Philosophical Conversations in Healthcare and Scholarship*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2005, pp. 111-147; DINKINS, Christine Sorrell and SORRELL, Jeanne: *Our Dissertations, Ourselves: Shared Stories of Women's Dissertation Journeys*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014; SORRELL, Jeanne, CANGELOSI, Pamela and DINKINS, Christine Sorrell: "Dialog on a Country Path: The Qualitative Research Journey", in *Nurse Education Today*, vol. 34, Philadelphia, PA (USA), 2014, pp. 295-298; HANSEN, FINN; Finn Thorbjørn: *Den sokratiske dialoggruppe [The Socratic Dialogue Group]*, Gyldendal, Copenhagen, 2000; HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: *Det filosofiske liv [The Philosophical Life]*, Gyldendal, Copenhagen, 2002; HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: *At stå i det åbne: Dannelse gennem filosofisk undren og nærvær [To Stand in the Openness: Bildung through Philosophical Wonder and Presence]*, Aalborg University Press, Aalborg, 2008; HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: "One Step Further: The Dance Between Poetic Dwelling and Socratic Wonder in Phenomenological Research", in GALVIN, Kathleen (ed.): *Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (Special Edition)*, New York, 2012, pp. 1-20; HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: *Kan man undre sig uden ord?: Design- og universitetspædagogik på kreative videregående uddannelser [Can We Wonder without Words? Design and University Pedagogic in Creative Higher Education]*, Aalborg University Press, Aalborg, 2014; HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: "Det sokratiske forskningsinterview [The Socratic Research Interview]", in MUNK, Karen (ed.): *Metodefetichisme, kvalitative metode på afveje - ophav, kritik, nye perspektiver*, Aarhus University Press, Aarhus, 2015; HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: "The Call and Practice of Wonder: How to Evoke a Socratic Community of Wonder in Professional Settings", in WEISS, Michael Noah (ed.): *The Socratic*

Socratic dialogue in the contexts of qualitative and action research, the authors have observed a consistent pattern of unfolding and opening in these dialogues. Through Socratic dialogue, the researcher helps participants through and past a cognitive approach to the phenomenon, leading to a point of being stuck or puzzled (*aporia*). Faced with *aporia* and encouraged to continue reflecting, the participant and the researcher enter together into a community of wonder (*thaumazein*), moving past mere observation and perception of lived experience to a sense of foreboding (“What is the phenomenon? Why is it hard to grasp? What in the phenomenon seems to call to me?”) and finally to openness. This openness is the comportment necessary for what Heidegger calls the “clearing” or “event”². This openness allows the researcher and participant to serve as a ground for *aletheia*, allowing the phenomenon to reveal itself. While the authors’ earlier works have focused on aspects of *aporia* and *thaumazein*, this article will focus especially on the movement from wonder to foreboding to the open comportment necessary for *aletheia*.

Socrates’ Goals and Method in Plato’s Works

Since phenomenological researchers have a variety of established modes of questioning available to them, let us first examine the benefits specifically of Socratic dialogue, or Socratic shared inquiry. Heidegger asserts that in the search for truth, “the *wonder*

Handbook, LIT Verlag, Vienna, 2015; HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: "The Philosophical Practitioner as a Co-Researcher", in AMIR, Lydia and FATIC, Aleksandar (eds.): *Practicing Philosophy*, Cambridge Scholars Press, Cambridge, 2015.

² HEIDEGGER, Martin: *Poetry, Language, Thought*, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1975; HEIDEGGER, Martin: *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2012.

of questioning must be experienced in carrying it out and must be made effective as an awakening and strengthening of the power to question.”³ Likewise Gadamer, in discussing phenomenological hermeneutic methods, argues, “only the person who knows how to ask questions is able to persist in his questioning, which involves being able to preserve his orientation toward openness. The art of questioning is the art of questioning ever further.”⁴ Here, Gadamer’s language points to an advantage in a questioning style that allows for follow-up questions, for digging deeper into an inquiry, moving the inquiry toward openness. Gadamer goes on to say, “the hermeneutic phenomenon... implies the primacy of dialogue.”⁵ Dialogue, unlike some sorts of questioning, implies a back-and-forth, a give-and-take. For a conversation or an interview to be a dialogue, the researcher must listen, respond, project an idea forward, listen, and continue this way in a reciprocal process. The Socratic researcher must listen for concepts or ideas that seem to resonate with a “living meaning” as opposed to “the dead trace of meaning.”⁶ The researcher can be helped in these goals by having a sort of phenomenological “musicality”⁷ for the voice of the subject matter itself (*die Sache selbst*).

If such dialogue is the goal, the ancient expert of philosophical dialogue, Socrates, can still be very relevant for researchers today. Socrates as he appears in Plato’s dialogues is not just a model philosopher but a model *philosophical practitioner*. Unlike his

³ HEIDEGGER, Martin: *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2012, p. 10

⁴ GADAMER, Hans-Georg: *Truth and Method*, Sheed and Ward Ltd., London, 1989, p. 367

⁵ Ibid, p. 369

⁶ Ibid, pp. 167 and 164

⁷ HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: “One Step Further: The Dance Between Poetic Dwelling and Socratic Wonder in Phenomenological Research”, in GALVIN, Kathleen (ed.): *Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology* (Special Edition), New York, 2012, pp. 1-20.

predecessors and the majority of philosophers who came after him, Socrates was no theoretician or arm-chair philosopher, and he did not merely apply his philosophical theories to larger issues. He insisted on *practicing his philosophy* as a communal activity.⁸ In Plato's *Apology*, when Socrates is on trial for corrupting the youth, given the option of accepting exile as his sentence, he refuses, saying it would do him no good since then he would be among strangers who would not talk with him, so he would be unable to practice philosophy.⁹

Throughout Plato's dialogues, we see Socrates pursuing philosophical inquiry through friendly, caring conversations with partners or a group. In fact, it is reasonably clear that Socrates was put to death not primarily for his views or for any sacrilege, but because he would not stop engaging in inquiry with the youth and encouraging them to pursue their own questions. Fortunately for modern researchers, Plato's dialogues provide rich illustrations of Socrates' mode of inquiry. While this method is not entirely consistent across all the dialogues, certain techniques and principles appear again and again, and these techniques and principles can serve as guides for modern researchers.

Socrates tends to start an inquiry by asking for a definition. In the *Meno*, when Meno abruptly asks Socrates whether or not virtue is teachable, Socrates insists, "I am so far from knowing whether virtue can be taught or not that I do not even have knowledge of what virtue itself is."¹⁰ In other dialogues, when a friend or person of importance seems to be taking a significant action, Socrates begins an inquiry by asking the person to define the virtue relevant

⁸ PLATO: *Apology*, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): *Five Dialogues*, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 29d

⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 37c-38a

¹⁰ PLATO: *Meno*, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): *Five Dialogues*, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 71a

to the situation.¹¹ Starting with a definition allows both partners in the dialogue to have a foundation to examine, reflect on, and question as they explore their own ideas about the phenomenon under study.

To help an inquiry along, Socrates often uses an analogy to help his co-inquirer think through their own ideas and statements. When Euthyphro defines piety as a matter of service to the gods, Socrates asks about shipbuilders and generals to clarify what sort of service Euthyphro means.¹² In a similar way, Socrates uses examples to test out and explore a co-inquirer's statements. When Menexenus has claimed that two people can be friends when only one of them loves the other, Socrates presents a test example of a man who is hated by his beloved. Reflecting on this example, Menexenus finds that he wants to question his earlier claim, realizing now that neither person in such a case can be called a friend.¹³

A typical Socratic dialogue proceeds somewhat along the following pattern:

1. A friend asks Socrates a question or Socrates sees someone performing a significant or questionable act.
2. Socrates asks the person for a definition of the relevant virtue, thus beginning with his dialogue partner a shared inquiry into the nature of that virtue.
3. The co-inquirer offers a definition.
4. Using analogies, examples, and follow-up questions, Socrates prods the co-inquirer to help the co-inquirer find

¹¹ E.g., PLATO: *Euthyphro*, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): *Five Dialogues*, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 4c-d

¹² PLATO: *Euthyphro*, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): *Five Dialogues*, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, pp. 13e-14a

¹³ PLATO: *Lysis*, in REEVE, C.D.C (ed.): *Plato on Love: Lysis, Symposium, Phaedrus, Alcibiades, with Selections from Republic and Laws*, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2006, p. 212b-c

conflicts in his beliefs or other revelations that make him doubt his definition.

5. The process of #4 leads the co-inquirer to revise or reject his definition of the virtue.
6. Socrates encourages the co-inquirer to try another definition. Steps 3-5 repeat.
7. The dialogue ends, usually with little resolution. A proper definition has not been found, and Socrates and his co-inquirer are left to ponder further.

Underlying these techniques and patterns, and just as important to his method, are certain principles Socrates seems to hold dear. He considers the inquiry to be a *shared* inquiry. While he maintains a Socratic veil and rarely shares his own opinion outright, he does participate actively in the dialogue, allowing his own expectations to guide his questioning as he and his partner explore the partner's beliefs about the phenomenon. Socrates sees this inquiry as a process that guides his partners to "discover within themselves a multitude of beautiful things, which they bring forth into the light."¹⁴

Socrates frequently and explicitly insists that his co-inquirers say what they actually believe, rather than saying the popular view or what they have heard from experts or what they think Socrates wants them to say. Socrates asks Crito, "try to answer what I ask you in the way you think best."¹⁵ Theaetetus raises this issue explicitly when he says, "if I answer what seems true in relation to the present question, I shall say 'no, it is not possible;' but if I consider it in relation to the question that went before, then in order to avoid contradicting myself, I say 'Yes, it is.'" Socrates asserts that Theaetetus must say what he believes, not just what will allow

¹⁴ PLATO: *Theaetetus*, LEVETT, M.J. and BURNYEAT Miles (trans.), Hackett, Indianapolis, 1990, p. 150d

¹⁵ PLATO: *Crito*, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): *Five Dialogues*, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 49a

him to avoid contradiction: “if you answer ‘Yes,’ ... the tongue will be safe from refutation but the mind will not.”¹⁶

Socrates says that he is a midwife like his mother, except that he is a midwife of ideas. Midwives in Ancient Greece helped deliver babies and also were trusted match-makers. For Socrates, this midwife role involves helping his co-inquirer connect (match up) beliefs and ideas, looking to see which ones yield “phantoms” or “fertile truths.”¹⁷ Socrates seems to rely on a connectedness among his partner’s beliefs and an instinct from the partner of which ideas are closer to the truth. Thus, if Socrates can identify a conflict between beliefs, he can press his co-inquirer to choose one over the other – which seems more right? The most dramatic example of this cross-comparison happens when Euthyphro describes care of the gods as giving them what they need. Socrates asks, do we care for the gods in a way that is supposed to make them better? Euthyphro, a good priest, responds “by Zeus, no!”¹⁸

Socrates explains this connecting-and-comparing process in the *Theaetetus*: “Our first aim will be to look at our thoughts themselves in relation to themselves, and see what they are – whether, in our opinion, they agree with one another or are entirely at variance.”¹⁹ In that same work, Socrates asserts that midwives are “marvelously knowing about the kind of couples whose marriage will produce the best children.”²⁰ He seems here to suggest that he is an expert in helping his dialogue partners find which ideas to compare to think more deeply and reflect more

¹⁶ PLATO: *Theaetetus*, LEVETT, M.J. and BURNYEAT Miles (trans.), Hackett, Indianapolis, 1990, p. 154d

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 150c

¹⁸ PLATO: *Euthyphro*, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): *Five Dialogues*, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 13c

¹⁹ PLATO: *Theaetetus*, LEVETT, M.J. and BURNYEAT Miles (trans.), Hackett, Indianapolis, 1990, p. 154e

²⁰ Ibid, p. 149d

critically on their beliefs about a given phenomenon. This process has no set goal, no assumed outcome, beyond a search for, and love of, wisdom and truth. And with that love of wisdom comes “doric harmony: between *logos* and *ergon*.²¹ As Socrates describes this beautiful process, “the lover of inquiry must follow his beloved wherever it may lead him.”²²

Together, Socrates and his co-inquirer can check each other’s assumptions and help each other follow genuinely “the beloved” (the call of the inquiry or the phenomenon itself). The process may be largely negative – discovering false assumptions, realizing that perceived aspects of the phenomenon might not be accurate – right up to the end of a dialogue, when almost always the dialogue partner expresses frustration at not having found a definition. The partner, and the dialogue as a whole, are left in *aporia*. They are stuck, struck dumb by realization of how little they know that they thought they knew. But throughout the dialogues, it is abundantly clear that this *aporia* is a *positive* force. The *aporia* gets interlocutors past the illusion that they know what they do not know. After all, Socrates is the wisest man in Greece not because he knows so much, but because more than anyone else, he knows how little he knows.²³

For some interlocutors, *aporia* may be where their inquiry ends. Frustrated, they know they do not know, but cannot or will not proceed past that point. For others – those who love wisdom, those who seek truth – *aporia* creates a sense of wonder, or *thaumazein*. Famously, in the *Theaetetus*, Socrates says, “For this is an experience which is characteristic of a philosopher, this

²¹ PLATO: *Laches*, in SPRAGUE, Rosamond Kent (trans.): *Laches and Charmides*, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1992, p. 188d

²² PLATO: *Euthyphro*, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): *Five Dialogues*, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 14b

²³ PLATO: *Apology*, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): *Five Dialogues*, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 23b

wondering (*thaumazein*): this is where philosophy begins and nowhere else.”²⁴ This oft-quoted sentence has led many scholars to attribute to Plato (or to Plato’s Socrates) the claim that philosophy begins in wonder. But Plato gives us very little to go on here. What is this wonder? Why must philosophy begin in *thaumazein*? Ranner²⁵ argues that *thaumazein* is a philosopher’s response to aporia. The choice and determination to continue dwelling in the realization of lack of knowledge, to continue the inquiry – this determination is *thaumazein*; this commitment is the beginning of philosophy. The beginning of philosophy in its original sense as “love of wisdom,” not a theoretical, merely intellectual approach, but a true longing and desire. Heidegger writes about this passage, emphasizing the importance continually to *dwell* in wonder:

This characterization of the origin of philosophy out of marveling... is often quoted and readily cited in order to account for the origin of philosophy psychologically and in that way to deprive philosophy precisely of the wondrous... But what is at issue here is only to raise philosophy – or any other essentially creative power – up into its inexplicability and to preserve it there, and only there, as a possible acquisition against all trivialization. To say philosophy originates in wonder means philosophy is wondrous in its essence and becomes more wondrous the more it becomes what it really is.²⁶

This reading of *thaumazein* and its place in inquiry and in philosophy fits well with the Cave allegory. This *thaumazein* is a sort of love (*eros*) of wisdom, a love experienced as wonder. We

²⁴ PLATO: *Theaetetus*, LEVETT, M.J. and BURNYEAT Miles (trans.), Hackett, Indianapolis, 1990, p. 155d

²⁵ RANNER, Oliver: “Plato and Aristotle on the Origin of Philosophy”, available in <http://www.apaclassics.org/AnnualMeeting/03mtg/abstracts/ranner.html> (last access September 30, 2015), 2003.

²⁶ HEIDEGGER, Martin: *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic”*, ROJCEWICZA, Richard and SCHUWER, Andre (trans.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994, p. 141

experience true wonderment when we silently experience an ontological relation with something we really care for but that we cannot find words for or explain. The prisoner shackled all his life in the cave, who escapes to see the real world and eventually the sun, faces pain, hardship, fear, confusion, and is eventually rewarded with the light of truth. His experience is dazzling, blinding and at the same time wondrous and beautiful. Quite an egalitarian for his time, Socrates – who taught youth who could not afford to pay Sophists, and taught a slave boy to do geometry²⁷ – says after the Cave allegory, “our present discussion... shows that the power to learn is present in everyone’s soul and that the instrument with which each learns is like an eye that cannot be turned around from darkness to light without turning the whole body.”²⁸ This strong assertion by Socrates, together with the dialogue model Plato entrusts to us in his works, gives today’s researchers a guiding path and also a promise. In a shared inquiry, each soul – researcher’s and participant’s – can be turned toward the light. This light is not a cognitive truth but rather a living ontological relation and sudden opening that happens so that wordless insight (*nous*) can happen.

With the cave as a key illustration of the Socratic journey (following the “beloved”), and *thaumazein* understood in this light, it becomes clear that Socrates’ questions in the dialogues are not seeking to expose mere logical deficiencies in interlocutors’ statements. His questions seek what phenomenologists might call an existential or ontological deficiency. If a person cannot *live* his thoughts, or if his thoughts are out of harmony with each other, he is not out of the cave; he is not in the loving relation with the world. Socrates’ dialogues aim to strengthen the interlocutor’s

²⁷ PLATO: *Meno*, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): *Five Dialogues*, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 82b-84b

²⁸ PLATO: *Republic*, GRUBE, G.M.A and REEVE, C.D.C. (trans), Hackett, Indianapolis, 1992, p. 518c

ergon by way of studying and testing the *logos*. Gadamer writes in *Dialogue and Dialectic*:²⁹ “When we have been disappointed by another and must say of him that ‘he has no idea of what friendship is’, we are speaking of no logical deficiency in his ability to define something, to be sure, but of a deficiency in knowledge nonetheless.” Thus, if we want truly to know what friendship is (ontologically) we must first *live* it, be-with and be-in-relation-to the phenomenon. The prisoner comes out of the cave into the light to *live* The Good and The Beautiful, to hunt for the words (*logoi*) while seeking to ground his deed (*ergon*) in truth (*aletheia*). To seek Doric harmony in life and actions.

Goals and Outcomes of Socratic Dialogue in Qualitative and Action Research

The goal of Socratic dialogue in Plato’s works seems to be initially *aporia*, opening the way for *thaumazein* and, ideally, eventually, *aletheia* - truth. The goal of Socratic dialogue in qualitative or action research is largely the same, but with more emphasis on the search for and proper comportment to ground truth as *aletheia*. *Aletheia* is not a propositional truth or a clear concept description. Rather, it is the truth of the Ancient Greeks who came before Plato, the truth before humans began to think of truth as correctness. *Aletheia* is a self-revealing of the phenomenon that is the subject of the inquiry. The phenomenon unconceals itself.³⁰

In seeking *aletheia*, Socratic dialogue in research seeks that openness that makes way for *aletheia*: An openness that comes

²⁹ GADAMER, Hans-Georg: *Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato*, SMITH, P. Christopher (trans.), Yale University Press, New Haven, 1980, p. 10

³⁰ HEIDEGGER, Martin: *Being and Time*, STAMBAUGH, Joan (trans.), SUNY Press, New York, 2010.

with love (of inquiry, of wisdom), with care (for the phenomenon, for those encountered with it) and with a desire to live an examined life. This research is grounded in Socrates' claim that "an unexamined life is not worth living",³¹ a commitment to help participants dwell in wonder rather than give up in *aporia*, to describe authentically lived experience and then move beyond to a reflective view of that experience and of that perspective. In that moving beyond lived experience, the participant and researcher may experience a foreboding – a sense of the phenomenon, of truth itself, concealing itself even as unconcealment is on the horizon. This foreboding is the final preparation for the openness that grounds *aletheia*.

Many elements of Socratic inquiry are synergistic with elements of phenomenological theory and practice. Eidetic reduction, for example, tends to involve comparisons, the imagining of differences, and a testing of what belongs to the phenomenon and what does not. Van Manen describes eidetic reduction in this way:

Eidetic reduction aims to somehow express in language what is experienced prior to reflection on the experience... In eidetic reduction one needs to see past or through the particularity of lived experience toward the *eidos* that lies on the other side of the concreteness of lived meaning. The idea of phenomenological *eidos* does not refer to some immutable universal or generalization about human nature of human life... The first important reminder is that phenomenological inquiry is only concerned with "possible" human experiences - not with experiences that are presumed to be empirically or culturally universal or shared by all human irrespective of time, culture, gender, or other circumstances. The second important reminder is that phenomenological determination of meaning is always indeterminate, always tentative, always incomplete, always inclined to question

³¹ PLATO: *Apology*, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): *Five Dialogues*, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 38a

assumptions by returning again and again to lived experience itself, the beginning of phenomenological inquiry.³²

Along similar lines, Socratic inquiry is designed to compare, test assumptions, and ferret out the borders of a phenomenon. In addition to eidetic reduction, the hermeneutic circle is echoed in Socrates' inquiries, which often circle back to the beginning. Heidegger states that on the hermeneutic circle, "every inquiry is a seeking," and that "every seeking gets guided before-hand by what is sought."³³ Socratic method relies on Socrates' (or the researcher's) glimpses of what may lie just ahead in the inquiry to guide the questions asked of the partner or research participant. These glimpses are not just possible logical steps ahead but rather possible inspirations and forebodings from the "reverberation" of the phenomenon being invited into the inquiry.

Similarly, Socrates' model as a midwife suits the modern phenomenological researcher well. Socrates' inquiries are rooted in care – for the phenomenon as such, for his dialogue partners, for his community – just as a modern researcher's inquiry is or should be. In research through Socratic dialogue, the researcher and participant develop a trust and a closeness. The researcher must show vulnerability and expose some of her own assumptions to questioning, just as Socrates does. This finds its zenith in the community of wonder where both the Socratic researcher and the interlocutor(s) are taken and led by the questions and by the subject matter itself. Like Socrates, like a midwife, the researcher leads the participant to a way of self-care – an examined life; an authentic, reflective, philosophical life. By leading participants past *aporia*,

³² VAN MANEN, Max: *Phenomenology of Practice. Meaning-giving methods in phenomenological research and writing*. Left Coast Press, Walnut Creek, CA (USA), 2014, pp. 229-230

³³ HEIDEGGER, Martin: *Being and Time*, MACQUARRIE, J. and ROBINSON, E. (trans.), Harper & Row, New York, 1962, p. 24

encouraging them to dwell in wonder, to welcome the foreboding of the phenomenon as truth withdraws and then is revealed, the researcher can hope to help participants develop tools or cultivate virtues to keep thinking and reflecting beyond the limited situation of the interview or of the group research sessions. The researcher can guide participants to continue to see the sun even when they must journey back into the everyday life of the cave – whether that be taking care of a loved one with Alzheimer’s or living one’s daily professional practice.

In practice, Socratic dialogue in research follows the same principles and techniques as Socrates in Plato’s dialogues. The researcher may start by asking for a definition or asks some other foundational question. In trying to answer the initial question, the participant is likely to hit obstacles and to discover conflicts in beliefs as the researcher asks about examples or offers analogies. Through this process, the participant’s naturally *cognitive* approach to the phenomenon is accepted and even welcomed but eventually defeated. Any phenomenon under study resists clear, simple, objective description; the phenomenon conceals itself. Once the cognitive approach proves a challenge and ends in *aporia*, once the participants have rich awareness of their not-knowing about the phenomenon, the participants are ready for wonder, *thaumazein*, for openness to the mystery.³⁴ With the cognitive approach closed down, researcher and participant can stop *thinking at* the phenomenon and begin to *dwell in* that uncomfortable but intriguing space of ignorance and longing-to-know, the place where a certain “hearken” and foreboding starts to appear. They can pursue wisdom together, excitedly chasing after the call of the phenomenon. In their community of wonder, they can practice love-of-wisdom, philosophy, together. This process is akin to what

³⁴ HEIDEGGER, Martin: *Discourse on Thinking*, ANDERSON, J.M. and FREUND, E.H. (trans.), Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1969.

Heidegger calls “the critical regress from correctness to openness.”³⁵

Having moved beyond the merely cognitive, this wonder and awareness of mystery allow participants to focus on their lived experience of and with the phenomenon. How has it actually appeared and been experienced, beyond what we *think* it is supposed to be? This phase of the qualitative interview, or of the “Wonder Lab” in the action research process, asks participants to relate to the phenomenon in an experiential, existential, even ontological way. What is it to be-with the phenomenon? To be-in-the-world in relation to the phenomenon? Participants are helped to articulate what they have witnessed and experienced, with many of their presuppositions and opinions now cleared away. In focusing on their lived experience, they come closer to their immediate connection with the phenomenon.

While lived experience is the focus or even the goal of much qualitative research in current practice, lived experience alone raises concerns about what it does or does not reveal about the phenomenon. Brinkmann³⁶ argues that limited questioning designed to elicit descriptions of lived experience lets the researcher learn more about the participant than about the phenomenon; he calls these interviews “doxastic,” stating that they reveal primarily the participants’ impressions or opinions about the phenomenon³⁷. Van Manen³⁸ also discusses the limitations of a

³⁵ HEIDEGGER, Martin: *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2012, p. 261

³⁶ BRINKMANN, Svend: “Could Interviews Be Epistemic? An Alternative to Qualitative Opinion Polling”, in *Qualitative Inquiry*, Vol. 13, No. 8 (December), Los Angeles, 2007, pp. 1116-1138.

³⁷ Brinkmann instead suggests that we must go from doxastic interviewing to ‘epistemic interviewing’, and Brinkmann connects the Socratic dialogue and maieutics as a model for this epistemic interviewing in qualitative research in order to produce better scientific knowledge. But Hansen (2015a, 2015b) critically discusses this suggestion by Brinkmann and argues for a Socratic

focus on lived experience. Experience, he says, is immediate and elusive; complex enough that it is difficult for any description to capture its essence.

Heidegger also explores the limitations of lived experience. In *The Origin of the Work of Art*, his concerns about experience of art can alert us to concerns about focus on experience overall. He argues, “The way in which man experiences art is supposed to give information about its nature. Experience is the source that is standard ... for art appreciation...Everything is an experience. Yet perhaps experience is the element in which art dies.”³⁹ Heidegger is concerned that by focusing on experience, we Enframe the work of art, filtering and predetermining how it should appear to us. We force it to appear before us, to appear *for* us. Generalizing from Heidegger’s concerns here about understanding art merely through experience, we can see that focus on lived experience leads participants to ask, “what does the phenomenon mean to *me*? How does it appear to *me*?” Focus on lived experience is a very useful step in grasping our direct connections with the phenomenon and beginning to articulate our experiences of the phenomenon. Limiting ourselves to lived experience, however, does an injustice to the phenomenon and fails to lay the groundwork for the process of *aletheia*.

Heidegger voices similar concerns about lived experience in *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*. In that work, he finds that “lived experience promotes and entrenches the anthropological

interviewing that goes from doxa over episteme to thaumazein as it is in fact not knowledge, but this special kind of ontological not-knowing; a phenomenological, silent and wondrous seeing into the heart of things that may be the overall purpose of the Socratic maeiutics.

³⁸ VAN MANEN, Max: *Researching lived experience: Human science for an action sensitive pedagogy*, SUNY, New York, 1997.

³⁹ HEIDEGGER, Martin: *Poetry, Language, Thought*, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1975, p. 79

way of thinking.”⁴⁰ He sees the focus on lived experience as linked to machination and our obsessive need to explain (and thereby control) everything, while being and truth abandon us.⁴¹ Heidegger thus urges us to reach beyond this anthropocentric view to that which withdraws from us. To put this same idea in Socratic terms, the concern seems to be that even in focusing on lived experience, there is still an illusion of knowing, a blocking out of the not-knowing, of the phenomenon and truth that withdraw from us even as we try to grasp them. Of course, in any phenomenological inquiry, we are always examining the phenomenon through experience, because experience is all we have; experience is reality.

Nevertheless, addressing the concerns voiced above, we do not have to put ourselves at the center of that experiential truth. A philosophical practitioner can help a research participant move to a more reflective critical mode, looking from outside at this lived experience. The practitioner first can encourage the participants to ‘unfreeze’ the frozen concepts, assumptions, or intuitions which the participant has used to describe this lived experience or which seem to be taken for granted in the description. Next this Socratic practitioner can join the participants in trying to think *from within* or *towards* that which seems to emerge when the frozen concepts are opened up and the phenomenon becomes more free to ‘speak back’ in its own voice. To get into a resonance or dialogue with that ‘voice’, the researcher and participants in the dialogue have to move into a more contemplative, wondrous and listening kind of attuned thinking (which the Greeks called the movement of *theoria*). This critical reflection and wondrous thinking may parallel the journey out of Plato’s cave, a journey researcher and participant make together.

⁴⁰ HEIDEGGER, Martin: *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2012, p. 104

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 103-104

Awareness of the limits of lived experience, as this seeming knowing is revealed to be a new stage of not-knowing, can help bring on an uneasiness, a restlessness or anxiety, like what Heidegger calls the foreboding: “In the first beginning: wonder. In the other beginning: foreboding.”⁴² Many if not all researchers have experienced this foreboding, even if they have not labelled it in this way. It can be that spine-tingling or eerie sense that something beyond us speaks to us even as it withdraws. Heidegger says it is the “basic disposition” needed for *aletheia*; a disposition without which “everything is a forced clatter of concepts and of the mere shells of words.”⁴³ Heidegger says the term “foreboding” will not always capture this disposition, which might also be called “shock” or “restraint.” In whatever form it takes, it is the “sheltering of the unconcealment of the concealed”,⁴⁴ i.e. it is the ground for *aletheia*.

In Socratic interviewing and the action-in-the-field done by the ‘Wonder Lab’ of Socratic action research (see later), as the researcher guides participants past the cognitive and any “clatter of concepts” or “mere shells of words” to *aporia* to a state of wonder and then a realization of the limitations of lived experience, the Socratic questioning provides a consistent reminder of the not-knowing. It brings on the vulnerability experienced in foreboding in order to make way for *aletheia*. Returning to the interpretation of Plato’s *thaumazein* as a philosopher’s response to *aporia*, Socratic questioning maintains the acceptance – even the embrace - of the not-knowing. It preserves the choice to inquire, to listen, to wonder, rather than to admit defeat or to declare a question decided. Heidegger calls for this same sort of attitude when he declares,

⁴² Ibid, p. 18

⁴³ HEIDEGGER, Martin: *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2012, p. 19

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 19

“The questioners have broken the habit of curiosity; their seeking loves the abyss, in which they know the oldest ground.”⁴⁵

Socratic questioning thus prepares the way for *aletheia* by establishing and preserving the proper comportment for the grounding of *aletheia*. Truth as *aletheia* is an event, a clearing. This clearing, Heidegger says, is the clearing “for concealment (truth as un-truth), in itself conflictual.” Truth, he says, is “the clearing for self-concealing.”⁴⁶ On this understanding of truth, one cannot have truth (unconcealment) without concealment. Socratic inquiry’s preservation of the not-knowing acts as a concealment – a shutting down of assumptions and of demands projected at the phenomenon, with a resulting protecting concealment to allow for the phenomenon’s unconcealment. Heidegger makes the importance of this knowing-we-do-not-know clear in his insistence that the clearing, the potential unfolding of *aletheia*, must not become “an emptiness in which everything simply presents itself as equally easy to ‘understand’ and master.”⁴⁷

Socratic questioning, among all forms of dialogue, has perhaps the unique ability to maintain concealment – this awareness of not-knowing – while preparing the ground for unconcealment. Heidegger argues:

The self-concealing protrudes through the clearing, and only if that happens, i.e. only if the conflictual in its intimacy reigns throughout the ‘there,’ can the dislodgement from the indeterminate (and, as such, not at all grasped) domain of representation and lived experience succeed and can steadfastness in Da-sein be attempted... Therefore truth is never merely clearing; it essentially occurs as concealment just as originarily and intimately along with the clearing. These, clearing and

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 13

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 273

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 276

concealment, are not two; instead they constitute the essential occurrence of the one truth itself.⁴⁸

Thus, Socratic dialogue's reciprocal relationship between not-knowing and the love of wisdom and inquiry, between *thaumazein* and *aletheia*, may suit it perfectly for preserving and following this conflictual yet necessary relationship between concealment and unconcealment.

The Socratic researcher's goal to help participants live philosophically, to live an examined life, also fits well with what Heidegger views as the authentic life for *Da-sein*. He worries that we have lost the ability to be *Da-sein* as we fall prey to belief in our own knowledge and the control and power over the world that come with that knowledge. He urges that we must "let *Da-sein* arise out of ... the essential occurrence of truth in order to ground therein beings as a whole and as such and, in the midst of them, to ground the human being."⁴⁹ Our calling, Heidegger believes, our role as *Da-sein* if we are to live authentically, happens only "in the modes in which truth is sheltered out of the securing of the cleared-concealed event."⁵⁰

Thus, to pursue Socratic inquiry, to remain in wonder with a preservation of the not-knowing, is to live authentically, to live philosophically; to resist being curious for answers and instead remain open to being a ground for truth to reveal itself. When researcher and participant become, together, a ground for the clearing that is *aletheia*, the researcher is helping the participant to live authentically. There is a vulnerability in this process for both researcher and participant; they are allowing themselves to be thrown, unprotected, into the happening of the clearing.⁵¹ This

⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 276

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 9

⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 26

⁵¹ HEIDEGGER, Martin: *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, Indiana

vulnerability requires the care, trust, and respect that Socrates so often models in Plato's dialogues.

Socratic Dialogue in Practice – Qualitative Research and Action Research

A qualitative or action researcher who wishes to guide participants through this process from a cognitive to a more ontological approach to the phenomenon, seeking an openness as a grounding for *aletheia*, will be served well by a Socratic shared inquiry approach. Just as importantly, this approach enables the researcher herself to remain open, as the dialogue tests her own assumptions as well, avoiding what Gadamer calls “the tyranny of hidden prejudices that [make] us deaf to what speaks to us.”⁵² In addition to the benefits of the dialogue itself, beginning with a definitional question allows the researcher to start at a neutral point so that interview participants can take the conversation in their own direction. Participants are likely to introduce ideas the researcher may not have anticipated.

Following are specific examples from qualitative and action research to help give a more thorough picture of how this method unfolds in both of these contexts. In both qualitative one-on-one interviews and in action research in a group practice setting, it is best to explain to participants a bit about the method, so that participants will not be caught off guard by the questioning, nor mistake it as meant to challenge in an unfriendly way. The researcher might say, “I may press you a bit, and that is so we can both work to understand the implications of what you are saying.” The researcher should make explicit that this is a shared inquiry: “I

University Press, Bloomington, 2012, p. 260

⁵² GADAMER, Hans-Georg: *Truth and Method*, Sheed and Ward Ltd., London, 1989, p. 270

don't know the answers either – I want to learn from you,” an echo of what Socrates tells his dialogue partners in almost every Platonic dialogue.⁵³

A researcher using Socratic dialogue makes herself more vulnerable than one who is using a more structured approach to interviewing, for instance one with largely pre-determined questions. She must be ready to expose her own doubts and prejudices and also to think on her feet. Because the dialogue can be challenging for the researcher and participants, it is all the more important for the researcher to model clearly the virtues of friendship, love, humility, patience, humor, and courage. The researcher thereby can invite the participants to practice these same virtues: the courage to put oneself at play, to take a stand; the patience to wait for the phenomenon's call; the humility in accepting, without being too discouraged, our own lack of knowledge.

Socratic one-on-one interviews in qualitative research

In one-on-one interviews in qualitative research, after setting the stage and explaining the method, the researcher starts by asking for a definition of the phenomenon in question. Most likely, the participants have been chosen because of some significant connection with the phenomenon, so they will expect that they know a fair amount about it. In a recent study on women's experiences writing a dissertation,⁵⁴ the researcher started with the

⁵³ See, e.g., PLATO: *Euthyphro*, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): *Five Dialogues*, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 16a; PLATO: *Meno*, in GRUBE, G.M.A. and COOPER, J.M. (trans.): *Five Dialogues*, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, p. 70b-70c

⁵⁴ DINKINS, Christine Sorrell and SORRELL, Jeanne: *Our Dissertations, Ourselves: Shared Stories of Women's Dissertation Journeys*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014.

question, “what is a dissertation?” Some participants tried definitions that were ultimately abandoned or heavily revised, while others were stuck from the very start, realizing they had written an entire dissertation but still could not say what one is.

When Eleanor was asked, “what is a dissertation?” she said: “When I started thinking about that question, I had trouble separating it from what I believe other people think it should be . . . and it’s kind of funny because one of the things I think a dissertation is means our making that separation, and figuring out what we really do believe.”⁵⁵ Here, we see Eleanor catching herself tempted to violate the “say what you believe” principle. It is often easier to articulate what we know others say of the phenomenon – what it is *supposed* to be – than what we think it is ourselves. Alecia found she could best express her definition of a dissertation through an analogy:

The whole idea is very pregnancy-like, it’s very much your baby that you create, but... it’s totally you and I guess what people are able to do is to say, okay, this is my genes, and I want this, this, this, this, and this... having this huge project that looms ahead of you that you’ve spent all this time working in this area, developing this thing, you have some definite ideas about how this is, and then you’re creating this kinda baby of yours.⁵⁶

Many of the participants found that their understanding of a dissertation had changed as they had progressed in the writing process. Mary said, “When you start you think, oh, I’m going to answer an enormous question and make such a difference. But that’s just not true. You’re going to answer maybe a part of a question, or you’re going to add to the body of knowledge about a

⁵⁵ DIKINS, Christine Sorrell and SORRELL, Jeanne: *Our Dissertations, Ourselves: Shared Stories of Women’s Dissertation Journeys*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014, p. 3

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p. 4

question that others are working on. But that kept me up at night, you know?”⁵⁷ In all of these interviews, the definition or the attempt at a definition is never a conclusive answer. Instead, the attempt at the definition opens up the participant’s thinking, exposing assumptions, forcing a comparison of beliefs with each other and with actual experience, opening up the inquiry for genuine curiosity and wonder.

Examples and analogies help a participant in one-on-one interviews explore and test their beliefs and statements about the phenomenon. In a research study on the value of a face-to-face liberal arts education,⁵⁸ several students were asked the initial question, “What is X College to you?” The students explained that faculty and staff at their college “cared” about them as people, not just students. The concept of care can mean many things, and therefore examples and analogies were necessary to examine these statements further. How is this care the same or different as the care you would expect from a professional to a client, from a doctor to a patient? How is it the same or different from the care of a family member? One student explained that caring from faculty is unique:

When you know that you are going to be asked to be engaged personally, there is an accountability there. It’s like the professor says, “I care about you and I’m invested in you” - holding me accountable - I have to perform to get the most out of that relationship, and in the freshman year, we might not do that, but when you finally do that, the rewards are out of this world.

Another student responded, “it’s more of a mentor/protégé sort of thing and that’s been vitally important towards development of what I believe and my approach to my academics.” This response,

⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 6

⁵⁸ DINKINS, Christine Sorrell: “Articulating the Value of a Face-to-Face Liberal Arts Education,” unpublished study.

in turn, prompted questions about what mentor and protégé meant in this context.

When a college counselor in this study said that the culture on campus is like that of family, this claim necessitated prompting on the ways in which the culture is or is not like a family of mother, father, son, or daughter living in a household. This questioning allowed the counselor to clarify that part of the family aspect on the campus *is* the living together, the being there for each other: “most of our students might [when they are stressed] - if they were living at home or in a different place might go to a parent or a best friend or someone who had known them for a long time - and they come here and they don't have that. They are looking for a safe place to be.” The counselor explained, “I think that we do a lot of times help cushion or take the place of that family unit that these students are leaving for the first time.”

In these one-on-one interviews, the researcher is always midwifing. She is connecting ideas, looking to see which ones might match up to lead to a fruitful step in the inquiry, even if that step is primarily a negative or purgatory one – bringing to light prejudices or gaps in knowledge. The interviews always reach a point of *aporia* in which both researcher and participant realize that what they do not know about the phenomenon far outweighs what they do know. In the dissertation study, this *aporia* was particularly powerful, as the women participants realized that after years of writing and eventually completing a dissertation, they still did not know what it was. This realization of not-knowing led to important dialogue about the lack of clarity in graduate programs about what a dissertation is or supposed to be, and eventually led to a link between this uncertainty and the frustrations and feelings of isolation the women had experienced.⁵⁹ The researcher and each

⁵⁹ DINKINS, Christine Sorrell and SORRELL, Jeanne: *Our Dissertations, Ourselves: Shared Stories of Women's Dissertation Journeys*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014, p. 19-21

participant thus moved from failed definitions, to *aporia*, to wonder and a richer description of the participants' broader lived experiences. In reflecting on these lived experiences, both researcher and participant came upon an uneasiness, and in it a tantalizing call, to learn more of the truth of the phenomenon under study.

In these one-on-one qualitative research interviews, the researcher is the keeper of the hermeneutic circle, welcoming a deliberate and fruitful circularity. The researcher may ask the same questions more than once of the same participant, comparing different answers the participant gives. Or she might retrace a conversation back to its beginning to see what details might have been overlooked or omitted. The researcher may even notice that the participant's own ideas from the beginning of an interview return later in the same interview; she then follows up on the implied connection that might warrant further investigation. The Socratic qualitative researcher follows the hermeneutic circle not just in this kind of circling back to earlier parts of an interview, but also in connecting one interview to the next. She allows what is learned in each interview to inform and influence her questions and responses in the interviews that follow. In this way, even though the participants do not have a chance to dialogue directly with each other, the researcher can serve as a connector of the separate shared inquiries, helping to make them part of a larger whole.

Socratic dialogue groups and 'wonder labs' in action research

There are of course many similarities between the Socratic dialogue form as it unfolds in a one-on-one interview in qualitative research and as it is played out in a Socratic dialogue group and wonder lab in an action research project. The processes and journey of first reflecting critically about a chosen concept or question and later to arrive at an epistemological puzzlement (*aporia*) and later

again to an ontological wonderment (*thaumazein*) and end in a kind of listening to the Call and truth-telling of the phenomenon (*aletheia*) in the lived experience – is the same journey in a Socratic action research approach.

The difference, however, might be seen in the following four aspects:

1) *When research is done in shared group sessions and inquires:* In an action research project and process⁶⁰ the action researcher is supposed to go into the field and participate on an equal level with the members of an organization or profession. Together the action researcher and pilot group of say 7 practitioners, decide on what kind of problem, possibility or wonderment they want to inquire into. The practitioners are seen as co-inquirers (not doing research on people but with people) in an even more radical way than qualitative researchers normally will describe their interactions and dialogues with the interviewees. Thus, doing action research is not so much as a qualitative researcher a question of going out to people in the professional field in order through interviews and observations to do an information gathering and then later – safely back in the armchair – to reflect upon and analyze the ‘empirical data’. This is not the case of course in the above description of Socratic one-on-one interviews in qualitative research done by Dinkins. But you can still say that the Socratic one-on-one interview is a kind of serial process of many interviews with many different people, where the only remaining person is the qualitative researcher. She moves around like a bee collecting ‘philosophical nectar’ at each one-on-one interview and back at the office and in dialogue with the academic research environment she herself develops the final ‘honey’ – the research result. Of course there will also be moments of armchair reflecting and ‘academic honey-

⁶⁰ BRADBURY, Hilary (ed.): *The SAGE Handbook of Action Research*, 3rd Edition, SAGE Publications, Los Angeles, 2015.

making’ as well in the action researcher’s work. But the Socratic action research is a more shared inquiry where the action researcher meets with the same group of people and main parts of the researching ‘happens-in-action’ and group sessions. And while always reflecting and being in groups the action researcher is also allowed more than ‘the serial qualitative researcher’, to have a better chance of following a dialogue and a thinking and a practice-based research that really is more in the hand of the practitioners than in the researcher’s hand. The researcher thus can act as midwife, a ‘match-encourager’ of trying out life forms and ways of living in the participants’ own lives where different important philosophical ideas are lived out – and tried out *in* the living or by living it at the concrete place or in the organization over time.

2) *Time, lots of time, is the leisure of doing Socratic action research:* The action researcher must allowed a huge amount of time that to stay out in the practice and culture of the practitioners, as well as time to facilitate different forms of Socratic dialogue groups or other wonder-based dialogue and reflection workshops with the participants. This extra time dimension seems paramount for the results of the Socratic action research.

Firstly it helps the Socratic action researcher to dwell in the unique life form and culture of the practitioners. Not in order – as the anthropologist – to spot and describe socio-cultural and socio-material patterns and habits, but rather to experience more phenomenological, at least in a glimpse, what it is like to be in such practices. This may help the Socratic action researcher to ‘wonder-from-within-practice’ at least in a better way than if the action researcher was only staying in the organization or professional community of practice for short visits. So in order to look for and critically question the ‘lived philosophy’ of the practice, that the practitioners seems to take for granted, it helps that the Socratic action researcher has also an embodied and lived experience of being in this place. But for sure, only the practitioner himself can

be a true insider of this place and practice. So the main purpose of the Socratic action researcher is – through dialogues and shared reflection-in-actions-with-the-practitioners – to act as a midwife for the lived philosophies and fundamental assumptions and values that is silently and often unnoticed taken for granted by the practitioners themselves.

Secondly it is also important to notice that to get people into an authentic and living wonderment in connection with the practitioners' own lives, lived experiences and professional practices – time, lots of tranquil and continuous time, is needed. Experiences from doing Socratic action research on a Danish design school⁶¹ and a Danish hospice⁶² shows that the most important insights, openings and wonderments did not in fact emerge during the facilitated group sessions and workshop (the Wonder Labs) but happened between these meetings and gatherings. Typically these wonderments and invocative clearings would happen when the practitioner was driving home, walking by the beach, taking a shower, or other places where an insight or wonder suddenly and unexpectedly came as an inspiration. Typically a Socratic action project will be of minimum one year and normally 2-3 years. And this of course will also give the action researcher and his co-inquirers in the field many opportunities to try out things, do experiments alone by themselves or with the action researcher and to let a more slow *Bildung* process occur

⁶¹ HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: *Kan man under sig uden ord? Design- og universitetspædagogik på kreative videregående uddannelser* [Can We Wonder without Words? Design and University Pedagogic in Creative Higher Education]. Aalborg Universitetsforlag, Aalborg, 2014.

⁶² HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: *At undre sig ved livets afslutning: Om brugen af filosofiske samtaler i palliativt arbejde* [To Wonder at the End of Life: About the use of philosophical conversations in palliative care], Akademisk Forlag, Copenhagen, forthcoming.

where the Socratic virtues, mentioned above, can be learning and trained.

3) *Wonder Labs as the action-in-the-field*: When doing action research the people engaged are also expected to do some sort of new action in the field or professional practice in order to initiate change in the organization or professional practice ‘for the better’. What ‘for the better’ means depend on what kind of tradition of action research we are working within. It is, though, important to know that normally action research is understood as a problem-solving and pro-active and emancipatory performance, where there is a goal for change to come in the organization or profession. The Norwegian action researcher, Olav Eikeland⁶³ would call such an action research for a practice-oriented and practice-based action research as opposed to praxis-oriented and praxis-based action research. Eikeland draws on the philosophy of Aristotle (especially *The Nicomachean Ethics*) and his notion of *praxis* as an activity that is a value in itself. Whereas *practice* is understood as mean for something else, when we really want to focus on the ethical and existential dimensions of a profession or organization Eikeland asserts that we must then concentrate primarily on action research as *praxis research*. This is also the case in the Socratic action research. As a result of this in a Socratic action research project we will not be searching for problems and pragmatic problem-solutions but rather after wonders, fascination, or life impressions that really have made an impression on us. The philosophy is that when being in a praxis we are on a more existential, ethical and ontological level in resonance with life and what is meaningful and

⁶³ EIKELAND, Olav: “Phronesis, Aristotle, ad Action Research”, in *International Journal of Action Research*, Vol. 2, No. 1, São Leopoldo-RS, Brazil, 2008, pp. 5-53; EIKELAND, Olav: “Action Research – Applied Research, Intervention Research, Collaborative Research, Practitioner Research, or Praxis Research?”, in *International Journal of Action Research*. Vol. 8, No. 1, São Leopoldo-RS, Brazil, 2012, pp. 9-44.

worthy as such in being in and doing this praxis. So, the question the Socratic action researcher raises with his co-inquirers from the profession or organization is: How can we better connect with those enigmatic sources or life phenomena in daily life and professional and organizational work and living from where a deeper experience of meaning, beauty, and goodness is experienced? So, in order to awaken a growing sense for the "...regions where meanings and understanding originate, well up, and percolate, infect, touch, stir us, and exercise a formative and affective effect on our being..."⁶⁴ the Socratic action research that Hansen⁶⁵ has facilitated was typically built up around a Wonder Lab. This lab was a serial workshop of different exercises in phenomenological, hermeneutic, Socratic-dialectical, existential-contemplative and phronetic reflections and dialogue forms.⁶⁶ By going together as travel companions through these different forms of wonder-based reflections and actions the participants and the action researcher got – over due time – into a deeper dialogue with the praxis and the life phenomenon in this praxis which seems to call their attention. In the Wonder Lab they did not start up with a

⁶⁴ VAN MANEN, Max: *Phenomenology of Practice. Meaning-giving methods in phenomenological research and writing*. Left Coast Press, Walnut Creek, CA (USA), 2014, p. 26-27

⁶⁵ HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: *Kan man under sig uden ord? Design- og universitetspædagogik på kreative videregående uddannelser* [Can We Wonder without Words? Design and University Pedagogic in Creative Higher Education]. Aalborg Universitetsforlag, Aalborg, 2014.
; HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: *At undre sig ved livets afslutning: Om brugen af filosofiske samtaler i palliativt arbejde* [To Wonder at the End of Life: About the use of philosophical conversations in palliative care], Akademisk Forlag, Copenhagen, forthcoming.

⁶⁶ For a more detailed and step-by-step-description of these five momentums in the Wonder Lab, please read HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: "The Call and Practice of Wonder: How to Evoke a Socratic Community of Wonder in Professional Settings", in WEISS, Michael Noah (ed.): *The Socratic Handbook*, LIT Verlag, Vienna, 2015.

clear and chosen question or clarification of a definition as in a Socratic one-on-one interview. They typically started out with a story and lived experience of ‘something’ (they did *not* know what it was from the beginning), that seems to have made a great impression on them when working or being in their daily work life at the organization.

The researcher first facilitates the wonder lab, but then the practitioners themselves will make their own kind of wonder labs (and experiments of wonder-based reflections) *within* their own profession with colleagues that are not in the pilot group of the action research project. This is to see how *they* will change and find new and better ways to create wonder-based reflections and dialogues in their own context. And when that happens - about half in the 2 or 3 year project – then and only then the action researcher might follow the co-inquirers more as a Socratic qualitative researcher - interviewing and observing them in the Socratic way that Dinkins does in her research.

4) *To encourage the practitioners to live a philosophical life in their own praxis:* At last note on the feature of the Socratic action research is the ambition to train the practitioners to become Socratic researchers in their own praxis. Through the exercises and training in Socratic dialogue groups⁶⁷ and Wonder Labs they will acquire a growing phenomenological sensitivity as well as a Socratic musicality for hearing and seeing the wonders and mysteries in their daily work life and life as such. This will help them also after the Socratic action researcher has ‘left the ship’ to take over and start taking ‘phenomenological snapshots’ from their life-worlds as practitioners in their field as well as creating Socratic communities of wonder on their own. This was indeed what happened for the staff of the Danish hospice when the action research project

⁶⁷ HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: *Den sokratiske dialoggruppe* [The Socratic Dialogue Group], Gyldendal, Copenhagen, 2000.

was over. Today they have a continuous wonder lab each second week on equal basis as the psychological supervision group which also is held with the staff every second week.

Conclusion

While the techniques and principles discussed in this article are a helpful base for Socratic interviewing or Socratic action research through wonder labs, a researcher wishing to try them out should not let herself become too tied to the specifics of these techniques. Certainly, they are important, and Plato in his illustration of Socrates' dialogues employed them for a reason. Also important, though, is the dialogue itself. A dialogue between researcher and participants must be authentic, a genuine interaction in which the researcher listens carefully and respectfully and responds and questions honestly and openly.

After years of conducting qualitative and action research using Socratic shared inquiry, both authors have found it fruitful and rewarding for researcher and participants alike. Participants in one-on-one interviews tend to report them being “cathartic” or “fun.” Participants find the interviews to be revelatory, and they seem to enjoy reflecting on and questioning their own beliefs. In action research there seems to follow a kind of philosophical lifestyle and *Bildung* process among the practitioner in the aftermath of a Socratic action research. And when evaluating the whole process many of the practitioners comment on the new kind of slowness and careful awareness in their thinking, that makes them able to ‘stand in the openness’ without rushing to find an answer or find a quick solution. At the Danish Hospice one of the older and very experienced palliative nurses said that one of the greatest things she learned for the action research project was the possibility as a professional to “become small together around the Big Questions”.

This experience had taught her how not to try to act (seemingly professionally) as if one knows things – when in fact we in the encounter with the big question of life and death are all equals as fellow human beings, whether a patient, a relative, a nurse, or a philosopher.

The hope of the authors is that researchers who find their goals aligned with those outlined here will try out the Socratic approach in their research. Because of its flexibility and responsiveness, it can lead to wonderful connections between researcher and participant, and thus is rewarding not just in the research produced but in the journey to get there.

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MIDWIFERY ON THE BORDER BETWEEN THE CLOSED AND THE OPEN. HOW PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO SCIENTIFIC CHANGE

MAYÉUTICA EN EL LÍMITE ENTRE LO CERRADO Y LO ABIERTO. CÓMO LA FILOSOFÍA APLICADA PODRÍA CONTRIBUIR AL CAMBIO CIENTÍFICO

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Abstract: My article discusses the possibility to use philosophical practice as a tool for scientific research. It departs from the claim that there are stages in the development of the sciences when philosophy reemerges. This happens when the sciences face open questions calling for a restructuring of the scientific framework. It is suggested that the methods of philosophical practice may turn out useful in such a process.

Keywords: midwifery, scientific change, socratic dialogue, open questions.

Resumen: Este artículo discute la posibilidad de usar la Filosofía Aplicada como un instrumento para la investigación científica. Parte del hecho de que existen fases en el desarrollo de las ciencias en que la filosofía renace. Esto sucede cuando las ciencias se enfrentan a cuestiones abiertas que exigen una reestructuración del marco científico. Se sugiere que el método de la Filosofía Aplicada podría ser giro oportuno para tal proceso.

Palabras clave: mayeutica, cambio científico, diálogo socrático, preguntas abiertas.

Introduction: Philosophy as the mother of science

Philosophy has often been called the *mother of sciences*. Although the grounds for this contention seldom are stated very clearly, it

would seem to be based on at least three assumptions. First, that philosophy and science share a common ground by involving a *rational* approach to the world. Second, that there has been a *historical development* in which the principal sciences, one by one, have emerged from within philosophy. Third, that philosophy and the sciences are *different enough* to make their separation unquestionable. This difference has often been understood as the opposition between the *purely rational* and the *empirical*, or the contrast between the *speculative* and the *systematical*.

The sequel of this account of the birth of the sciences is a modern, shrunken conception of philosophy, according to which philosophy becomes a matter of purely historical concern, or is transformed into a highly specialized non-empirical science (one example being the idea of philosophy as logics). In both cases, a radical separation between philosophy and the empirical sciences is implied, although some space is left for interdisciplinary research involving philosophy in the shape of a scientific discipline

Now, I do not want to put in question that the “standard account” of how philosophy has been a mother to the sciences has some historical truth. It does not, however, form the whole picture. I want to argue that there also is another, more subtle way in which philosophy may give birth to science. Furthermore, this second birth giving does not confine itself to a, more or less, delimited moment in history. Rather, it may be viewed as process of *ongoing delivery*. What I have in mind is the way in which *philosophy* may reemerge within any science engaged in *scientific rethinking*. Understanding the very nature of this process will be the first task of my paper.

My second claim is that the reemergence of philosophy in the course of scientific thinking involves a process in which philosophical practice might turn out useful. Obviously, however, the involvement of philosophical practice in scientific research would run the risk of turning the former into a mere *technique* for

the scientist's toolbox, running against practitioners' traditional ambition of promoting the good life. Some of this tension may, I will argue, however, be relieved by the realization that engaging in philosophical practice will also affect the self-understanding of science itself, fostering a greater awareness of the limitations and conditionality of science. Finally, I will turn to some remarks on the value of philosophical practice in the education of scientists.

Before proceeding, let me say some words about my background. My knowledge of the science part stems from nearly 30 years of giving basic university courses in the philosophy of science at the University of Helsinki, together with an early career as a student of physics and chemistry. The training in philosophical practice I have goes back to some ten years as a member of a Finnish society for philosophical activity named *Interbaas*, which specializes in Neo-Socratic dialogue¹. The present article may be seen as a first step to bring together my experience of science education with my knowledge of philosophy of science and philosophical practice. Thus, it should be seen as reflections shaping a possible domain for fruitful interaction, and not as a report of actual experience of combining scientific research with the methods of philosophical practice. As already indicated, I am also aware of the possibly tensions such an interaction might create from the point of view of philosophical practice, which its traditional commitment to serving the good life.

Philosophy at the border between the closed and the open

My first claim is, thus, that philosophy may reemerge within a science engaged in rethinking matters. But when does this happen,

¹ See ÖSTERMAN, Bernt: "Neo-Socratic Dialogue as a Paradigmatic Setting for Philosophizing", *Philosophical Practice*, 3, 9, New York, 2014, pp. 1426-1435.

and what does it involve? In general, we are speaking about situations where the very *framework* of a branch of research is challenged. In order to clarify what is at stake, I will use a distinction between *closed* and *open questions* made by Martin Hollis as my point of departure².

According to Hollis, a closed question is a question we know how to settle. Another way to put it, is that it poses a question *within a certain framework*. This does not imply that we currently have to be in a position to answer such a question. The crucial thing is whether we can say that the question, at least in principle, might be answered³. Here is an example of how I understand the way closed questions may be manifested within the sciences. Some years ago I was present at a talk given by a physicist concerning the present state of particle physics. I remember him saying something like the following: “We do not yet know how...” followed by surprisingly detailed description of what it, in fact, was that wasn’t known, suggesting that it only was a *matter of time* until thing would become clear. I take the example, with its *claim to know the unknown*, to be typical for any research area guided by a strong framework.

In contradistinction to closed questions, open questions are questions which *we do not know how to go about with*. This could

² HOLLIS, Martin: *Invitation to Philosophy*, Blackwell, Oxford 1985. As will become obvious there is an obvious affinity between Hollis’ discussion of emerging open questions and what Thomas Kuhn says about the occurrence of anomalies in science in his ground breaking book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (KUHN, Thomas: *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, University Press, Chicago, 1970). Roughly, closed questions are what characterizes what Kuhn calls a *normal science*, whereas open questions are typical of a science in crisis. My reason for preferring to use Hollis’ terminology to Kuhn’s is that it seems more useful for describing the role played by *philosophy* in the process.

³ HOLLIS, Martin: *Invitation to Philosophy*, Blackwell, Oxford 1985, p. 5.

also be expressed by saying that they *lack* a framework, or are posed *outside of* a such. Still, we should not think about typical open questions as being merely free floating speculation. Rather, they should be seen as questions which cannot be treated within some particular, establishes framework, thus putting it to the test, or as Hollis writes:

A closed question asks for information within an existing framework and, at some indefinite point, such requests challenge the framework itself. At that point an open question is posed, one which also wonders how it is to be answered.⁴

Hollis's own examples focuses on major changes in world view, such as the passage from a geocentric universe supported by the Church to the by now familiar view of the earth circulating the sun. Readers familiar with the writings of Thomas Kuhn, will, of course, immediately recognize the last quote as a description of the first phase of *radical scientific change*, or what Kuhn preferred to call *scientific revolutions* or *paradigm shifts*. To illustrate the dynamics between closure and openness inherent in Hollis's account I will choose one of the cases that were also studied by Kuhn, the discovery of oxygen in the 18th century, associated with the fall of the *phlogiston theory* of combustion⁵.

Roughly, the *phlogiston theory* was the idea adhered to in the first half of the 18th century, that something (a substance) was lost to a body in the process of burning, or to a metal in the related process of calcination. It went back to the ancient assumption that, when something burns, there is a substance *escaping* from the body in the fluttering flames. The framework presupposed by the theory could, qualitatively, account for, for instance, such observations

⁴ HOLLIS, Martin: *Invitation to Philosophy*, Blackwell, Oxford 1985, p. 17.

⁵ My account is based on BUTTERFIELD, Herbert: *The Origins of Modern Science 1300 – 1800. Revised edition*, The Free Press, New York, 1965, Ch. 11.

that a metal could be recovered from the calcinated metal by heating it in the presence of charcoal – supposedly, as a process of regaining the phlogiston that had been lost. Hence, the question “why does a calx return to the metal when heated with charcoal” may be viewed as closed under the framework of the phlogiston theory⁶. The observation that challenged this framework was, however, the fact that a calcinated (i.e. dephlogistonized) metal was heavier than the uncalcinated metal. For how could this be, if calcination is a process where a substance *escapes* from the metal? Thus, the question “why is dephlogistonized metal heavier than the original metal” is open under the framework.

Now, logically at least, there are several ways of closing this question. The actual path followed by chemistry was to abandon the assumption that combustion and calcination involved the escaping of a substance, to replace it with the idea that something, in fact, was *added* to the object in the process (eventually this turned out to be oxygen). Another suggestion prevalent at the time was, however, the idea that the weight of the calcinated metal increased because phlogiston is a substance with “negative weight”, implying that a loss of it might, indeed, result in an increase of the weight of its host. The latter proposal has, of course, later become known as one of the standard text book examples of suspicious *ad hoc* hypotheses, i.e. the attempt to make amendments to a theory simply in order to save it from a particular refutation⁷. But as an effort to reform the metaphysics of science it was, undeniably, brave.

The downfall of the phlogiston theory may be seen as an example of how the framework of a branch of science (i.e. the early chemistry of the 18th century) is deranged by the occurrence of an

⁶ According to the Free Dictionary a calx is “the crumbly residue left after a mineral has been calcinated or roasted”.

⁷ See e.g. HEMPEL, Carl: *Philosophy of Natural Science*, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1966, 29-30.

open question (how the weight of an object may increase by calcination) leading to a radical restructuring (the understanding of combustion as an additive process instead of a subtractive) eventually turning the recalcitrant question into a closed one. But what does *philosophy* have to do with this process? According to Hollis philosophy is, in fact, absolutely vital for the dynamics of the open and the closed – or as he expresses it, “the work of philosophy is at the shifting border between closed and open”. This sounds good, but how, exactly, is it to be understood?

The role of philosophy in radical scientific change

Let us start by asking how open questions are related to philosophical questions. I think the answer simply is that philosophical questions which are questions which are open in relation to prevailing frameworks of thought. Obvious examples of traditional philosophical questions open in this way are, for instance, questions related to the knowledge of the external world. Take for instance a question like “how do I know that the tree I see over there *really is* there?”, which is open in relation to our ordinary framework for establishing the existence of things (e.g. by using our senses). But, and this, clearly, is Hollis’ view, some questions which apparently *sound* scientific, may, covertly, contain a philosophical dimension (in proportion to the degree to which they are open). His favorite example is the question “Is there conscious life elsewhere in the universe?”, where the difficulty is related to what possibly would *count* as being conscious⁸.

Thus, it clearly makes sense, to localize the birth of philosophical questions to what Hollis calls “the shifting border between the closed and the open”. And where there are

⁸ HOLLIS, Martin: *Invitation to Philosophy*, Blackwell, Oxford 1985, pp. 1-2.

philosophical questions there is, *naturally*, a place for “the work of philosophy”. But how, precisely, does philosophy *act* on these questions? I think we can say that *philosophy explores possible ways of restructuring the framework in relation to which a question appears to be open*. We should, however, recognize that the philosophical work in connection with radical scientific change, in particular, does not presuppose the involvement of a *professional philosopher*. Normally, what actually happens when a science recloses its questions by successfully altering its framework is, clearly, that there is a single *scientist* who suddenly excels in a philosophical thinking (in the case of the phlogiston theory it was Lavoisier)⁹.

In principle, it would still seem possible that professional philosophers could be called in to help with such cases, armored with the special knowledge and skills the philosophical expert is expected to have (I am now, of course, thinking of philosophy in the shrunken, modern sense). Perhaps there are such cases, but I would be surprised if they were very common (I have, of course, heard of logicians and mathematicians helping each other, but I am now mainly interested in the contribution philosophy might give to *empirical sciences*). Still, however, the mere fact that scientists are the ones that might be expected to do the philosophical thinking required in radical scientific change, does not imply that there would be no room for professional philosophers in a wider sense. In fact, we here seem to have a clear space for *philosophy as*

⁹ “At this moment there emerged one of those men who can stand above the whole scene, look at the confused pieces of the jig-saw puzzle and see a way of turning them into a pattern. He was Lavoisier, and it is difficult not to believe that he towers above all the rest and belongs to the small group of giants who have the highest place in the story of the scientific revolution”, Butterfield, somewhat pathetically, writes in a passage that surely sounds like the intervention of a “great philosopher”, see BUTTERFIELD, Herbert: *The Origins of Modern Science 1300 – 1800. Revised edition*, The Free Press, New York, 1965, p. 217.

midwifery, or the ancient idea of helping people to give birth to philosophical insights. Thus, perhaps, it is not at all the modern academic philosopher the perplexed scientist should turn to, but the modern philosophical midwives, the brave men and women that nowadays are called philosophical practitioners?

Given the characterization of philosophical practice offered in a recent basic book in the field, the suggestion would at least seem worth considering. In the Prologue to the brand new *Socratic Handbook* Michael Noah Weiss describes the task of a philosophical practitioner as follows:

Socrates understood a philosopher's role to assist in this delivery [when the soul is pregnant and wants to give birth] ... If we go along with this Socratic "work attitude", *a philosopher's job is to support others on how to wonder, give birth to new ideas, and with that to change perspective and to think differently*¹⁰.

Now, clearly, this sounds exactly as the kind of help a science facing a set of open question threatening its framework needs! But exactly how should the philosophical practitioners support be conducted? I will now turn to some reflections on this subject.

Two modes of philosophical practice

I will begin by suggesting a distinction between two basic ways in which philosophical practice may be conducted. The first I call *Questioning* and the second *Dialogue*. They stand for different modes of interaction between the practitioner and the client(s), and, normally, also involve different numbers of participants. Thus,

¹⁰ WEISS, Michael Noah: "Prologue: Think Different", in WEISS, Michael Noah (ed.): *The Socratic Handbook*, Lit Verlag, Wien, 2015, p. 5, my italics.

whereas the typical setting for a Questioning only would involve the practitioner and one client, I think of a Dialogue as involving at least two participants *other* than the practitioner (who usually would be called a *facilitator*). It should, however, be added that the two methods, despite of representing different modes of philosophical practice, do not exclude one another, in fact a combination of the two may sometimes turn out fruitful.

Basically, Questioning is the activity where the primary objective is to get clear about the presuppositions and patterns inherent in a client's way of thinking and behaving. As the name already indicates, the basic technique is to work through a structure of questions and answers, where the practitioner assumes the role of the interrogator. In philosophical practice Questioning is an important part of the branch called *philosophical counseling*, which usually is initiated by an existential problem encountered by the client. Thus, the idea of helping the client to *solve* a particular problem usually forms an integral part of the process.

Now, as the reader may have noticed, Questioning looks very much like the kind of process Socrates subjects his interlocutors to in Plato's Dialogues. Thus, trivially it would seem, what I call Questioning certainly falls under the concept of a Socratic *Dialogue*, some may even want to see it as the very paradigm example of such an activity. So, what is the point of making a distinction between *this* activity, and Dialogue (or Dialogue *proper*)?

What I have in mind is a distinction that, if not always observed, clearly, is there *to be made* in philosophical practice. It is certainly present in ordinary language. For wouldn't one of the reactions to a Socrates appearing in modern society be that he is not actually speaking, or *genuinely in dialogue*, with his interlocutors, suggesting that he is not *involving himself* in the discussion? Or, if my example appears too imaginative, think of the way we may react similarly to any present day therapist, standing in a "clinical"

realation to his, or her, clients (psychologists, doctors, marriage counselors, and the like). Thus, as opposed to the mode of questioning directed from one part to another, I want to reserve the term Dialogue for a conversational mode characterized by *equality* and a *mutual interest*. To this we may add the condition of *working together towards a shared goal*.

As my primary example of a Dialogue I take *Neo-Socratic Dialogue*. Basically, this is a form of dialogue initiated by Leonard Nelson, and developed further by his pupil Gustaf Heckmann¹¹. It should, however, be noted that there are some different versions of similar dialogues around. Neo-Socratic Dialogue is also used for various purposes¹². I am myself mostly familiar with at version in which the idea is that a group (ideally 8-10 persons) analyzes a concept, or a phenomenon, based on personal experiences recounted by the participants. But it is also, for instance, possible to start from a particular question.

The most pertinent feature of Neo-Socratic Dialogue is a set of rules which govern the discussion which may be summarized a follows:

I. Think for yourself!

R1: References to authorities are forbidden.

II. Think here and now!

R2: Avoid bringing your already established views to the discussion.

R3: Be prepared to give up your previous views on a subject.

¹¹ See specifically NELSON, Leonard: *Socratic Philosophy and Critical Philosophy. Selected Essays*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1949, CH. 1 and HECKMANN, Gustaf: *Das Sokratische Gespräch. Erfahrungen in philosophischen Hochschulseminaren*, Hermann Schroedel Verlag KG, Hannover, 1981.

¹² "Neo-Socratic Dialogue is today used in many different contexts and strives to realize several goals simultaneously", Helge Svare writes in SVARE, Helge: *Den gode samtalen. Kunsten å skape dialog*, Pax Forlag, Oslo 2008, p. 159 (my translation from the original Norwegian).

III. Think together!

R4: Keep to the subject.

R5: Listen to others.

R6: Encourage the thinking of others.

R7: Avoid dominating the discussion.

R8: Try to look at every statement as a contribution to a discussion.

IV. Stay close to life!

As I have described elsewhere, a discussion governed by these rules form, I believe, an ideal setting for *philosophizing* by liberating the thoughts of the participants and positioning them for creative interaction¹³.

Questioning and Dialogue are different in many respects. As already indicated Questioning is normally a process involving only one client (in the case of Socrates there may, of course, be many, but one gets the impression that they are standing in a row, so to say). Dialogue involves many participants working together on a question. Both modes of practice are certainly true to the Socratic ideal of the philosopher as ignorant, but in different ways. In Questioning the practitioner assumes the position of an interrogator, whereas in Dialogue the practitioner acts as a facilitator of a dialogue between others (in Neo-Socratic Dialogue this, for instance, means to supervise the observance of the rules). Whereas Questioning is directed towards disclosing personal patterns of thought, Dialogue deals with what is shared by a community.

¹³ ÖSTERMAN, Bernt: "Neo-Socratic Dialogue as a Paradigmatic Setting for Philosophizing", *Philosophical Practice*, 3, 9, New York, 2014, spec. pp. 1428-1431.

Philosophical practice in scientific research

Let us pause for a minute to take stock of what, so far, has been said. I have argued that philosophy's birth giving to the sciences should not be seen as confined to a, once and for all, closed set of historical moments. On the contrary, we are dealing with an ongoing process occasioned by the emergence of open questions challenging the frameworks of the sciences. These reemerging windows for philosophy, however, do not normally imply that the scientist may take the liberty to hand over a bunch of philosophical problems to a professional philosopher and go on holiday. Rather, it calls for a capacity for philosophical thinking *within* the community of scientists. Still, there appears to be a space for philosophical intervention, but not with the philosopher in the role of a distinguished adviser or specialist to whom certain difficult questions may be trusted. What is required is for someone to step into the shoes (or sandals) of the legendary Socrates by assuming the part of an intellectual midwife. This brought us close to the domain of the activity that today is called philosophical practice. In the preceding section I have offered a distinction between two basic modes of philosophical practice and now is the time to apply the discussion to scientific research.

Now, as already stated in the introduction, my article is not based on any experience of working with scientist engaged in the restructuring of their field of knowledge (we should also remember that such cases are rare). In fact, I do not know of anyone else who has attempted something exactly like this either. Consequently, I cannot do more than offer some remarks that, maximally, will serve a sketchy indications of how things might work out in a domain that certainly still is in a pristine stage.

In drawing the distinction between Questioning and Dialogue I have already, more or less tacitly, assumed a certain division of labor. Thus, Questioning is the form of activity primarily aimed at

disclosing a framework, whereas Dialogue is the activity in which a framework is changed¹⁴. Now, this may look as an simplification, as it, to some extent, probably is. Hence, a process of Questioning may certainly initiate a change, similarly it does not seem impossible that a Dialogue also may result in a stronger awareness of the framework one is working under. Still, I believe that such outcomes often would appear as a *blending* of practices (which, of course, might be highly desirable). Thus, for example, a Questioning leading to a radical restructuring of thought might also include dialogical elements, where the process of questions and answers is nurtured by a growing mutual understanding of what is at stake (meaning that the questioner starts to enter increasingly dialogically into the proceedings). This being said, I will now attempt to offer a sketch of how the methods of philosophical practice might be applied to promote radical scientific change. For sake of simplicity, I will not try to enter an ongoing scientific dispute, but stick to the historical case of the decline of the phlogiston theory presented above, assuming that this is sufficiently like anything that might presently be going on (like the question of dark matter in astrophysics).

¹⁴ It may be noted, that there is a certain affinity between my distinction between functions of Questioning and Dialogue and “the two visions of philosophical practice” Ran Lahav has described as follows: “In the first vision, philosophy is a tool for solving personal problems. In the second vision, philosophy is a journey towards new horizons of life. The first vision tries to make our Platonic cave comfortable and problem-free. The second vision encourages us to step out of our Platonic cave. The first wants to adjust us to normal life. The second offers to awaken us from normal life” (LAHAV, Ran: “Two Visions of Philosophical Practice”, available in www.philopractice.org/the-vision-of-philosophical-practice/item/146-6-two-visions-of-philosophical-practice.htm, last access October 30th, 2015). In particular, of course, encouraging the “stepping out of the cave” is, precisely, the role I am tentatively assigning to philosophical practice as a contribution to scientific research,

So, let us start by assuming that there is a community of scientists adhering to the phlogiston theory of combustion, according to which a substance called phlogiston escapes from a body that burns, or is calcinated. Let us continue by assuming that the theory is confirmed by a number of experiments, such as regaining a metal from a calx by heating it in the presence of charcoal. There is, however, also an experimental outcome that doesn't seem to fit the picture at all, i.e. a persistent increase in weight registered for any instance of a calcinated metal. The community of chemists are facing an open question: why does a metal get heavier through a process of calcination?

Now, let us add the assumption that the particular scientific community is lucky enough to have intellectual midwives around, whom the scientists turn to in their distress. What should such a practitioner do? Following the division of labor that has been assumed above, the first step would be to use Questioning to help the community in disclosing the framework of the phlogiston theory. What are, for instance, the assumptions of the nature of phlogiston inherent in the theory? Is it a substance just like any other, or of a very special kind? And what kind of beliefs about substances are prevalent among the chemists in question (and so on)?

From this we move to Dialogue. A number of colleagues working on the issue of the strange increase in the weight of a metal through calcination are invited for a discussion under the guidance of the practitioner, who now would switch from questioner to being a facilitator of a Socratic-type dialogue. To simplify, we may assume that it starts right from the crucial question, i.e. "why does a metal get heavier through a process of calcination?" The task of the facilitator is to eliminate some common hazards to a philosophical dialogue like competitiveness, prestige, dominant natures, shyness, reliance on authority, or mere stubbornness of human beings. This he, or she, would, of course,

do by surveying adherence to a set of discussion rules. These might, I believe, look very much like the rules of Neo-Socratic Dialogue listed above, with one obvious exception: the fourth imperative, “Stay close to life!” would not seem to make much sense in this context (I will return to this seemingly innocent move in the following section).

Before closing my imaginative example I would like to add a suggestion concerning how Questioning and Dialogue might be combined in a case like this. An important imperative of the Neo-Socratic dialogue is the idea that the participants should bring as little as possible with them to the discussion (captured in the rules R1 and R2 above). Now, the presuppositions disclosed in the process of Questioning may be understood, precisely, as the set of assumptions the scientist may have to abandon to regain the closure of his, or her, field. Most importantly, however, it should be possible to advance *piecemeal*. Thus, we may envisage a situation where the initial Questioning would result in the list of, say, three presupposition of the theory under examination, P1, P2 and P3. By tentatively abstaining from all three of them, we would get a maximally liberated philosophizing on the subject at hand. It might, however, be more fruitful to proceed by abstaining from the presuppositions one by one, with a keen eye for tensions created among our most deeply entrenched beliefs in subsequent discussion. If all this sounds too neat for a real life situation, we may add the possibility that some parts of the framework are disclosed only gradually through the Dialogue (we may also assume that the facilitator is able to switch from one mode to another in the living process by asking the right questions at the right moment). To illustrate, we may assume that imaginary group of phlogistonists with access to an intellectual midwife at *some point* of the Dialogue would come to a point were they also try to abstain from the basic assumption that combustion, and calcination, basically involves a substance *escaping* from the body (on the way

perhaps even passing through the stage of bracketing the presupposition that weights only can be positive).

For sake of clarity, it should perhaps be added that I am at no point suggesting that problems of science could be solved by Questioning and Dialogue *alone*. The ultimate test of any intellectual innovation belonging to science, of course, remains empirical.

The perspective of philosophical practice

Although my suggestions admittedly have been very sketchy, I hope that I have been able to convince my reader that there, indeed, could be cases where applying the methods of philosophical practice in scientific research actually might make sense, not to say be fruitful. So far, I have not, however, said anything about how this all might look from the point of view of the philosophical practitioner. Is giving a helping hand to scientific research in the suggested way something the philosophical practitioners would like to do? And would they be able? I will start with the latter question.

Philosophical practice, as we know it, does not require any specialized *theoretical* knowledge. Being able to ask the right questions, and observing things like that a participant is keeping to the subject in a dialogue, do not require any other knowledge than what follows from sharing a culture and language with the clients. Acting as an midwife of scientific thinking in a philosophical mode would, naturally, be an entirely different thing. Clearly, any successful intervention would require at least some scientific training. Consequently, it would suddenly be reasonable to talk, for instance, of philosophical practitioners *specializing* in physics, chemistry, biology, or the like.

But getting involved with science would also seem to bring in ideological considerations. Whatever philosophical practice else

may be, there is a strong historical connection with the idea of *promoting the good life*. A philosophical practice reduced to a – however unique – tool of scientific research seems difficult to reconcile with this ideal. In fact, we already saw that the requirement of staying close to life associated with Neo-Socratic Dialogue does not seem to have any significance in the application to scientific research we have been discussing. The traditional goal of creating, or restoring, meaning to people by examining their lives, simply seems worlds apart from a practice focused on being a technique to trigger scientific development. Another, related argument, may, I think, be derived from the opposition between, on the one hand, the *inherently valuable* character of at least some forms of philosophical practice and, on the other hand, the strong instrumentality of a practice ultimately aiming at *solving* scientific problems¹⁵.

It might, however, also be argued that the line I am drawing between an ethically oriented philosophical practice and the envisaged philosophical practice-like activity performing midwifery of radical scientific ideas, is too sharp. A method partially aimed at bringing frameworks of thinking into view will, I want to argue, inevitably also affect the perception of things. Thus, it seems clear that an encounter between philosophical practice and scientific research also would affect the way the participating scientists *understand science and scientific research*. Minimally, this would involve an improved awareness of the conditions presupposed by the scientific activity in question. Probably, it would also be a cure against scientism by contributing to a better understanding of the very nature of science, and its place in the world.

¹⁵ See ÖSTERMAN, Bernt.: “Neo-Socratic Dialogue as a Paradigmatic Setting for Philosophizing”, *Philosophical Practice*, 3, 9, New York, 2014, spec. pp. 1427 and 1433.

Conclusions

The article started from the suggestion that the contention that philosophy is the mother of the sciences may be understood in two different ways. On the “standard account” it describes the actual historical roots of the various scientific disciplines we have today. According to this, the sciences are *offspring* of philosophy, which certainly preserve some features of their origin, such as a “rational outlook”, but still continue to develop in a clearly separate grove. I have, however, attempted to show that there also is another, more subtle, way in which philosophy reemerges in the sciences. This happens when the framework of a science is challenged by the occurrence of open questions, characterized by the bewilderment of not knowing the way to go on. In general, the solution does, however, not call for professional philosophers, but scientists excelling in philosophical thinking. As I have indicated, it, however, seems reasonable to think that such a process might be facilitated by invoking “intellectual midwives”, applying some of the methods known from philosophical practice. In particular, I have suggested that a science in turmoil might profit from the methods I have identified as Questioning and Dialogue.

Now, as brought up in the last section, combining interests with the sciences may give rise to some friction with the ideology of the movement of philosophical practice. For what happens to the grand objectives of promoting the good life by helping people to solve their problems, and perhaps sometimes even to show them a way *out* of their personal cave¹⁶? Adding the quite obvious requirement that the practitioner would benefit from a thorough knowledge of the scientific field he, or she, is entering, it will start to look like we

¹⁶ LAHAV, Ran: “Two Visions of Philosophical Practice”, available in www.philopractice.org/the-vision-of-philosophical-practice/item/146-6-two-visions-of-philosophical-practice.htm (last access October 30th, 2015).

are simply creating a new field of practical expertise, which only happens to borrow some ingredients from philosophical practice. Not quite so, however. As indicated at the end of the last section, engaging in methods like Questioning and Dialogue would, inevitably I believe, not only enhance the creative powers of scientists, but also affect their *perspective* on what they are doing.

Consequently, my discussion also points towards a positive conclusion. There should be much to be gained from invoking the methods of philosophical practice in the education of scientists at the universities. What I am envisaging is a scientific training where Questioning and Dialogue would appear not only as exclusive techniques brought in at the decisive moments of science, but rather as a lasting feature of everyday education. It would involve learning how to answer and how to put questions, how to fruitfully participate in well-organized dialogues in order to *genuinely think* together, and how to conduct thought-experiments on what *might* be the case. To develop the utterly important skill of *doing science with a distance*.

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KARL JASPERS: AS BASES DA ORIENTAÇÃO CIENTÍFICA PARA VIVER. UM DIÁLOGO COM KANT

KARL JASPERS: BASES OF THE SCIENTIFIC ORIENTATION TO LIVE. A DIALOGUE WITH KANT

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Resumo: Nesse trabalho examina-se, segundo Karl Jaspers, até onde a ciência pode servir como orientação para viver. O conhecimento científico não alcança o ser em si, já dizia Kant, tem limites para alcançar e prever o funcionamento do núcleo da matéria, ensina a Física contemporânea. Por outro lado, a razão também encontra limite na liberdade pessoal, o que faz as ciências humanas precisarem conviver com essa limitação. Assim, uma orientação para viver que necessita de uma imagem completa do mundo somente pode vir da Filosofia, mas isto não significa que a Ciência não faça parte deste processo e nem ofereça elementos de orientação. A Ciência oferece a base e alimenta as filosofias de cada tempo. Não há como avançar na orientação filosófica sem o conhecimento que a ciência oferece a cada geração, quando esta respeita os limites da razão para conhecer o mundo. Esta é a forma de Jaspers refazer o diálogo com o Kant e o iluminismo, apontando que há de melhor e pior no movimento.

Palavras-chave: ciência, epistemología, filosofía, orientação, metodologia

Abstract: This study exams, according to Karl Jaspers, how science can serve as an orientation to live. The scientific knowledge does not reach the being in itself, already said by Kant, it has limits to reach and preview the function of the nucleus of the matter, as taught by the contemporary Physics. On the other hand, the reason also finds a limit on the personal freedom, which makes the human sciences the need to live together with this limitation. Thus, an orientation to live that needs a complete image of the world, can only come from the Philosophy, but that does not mean that the Science is not part of this process and does not offer orientation elements. Science offers a base and feeds the philosophies of each time. There is not a way to reach on the philosophy orientation without the

knowledge which science offers to each generation, when this one respects the limits of the reason to see the world. This is the Jaspers's way to redo the dialogue with Kant and the Illuminism, showing the better and the worst on the movement.

Keywords: science, epistemology, philosophy, orientation, methodology

Considerações iniciais

A filosofia moderna ocupou-se de muitos temas, um dos mais importantes foi a ciência. Não mais a ciência dos antigos gregos, mas a chamada ciência moderna com suas características singulares. Aquela feita nos laboratórios, a ciência das observações sistemáticas e do cálculo, a ciência que nasceu experimental, e "essencialmente métrica"^{1,2}. A ciência moderna representou uma nova forma de olhar a natureza, não mais como arbítrio, mas como harmonia retratada em lei³. A Filosofia, depois do surgimento da

¹ Ao considerar a origem da ciência moderna, Joaquim de Carvalho escreveu no ensaio *O ideal moderno da ciência* a mudança que ela representou no pensamento e no conhecimento do mundo: "Desde então, e sobretudo no século XVII, que é o século do gênio, (...), o homem confiante em si próprio e na racionalidade do ser, examina o que sabe, interroga o que o cerca, e pela alegria de criar, pelo prazer de explicar, formula um sistema do universo *more geométrico*, destrói a autoridade, substituindo-a pelo bordão ao qual se apoiará nas magníficas e inauditas jornadas: o método" (p. 303) e completa logo adiante: "a ciência deixa de ser a tradição que se transmite e o universal abstrato de Aristóteles para devir o conhecimento que se adquire, e, assim como se transmuda a essência do ideal científico, transmuda-se igualmente a noção de realidade" (p. 307).

² CARVALHO, Joaquim. *O ideal moderno da ciência*, em "Obras Completas", v. V, Calouste Gulbenkian, Lisboa, 1987. Págs. 295-314.

³ No quarto parágrafo de *La idea de principio en Leibniz y la evolucion de la teoria deductiva*, Ortega y Gasset trata do esforço da nova ciência de retratar o mundo em lei fazendo uma leitura exata do mundo e dos fenômenos físicos. A referência inicial é Galileu. Diz Ortega: "o modo de pensar galileano, a que Galileu tinha que ser fiel, é o que, do modo mais prodigiosamente claro, enuncia a definição da nova ciência, a qual havia de consistir em medir tudo o que se

moderna ciência, deu grande atenção ao conhecimento indutivo e matemático em que a ciência da natureza se baseava e a explicar as razões de sua ampla aceitação. Depois de algum tempo meditando sobre a Ciência, os filósofos de modo geral chegaram à quase completa confiança na capacidade da ciência moderna tratar o mundo. A *Crítica da Razão Pura* (1781), de Emmanuel Kant, é exemplo dessa confiança. Ao perguntar-se como era possível a matemática pura e a ciência da natureza, na introdução daquela *Crítica*, Kant manifesta a crença de seu tempo: a ciência é válida e se impõe por seus resultados, cabendo à Filosofia apenas dizer as razões dessa validade. Kant assim explicita essa crença: "Visto que essas ciências são realmente dadas, parece pertinente perguntar como são possíveis, pois que têm que ser possíveis é provado pela sua realidade"⁴.

À parte da outra crença kantiana, a de que a razão humana poderia levar a verdade epistemológica e servir de orientação nas ações morais se trabalhasse criticamente⁵, não altera a crença inicial do filósofo de que a ciência moderna garante o conhecimento verdadeiro contra os descaminhos da razão

pode medir e fazer que se possa medir o que não se pode medir diretamente". ORTEGA Y GASSET, José. "La idea de principio en Leibniz y la evolución de la teoría deductiva", en *Obras Completas*, v. VIII, Alianza, Madrid, 1994.

⁴ KANT, Emmanuel. *Crítica da Razão Pura*, Nova Cultura (3. ed.), São Paulo, 1987. Pág. 33.

⁵ No livro *O Espírito da Letra*, Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos cita um trecho de Kant onde esta crença se mostra: "Mas este país é uma ilha e está cercado pela natureza com fronteiras imutáveis. É o país da verdade (um estimulante nome), rodeado de um vasto e proceloso oceano, o verdadeiro lugar da ilusão, onde muito nevoeiro denso e muito gelo que logo derrete aparentam novos países" (SANTOS, Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos. *O espírito da letra, ensaios de hermenêutica da modernidade*, Imprensa Nacional, Lisboa, 2007). É um longo trecho em que se vê a confiança do filósofo na capacidade da razão crítica estabelecer as condições de chegar à verdade, completando a crença de que a ciência dá a verdade do mundo.

metafísica, à respeito da a qual Kant comenta: "No que tange à Metafísica, o seu mísero progresso até aqui e o fato de não de poder dizer, com respeito a nenhum dos sistemas até hoje expostos, que realmente exista no que concerne a seu fim essencial, dão a cada um razões para duvidar de sua possibilidade"⁶

A exacerbação dessa crença na certeza e valor do científico produziu já no final do século XIX, mas especialmente no século passado, reações. Foi então que a crença moderna no valor absoluto do conhecimento científico para apontar a verdade do mundo e a filosofia que lhe dava sustentação são questionadas⁷. É o que explica Heimsoeth:

Uma análise feita do ponto de vista da crítica do conhecimento não deixa, efetivamente, de conduzir, aqui - dentro do próprio campo das ciências exatas - a uma superação do dogmatismo científico e daí, ao mesmo tempo, a um abandono total da filosofia transcendental científicista e racionalista, como era a do naturalismo e a da sua concepção cientista de mundo⁸.

⁶ KANT, Emmanuel. *Crítica da Razão Pura*, Nova Cultura (3. ed.), São Paulo, 1987. Pág. 33.

⁷ Uma das mais interessantes críticas ao positivismo lógico e ao positivismo em geral, sustentáculo filosófico da tese de que a verdade vem com a ciência foi escrita por Delfim Pinto dos Santos com o título: *Situação Valorativa do Positivismo*. Sobre o que ali diz o filósofo português, lê-se em *Delfim Santos e o Neopositivismo*: “*Situação Valorativa do Positivismo* é um esforço, esclarece seu autor, para situar o positivismo no seu próprio lugar e valorizá-lo referentemente à esfera da realidade a que diz respeito. (...) A estratégia do autor era se conservar no âmbito da tradição epistemológica para, de dentro dela e considerando os argumentos dos próprios positivistas, apontar as contradições de um projeto intelectual que se *atinge pela clarificação dos conceitos e enunciados da ciência pela decidida eliminação da metafísica*” (SANTOS, Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos. *O espírito da letra, ensaios de hermenêutica da modernidade*, Imprensa Nacional, Lisboa, 2007. Pág. 130).

⁸ HEIMSOETH, Heinz. *A filosofia no século XX*, Saraiva, São Paulo, 1938. Pág. 20

Capítulo fundamental dessa crítica foi protagonizado por Edmund Husserl que a sistematizou em *A crise da humanidade europeia e a Filosofia*⁹. Ortega y Gasset, por sua vez, desenvolveu uma crítica contra a capacidade que a Ciência moderna tinha de orientar o homem contemporâneo, ao considerá-lo um novo bárbaro porque, limitado pelo conhecimento técnico-científico, perdera a referência geral da cultura que só o conhecimento de um ramo da ciência não pode fornecer. Essa especialização num único campo da ciência era, parece-lhe, expressão de incultura e de uma nova forma de barbárie¹⁰. Ortega não nega a eficiência da técnica e da Ciência moderna no controle do mundo, o que nenhum filósofo de peso faz. O que ele quer dizer é que além das limitações apontadas por Edmund Husserl e repetidas por outros especialistas, entre os quais muitos cientistas, o conhecimento da ciência não é suficiente para orientar o homem contemporâneo para viver uma vida plena, já que

⁹ Urbano Zilles resumiu o texto de Husserl. No que se refere à crítica da ciência moderna e à mentalidade positivista que lhe era solidária comentou Urbano Zilles: “Segundo Husserl, a objetivação da natureza, obtida por Galileu, não conduz ao ser das coisas e, assim, a objetividades ideais. A natureza idealizada passou a substituir a natureza pré-científica. A matematização da natureza violentou o ser natural. De acordo com Husserl, as ciências positivas são ingênuas. Viver consiste em comprometer-se com o mundo que nos dá a experiência através do pensar” (ZILLES, Urbano: “Introdução”, en: HUSSERL, Edmund. *A crise da humanidade europeia e a Filosofia*, Edipucrs, Porto Alegre, 1996. Pág. 26).

¹⁰ Para conhecimento dessa crise de cultura e do significado da nova forma de barbárie leia *O século XX em El Espectador de Ortega y Gasset: a crise como desvio moral*: “as minorias mais bem educadas nos diversos campos culturais não assumiam a tarefa de dirigir a sociedade, não respondiam a tarefa de dirigir a sociedade, não respondiam aos novos desafios que a vida apresentava, cultivavam um saber muito especializado e ignoravam quase todos os outros assuntos” (CARVALHO, José Maurício de: “O século XX em El Espectador de Ortega y Gasset: a crise como desvio moral”, en *Argumentos*, 4, Fortaleza, 2010. Págs. 15).

produzia uma forma de saber limitada. Em certo sentido ficava sob suspeição a capacidade da ciência orientar o homem na existência, dúvida que não havia, por exemplo, na tradição kantiana.

A análise de Karl Jaspers sobre a ciência e seu significado para o homem de hoje desenvolve-se no contexto dessas críticas do século passado à ciência moderna, onde estão, entre outras, as observações de Ortega sobre os limites da ciência como orientação para a vida. Jaspers estuda essas críticas e as limitações que a ciência tem, mas cuida de esclarecer como ela colabora e contribui para a orientação existencial. Trata-se, parece-nos, de retomar as posições de Kant, considerando as dificuldades interpostas por sua geração.

O artigo indica como Jaspers caminha intelectualmente, de cientista e médico, na primeira fase da vida, para filósofo que procura entender o sentido da presença da ciência na vida das pessoas. As duas etapas estão claramente interconectadas, mas a ciência médica praticada por Jaspers tinha ainda muito de tradicional. Se ele soube apontar seus limites e os rumos para onde ela devia ir, isso não significa que tenha feito suas práticas. Ao contrário, pareceu-lhe suficiente indicar os limites do saber científico e indicar sua imprescindível contribuição.

Por outro lado, se seguirmos o raciocínio e as orientações de Jaspers quando examinamos as razões que alguém apresenta, poderemos contextualizá-las na história da epistemologia, tratando das justificativas, clarificando os conceitos, descobrindo inconsistências no raciocínio e falsas crenças. Por isso, além do inegável valor como capítulo da filosofia teórica, as considerações de Jaspers sobre a Ciência são importantes para o filósofo prático. Depois de explicar as posições do pensador alemão e, no final desse trabalho, vamos apontar como as lições aqui mencionadas são importantes para clarear o raciocínio e seu valor na filosofia prática.

Ciência e Crença para Karl Jaspers

Para tratar a orientação que a ciência oferece, o filósofo recupera o sentido de crença e do seu papel na existência. Ele procura mostrar que as críticas ao iluminismo e à Ciência moderna desenvolvidas no início do último século não destroem as boas crenças, a confiança na razão, por exemplo, que ela produziu, desde que compatíveis com a dimensão crítica da razão. As críticas apenas atingem as crenças que desconsideram as interdições legítimas. Nesse sentido, Jaspers considera que o homem se move em meio a crenças e defende aquelas compatíveis com a razão¹¹. Neste sentido, a ciência destrói as crenças injustificáveis, e por isso possui um papel importante na orientação. Por outro lado, se a Ciência e o movimento iluminista produzem crenças e superstições injustificáveis devido à generalizações inadequadas ou outras razões. São essas crenças supersticiosas que precisam ser superadas, como fizeram alguns filósofos no século passado. Parece a Karl Jaspers ser essencial distinguir entre crenças razoáveis e não razoáveis, para rejeitar apenas aquilo que é ruim, resguardando o que parece essencial: o sentido de orientação para a vida que a ciência pode ajudar a construir. Ele afirma no capítulo VIII da *Iniciação Filosófica*:

O falso iluminismo julga poder fundar sobre o simples entendimento todo o saber, vontade e ação, em vez de utilizar o entendimento apenas como via imprescindível para o esclarecimento daquilo que tem que

¹¹ Ortega y Gasset desenvolve essa intuição de que vivemos em meio a crenças e comenta à respeito no parágrafo 30 de *La idea de principio en Leibniz y la evolución de la teoría deductiva*: "boa parte de nossas crenças não temos sequer notícia. Atuam em nós por detrás de nossa lucidez mental, e para descobri-las não temos que buscá-las nas ideias que temos, mas entre as coisas com que contamos" (ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: "La idea de principio en Leibniz y la evolución de la teoría deductiva", em *Obras Completas*, v. VIII, Alianza, Madrid, 1994. Pág. 288).

lhe ser fornecido; absolutiza os conhecimentos sempre particulares do entendimento em vez de os aplicar sensatamente ao domínio que lhes pertence; desencaminha o indivíduo suscitando nele a pretensão de saber por si só e agir em função de seu saber (...). Não confunde os caminhos do entendimento com os conteúdos do ser humano. Estes surgem como susceptíveis de esclarecimento mediante um entendimento racional, mas insusceptível de fundamentação no próprio entendimento¹².

E a Ciência serve de orientação quando não vem acompanhada de crenças injustificáveis ou "verdades previamente fixadas além das limitações morais provenientes de critérios de humanidade que, por exemplo, se opõe a certas experiências"¹³. Portanto, a ciência que pode oferecer algo válido como orientação é aquela que não fomenta crenças que sua prática não justifica. Por outro lado, não há boa prática da razão e nem efetiva defesa da dignidade humana sem Ciência. Se essa prática se perde ou fica ameaçada "surgem os crepúsculos, os claros escuros, os sentimentos confusamente edificantes e as decisões fanáticas de voluntariosa cegueira"¹⁴. Provavelmente Jaspers, quando escreveu essas linhas, tivesse em vista os descaminhos da ciência no período nazista e a tenebrosa doutrina da justificação científica da superioridade racial que ele assistiu crescer e prosperar na Universidade nazista contra a tradição humanística da Alemanha¹⁵.

A boa prática científica, afastada de pressupostos infundados como o racismo, estabelece referências que vem do mundo moderno, no quanto ele representa a emancipação humana dos

¹²JASPERS, Karl: *Iniciação Filosófica*, Guimarães, Lisboa, 1987. Pág. 83.

¹³JASPERS, Karl: *Iniciação Filosófica*, Guimarães, Lisboa, 1987. Pág. 84.

¹⁴JASPERS, Karl: *Iniciação Filosófica*, Guimarães, Lisboa, 1987. Pág. 84.

¹⁵ Em *Homens em tempos sombrios*, Hannah Arendt comenta as posições de Jaspers na Universidade alemã, como cientista e filósofo, afirmando: "O que Jaspers então representava, quando estava totalmente isolado, não era a Alemanha, mas o que restara da humanitas na Alemanha" (ARENDR, Hannah: *Homens em tempos sombrios*. Cia das Letras, São Paulo, 2010. Pág. 85).

limites da natureza. Por outro lado, a prática da Ciência entra por caminhos tortuosos quando aponta uma verdade para o mundo, pois isso está além das conclusões que sua metodologia permite. Quando a prática da ciência não destrói a noção de infinitude do mundo, torna fecundo o exercício da razão e dá o exato tom da investigação a se levar em frente.

Importante é que a orientação que a ciência oferece não concorre, mas é parte da orientação filosófica para a vida. Afirma Jaspers: "a orientação filosófica da vida nasce da obscuridade em que cada um se encontra, do desamparo que sente quando, em carência de amor, fica o vazio do esquecimento de si"¹⁶. E não apenas essas coisas, mas o cansaço, o esquecimento de si, o trabalho sem sentido e o ócio improdutivo, tudo isso demanda orientação filosófica¹⁷. Filosofar diante desses desafios significa "decidirmo-nos a despertar em nós a origem, é reencontrarmos e agir, ajudando-nos a nós próprios com todas as forças"¹⁸.

Portanto, investigação filosófica e científica representam exercícios complementares da razão, ambas posicionando-se contra "a cega e incrítica aceitação de algo como verdade"¹⁹. Nesse sentido, parece a nosso filósofo, ambas as orientações atendem o melhor da tradição iluminista, quando exigem "um limitado empenho na busca da evidência e uma consciência crítica dos

¹⁶ JASPERS, Karl: *Iniciação Filosófica*, Guimarães, Lisboa, 1987. Pág. 110.

¹⁷ No artigo *Karl Jaspers e a orientação filosófica no mundo* aprofunda-se o problema da orientação que a Filosofia oferece à existência. Essa orientação depende da ideia de mundo e de sua unidade que vem com a meditação filosófica, pois "a unidade do mundo não se formará pela existência empírica ou pela realidade objetiva" (CARVALHO, José Mauricio de - SILVA, Márcia Maria: "Karl Jaspers e a orientação filosófica no mundo", em *Saberes Interdisciplinares*, 14, São João del-Rei, 2015. Pág. 40).

¹⁸ JASPERS, Karl: *Iniciação Filosófica*, Guimarães, Lisboa, 1987. Pág. 84.

¹⁹ JASPERS, Karl: *Iniciação Filosófica*, Guimarães, Lisboa, 1987. Pág. 84.

modos e limites de qualquer das evidências"²⁰. As duas orientações se completam e são solidárias, embora sejam criações diferentes.

A pureza do conhecimento científico

No capítulo VII da *Introdução ao pensamento filosófico*, o filósofo diferencia a verdade que é válida para todos, daquela verdade íntima que é cara a cada sujeito e é conhecida por convicção. A verdade válida para todos, diz o filósofo, é a verdade que a ciência oferece, a verdade de convicção não se estende a todos os homens. Muitas vezes na vida social vemos verdades de convicção em conflito e isso alimenta tensões na sociedade. Parece a nosso filósofo que precisamos evitar tais conflitos, pois não se pode esperar que outras pessoas partilhem de nossas convicções e as tomem por verdadeiras. Apenas nas formulações científicas se pode esperar consenso.

Conseguir separar uma coisa e outra é fundamental como orientação nas diferentes situações da vida, já que a distinção entre elas "coloca-se face a todas as questões vitais"²¹. Por isso, perceber a distância entre verdades da ciência e de convicção é fundamental já que envolve, como disse o filósofo, diversas situações da existência.

E o que assegura a pureza do conhecimento científico de modo que ele não se confunda com as variações das verdades singulares que opõem os homens entre si? Jaspers afirmará que é o fato dele não conter juízo de valor, como afirmou Max Weber. Na esteira do kantismo alemão, Max Weber pretende manter separados o conhecimento do mundo e o problema da liberdade como foi feito por Kant. Jaspers comenta o pensamento de Weber num ensaio que

²⁰ JASPERS, Karl: *Iniciação Filosófica*, Guimarães, Lisboa, 1987. Pág. 84.

²¹ JASPERS, Karl: *Introdução ao pensamento filosófico*, Cultrix (9. Ed), São Paulo, 1993. Pág. 75.

dedicou à sua contribuição. Nele afirmou (1953): "Para ele, o conhecimento isento de valores era a finalidade das ciências"²². Não vamos discutir se, de fato, Weber concretizou ou não seu projeto em sua Sociologia.

O conhecimento científico, Jaspers esclarece:

deve limitar-se ao que lhe é acessível, ou seja, ao que pode ser conhecido de maneira empírica e lógica e, portanto, capaz de impor-se a todos. A verdade da ciência não esgota a verdade, mas o caráter da verdade que lhe é própria deve ser reconhecido por todos²³.

A descrição de Jaspers deixa claro que há uma verdade mais ampla e que ultrapassa os contornos da ciência, que ela não alcança, mas que dentro dos limites da ciência a sua verdade é válida para todos. Se esse conhecimento é fundamental para orientar a relação do homem de hoje com o mundo, produzir uma vacina por exemplo, a decisão de realmente tomá-la depende de escolha que ultrapassa a verdade da ciência. Decidir quantas vacinas serão produzidas, distribuídas e aplicadas é outra decisão de caráter ético e político que ultrapassa os limites da ciência. Assim é porque quando entramos nas escolhas humanas o valor conduz a ação. As opções do homem dependem dos valores que adota. A Ciência diz o que devo esperar quando certas condições estão presentes, mas não se devo ou não fazer algo. Eis como o filósofo comenta a questão: "nenhuma ciência empírica nos ensinará o que devemos fazer; só nos ensina o que podemos obter por este ou aquele meio, se nos propomos este ou aquele fim"²⁴.

²² JASPERS, Karl: *Balance y Perspectiva; Discursos y Ensayos*, Revista de Occidente, Madrid, 1953. Pág. 5.

²³ JASPERS, Karl: *Introdução ao pensamento filosófico*, Cultrix (9. Ed), São Paulo, 1993. Pág. 77.

²⁴ JASPERS, Karl: *Introdução ao pensamento filosófico*, Cultrix (9. Ed), São Paulo, 1993. Pág. 77.

Há um aspecto que precede a existência das verdades científicas, é a disposição para aderir à verdade, uma espécie de paixão que transcende os mecanismos da ciência. Admitindo, contudo, que se deseja a Verdade, deve-se ter em conta a verdade das leis que a ciência fornece e que não dependem da vontade individual, nem é afetada por ela. Por isso, a ciência renúncia e não faz julgamentos de valor diz acompanhando Weber, pois ela "deve renunciar ao que não tem meios de atingir, isto é, a formular julgamentos"²⁵. Por outro lado, a escolha dos assuntos a pesquisar e o modo de utilizar os conhecimentos da ciência envolve outras questões além da ciência.

Saber distinguir os julgamentos de valor das leis da ciência é, portanto, um elemento fundamental na orientação da pessoa em seu trajeto existencial, pois o que ela fará diante de uma lei da ciência ou de uma verdade de convicção não é a mesma coisa. Por outro lado, ao perceber o sentido amplo de verdade e entender os mecanismos da verdade científica estabelece-se um distanciamento crítico da realidade ao mesmo tempo em que se participa da realidade histórica. Como este distanciamento afeta a vida? Distanciando-se da realidade, rompendo-se o que impede de ir além do limitado e factível, "no sentido de independência quanto à maneira em que experimento minha total dependência no ser dado a mim mesmo"²⁶. Então, vivendo na realidade aprende-se que se está em relação com coisas que não se esgotam nessa relação comigo. Assim, a orientação que a ciência oferece dialoga e integra a orientação filosófica, pois também a Filosofia vai até aí prendendo o sujeito na realidade, mas mostrando que não se pode permanecer nela. E, como dito anteriormente, a verdade filosófica depende da verdade científica para ser construída. Eis a metáfora

²⁵ JASPERS, Karl: *Introdução ao pensamento filosófico*, Cultrix (9. Ed), São Paulo, 1993. Pág. 83.

²⁶ JASPERS, Karl: *Introdução ao pensamento filosófico*, Cultrix (9. Ed), São Paulo, 1993. Pág. 84.

proposta pelo filósofo na *Iniciação Filosófica* para explicar sua posição: "Nós somos como essas borboletas e estamos perdidos se desistirmos da orientação da terra firme. Mas não nos contentamos em permanecer nela"²⁷.

A exigência do rigor da ciência que orienta

Em *Razão e Contra Razão em nosso tempo*, Karl Jaspers mostra como o conhecimento científico é importante na orientação do homem. O discurso filosófico é que é determinante pela amplitude que alcança, mas ele se baseia na plataforma comum que a ciência moderna alcançou.

No entanto, este não é um campo fácil de ser trilhado. É preciso cuidado com os dados tidos por científicos, pois mesmo quando alcançam estrondoso sucesso, como ocorreu com o marxismo e a psicanálise, tal sucesso não assegura a verdade de suas construções. A dúvida se coloca quando as afirmações ultrapassam o que a prática científica permite concluir. Assim, a correta prática científica é: "condição para qualquer verdadeira filosofia"²⁸.

Karl Jaspers mostra que apesar das contribuições que deixou para a História e a Sociologia, o pensamento de Marx tem base filosófica e se falsifica quando se afasta do que a ciência ensina. E como se afasta? Por exemplo, Marx espera criar um pensamento materialista, mas não no sentido ensinado pela Física ou pela Química. Ele faz o materialismo surgir tratando o trabalho como realidade humana fundamental, de onde "em princípio qualquer

²⁷ JASPERS, Karl: *Iniciação Filosófica*, Guimarães, Lisboa, 1987. Pág. 118.

²⁸ JASPERS, Karl: *Razão e Contra Razão em nosso tempo*, Minotauro, Lisboa, (sin fecha). Pág. 14.

outra realidade humana pode ser deduzida"²⁹. Essa conclusão não é científica, mas filosófica³⁰. E o marxismo igualmente falha quando pretende ser ciência única, ou de base, uma vez que o discurso da ciência somente vale para seu campo de atuação. Não se faz ciência da totalidade, a totalidade é o espaço da Filosofia. Em outras palavras, "a ciência não é um método universal, mas métodos especializados de acordo com cada um dos objetos definidos sobre os quais se debruça"³¹. Além disso, Marx admite a violência na implantação da sociedade que pretende, indo, também por essa conclusão, além do discurso científico. Justo porque "reúne em si a ciência, a fé e a política, Marx representa uma fatalidade espiritual; e em seu próprio nome, reduz a ciência a zero"³². Neste sentido, o marxismo não é propriamente científico, mas uma articulação da crença na ciência para ela realizar mais do que pode, consistindo nisso uma forma de superstição que nasce a volta da ciência³³. É o

²⁹ JASPERS, Karl: *Razão e Contra Razão em nosso tempo*, Minotauro, Lisboa, (sin fecha). Pág. 20.

³⁰ No livro *Filosofia e Psicologia, o pensamento fenomenológico existencial de Karl Jaspers*, entende-se que "essa é a principal crítica que Jaspers dirige à psicanálise, cujos representantes mais ilustres tentam explicar outros aspectos da realidade pela energia psicológica" (JASPERS, Karl: *Filosofia e Psicologia; o pensamento fenomenológico existencial de Karl Jaspers*, Imprensa Nacional, Lisboa, 2006. Pág. 245).

³¹ JASPERS, Karl: *Razão e Contra Razão em nosso tempo*, Minotauro, Lisboa, (sin fecha). Pág. 22.

³² JASPERS, Karl: *Razão e Contra Razão em nosso tempo*, Minotauro, Lisboa, (sin fecha). Pág. 24.

³³ No capítulo VIII da *Introdução ao pensamento filosófico*, Karl Jaspers resume as razões pelas quais a Psicanálise e o Marxismo perdem a capacidade de orientar como deve fazer uma teoria científica. Elas fazem isso quando: 1. Pretendem fundamentar o próprio saber, já que "nem a Psicologia, nem a Sociologia dispõe de fundamento científico próprio" (JASPERS, Karl: *Introdução ao pensamento filosófico*, Cultrix (9. Ed), São Paulo, 1993. Pág. 91); 2. Quando se apresentam como ciência universal, isto é, "nada existe que não apresente ângulo de estudo em que elas não tenham interesse" (JASPERS, Karl: *Introdução ao pensamento filosófico*, Cultrix (9. Ed), São Paulo, 1993. Pág. 91);

que o filósofo denomina, no capítulo VIII da *Iniciação Filosófica*, de falso iluminismo, resultado do uso acrítico da razão³⁴. Trata-se de uma forma de abordagem que não entende os limites presentes na orientação que a ciência pode fornecer.

A psicanálise comete equívocos semelhantes quando confunde a compreensão dos fenômenos psíquicos com sua explicação. Ao fazê-lo desconsidera que o sujeito é capaz de ações livres e nem tudo se explica por pulsões inconscientes. Jaspers aponta o que considera erros da técnica psicanalítica, sem negar sua contribuição no esclarecimento do psiquismo humano. Rejeita o dogmatismo freudiano, que se revela no afastamento dos discípulos que discordam de Freud. Afastar quem não concorda com uma construção científica é atitude incompatível com a ciência moderna que se desenvolveu sem a figura da autoridade. A consolidação de semelhante conduta "poderia desembocar no sectarismo e, por consequência, em inimizade ou em hostilidade científica, na inumanidade e na contra-razão"³⁵. Mesmo tendo amplo

3. a Psicologia perde a força científica quando pretende "ocupar-se do mesmo de que se ocupa a Filosofia que esclarece indagando" (JASPERS, Karl: *Introdução ao pensamento filosófico*, Cultrix (9. Ed), São Paulo, 1993. Pág. 91); 4. Quando "as hipóteses da psicanálise se metamorfoseiam em conhecimento do ser, em uma ontologia, em psiquização do mundo" (JASPERS, Karl: *Introdução ao pensamento filosófico*, Cultrix (9. Ed), São Paulo, 1993. Pág. 91), pois quando Psicologia e Sociologia entram no terreno da ontologia "degeneram em ciências totalitárias, manifestam-se estranhos fenômenos entre seus adeptos" (JASPERS, Karl: *Introdução ao pensamento filosófico*, Cultrix (9. Ed), São Paulo, 1993. Pág. 92).

³⁴ Jaspers explica no capítulo VIII da *Iniciação Filosófica* que: "o falso iluminismo julga poder fundar sobre o simples entendimento todo o saber, vontade e ação, em vez de utilizar o entendimento apenas como via imprescindível para o esclarecimento daquilo que tem que lhe ser fornecido, absolutiza os conhecimentos sempre particulares do entendimento em vez de os aplicar sensatamente ao domínio que lhes pertence" (JASPERS, Karl: *Iniciação Filosófica*, Guimarães, Lisboa, 1987. Pág. 82).

³⁵ JASPERS, Karl: *Iniciação Filosófica*, Guimarães, Lisboa, 1987. Pág. 32-33.

conhecimento da psiquiatria que se praticava no seu tempo e incorporando parte dela na sua *Psicopatologia Geral*, os escritos posteriores apontam no sentido de uma psicologia fenomenológica bastante diferente da que era praticada no seu tempo. Jaspers afirma na *Psicopatologia Geral* que: "quando falamos na totalidade do ser humano, trata-se de algo infinito, que não se pode conhecer como totalidade"³⁶. Assim, se ele não se dedicou a construir uma alternativa completa para a psicologia do seu tempo foi porque decidiu enfrentar os problemas relativos à epistemologia da ciência e seu papel na vida do homem como filósofo. De fato Jaspers deixou a Faculdade de Medicina, dedicando-se à carreira filosófica nos últimos anos de vida. Contudo, tinha consciência do caminho que a Medicina precisava trilhar e do quanto ela precisava mudar para ser coerente com os princípios epistemológicos que elaborou. E o que há de essencial nessa mudança? A prática clínica só se compreende numa relação de absoluto respeito e cuidado humano. Ele diz em um escrito elaborado mais próximo do fim da vida: *O médico na era da técnica*. No texto fica claro como deve ser a relação médico-paciente: "O mais elevado que, aqui e ali, lhe acontece é tornar-se companheiro de destino do doente, razão com razão, homem como homem, nos incontáveis casos-limites de uma amizade que nasce entre médico e doente"³⁷. Para seguir nessa direção parece-lhe necessário ter consciência dos limites presentes no conhecimento científico, no caso da Psicologia humana pelo enfrentamento da liberdade.

A crítica que o filósofo elabora em *Razão e Contra-Razão no nosso tempo* explica até onde a Ciência pode ajudar quando compreende seus limites. Esse aspecto parece fundamental para não "renegar a ciência moderna autêntica em nome da pretensa

³⁶ JASPERS, Karl: *Psicopatologia Geral*, Atheneu, Rio de Janeiro, 1979. Pág. 44.

³⁷ JASPERS, Karl: *O médico na era da técnica*, Edições 70, Lisboa, 1998. Pág. 17.

ciência"³⁸. Toda vez que se vai além do que a Ciência consegue oferecer acaba-se mergulhando numa teoria metafísica, com ou sem consciência disso. Toda tentativa, feita no espaço da Ciência, de propor uma afirmação definitiva sobre o mundo ou um saber total, baseia-se no equívoco de tratar o saber científico como filosófico. Em outras palavras, para uma descrição metódica da natureza "impõe-se uma metodologia consciente. Mas, quando se trata de apreender a verdade a ciência não é tudo"³⁹. Portanto, para se valer da orientação que a ciência pode oferecer é preciso saber o que ela pode e o que ela não pode oferecer⁴⁰.

³⁸ JASPERS, Karl: *Razão e Contra Razão em nosso tempo*, Minotauro, Lisboa, (sin fecha). Pág. 46.

³⁹ JASPERS, Karl: *Razão e Contra Razão em nosso tempo*, Minotauro, Lisboa, (sin fecha). Pág. 51.

⁴⁰ No livro *Homens em tempos sombrios*, Hannah Arendt comenta o pensamento de Jaspers e menciona um aspecto da orientação que a ciência fornece, associando-a à dimensão filosófica da comunicação. Essa orientação aproxima os homens de modo a que a história mundial pode ser pensada como realidade de todos os homens, embora explique que o desenvolvimento da ciência e a atual unidade que ela fornece dependeu da profundidade da razão filosófica que a sustenta e dos valores desenvolvidos no que o filósofo denomina período axial da história (800-200 a. C.). Explica Arendt: "Se se destruísse a dimensão de profundidade a partir da qual se desenvolveram a ciência e a tecnologia modernas, o mais provável é que a nova unidade da humanidade não conseguiria sobreviver sequer tecnicamente" (ARENDDT, Hannah: *Homens em tempos sombrios*. Cia das Letras, São Paulo, 2010. Págs. 97). E mais adiante completa: "Jaspers descobriu um eixo histórico empiricamente dado que oferece a todas as nações um arcabouço comum de autocompreensão histórica. O eixo da história mundial parece passar pelo século V a. C., em meio ao processo espiritual entre 800 e 200 a. C." (ARENDDT, Hannah: *Homens em tempos sombrios*. Cia das Letras, São Paulo, 2010. Págs. 97-98).

Aprofundando os limites da orientação que vem da ciência

O principal dos estudos sobre o que a Ciência não pode fornecer, encontra-se no item *El sentido da ciência*, no segundo capítulo do primeiro livro de *Filosofia*, uma das obras mais importantes do filósofo⁴¹.

Pelo que afirma naquela obra, para compreender a orientação que vem da ciência, deve-se partir do significado da própria Ciência. Esse significado não se encontra nela mesma, embora enquanto saber sobre o mundo não haja dúvida sobre os resultados que a Ciência fornece. O significado da Ciência se revela na Filosofia, comenta o filósofo: "A Ciência alcança só até onde vai o saber impositivo, porém o tempo é mais. Averiguar este mais não conduz a demonstrações, senão apela e requer apreender o sentido da Ciência"⁴².

E porque a Ciência não encontra o seu sentido? Por que ela não se pergunta por ele. Ao cientista não parece necessário perguntar-se pelo sentido do que faz, pois ao observar um fenômeno, ao descrevê-lo em seu laboratório, o sentido parece surgir naturalmente dos resultados que alcança. E os resultados parecem seguros até a Filosofia questioná-los e aos limites auto-impostos com os quais trabalha a Ciência. O sentido que o cientista tem por evidente se limita à atuação de sua ciência particular e não à unidade que ela proporciona. Porém, sem pensar na unidade que nasce do saber das ciências "o sentido é relativo respeito aos pontos de vista individuais e técnicos"⁴³. Embora todas as ciências

⁴¹ Os livros mais importantes de Jaspers são: *Filosofia* (Porto Rico: Edição da Universidade, 1958), *Psicologia de las concepciones del mundo* (Madrid: Gredos, 1967) e *Psicopatologia Geral* (Rio de Janeiro: Atheneo, 1979).

⁴² JASPERS, Karl: *Filosofia*. Universidade de Porto Rico, Porto Rico, 1958. Pág. 151.

⁴³ JASPERS, Karl: *Filosofia*. Universidade de Porto Rico, Porto Rico, 1958. Pág. 152.

trabalhem com o pensamento lógico, e nele estejam baseadas, também a lógica não confere unidade as ciências. E estando seu sentido limitado ao espaço das ciências particulares, a orientação que as ciências podem fornecer é empírica e restrita ao campo a que se dedicam⁴⁴. No entanto, esse sentido serve pouco de orientação para viver, pois orientação para viver é a maneira como se deve portar no mundo de modo geral.

Embora delimitada ao campo epistemológico de seu objeto e sem se perguntar pela validade do que se está construindo, o cientista não raras vezes tira conclusões além do que sugerem seus estudos. Quando assim procede, ele deixa seu campo de trabalho para fazer Filosofia e a experiência mostra que surge então uma metafísica ruim. Explica o filósofo as razões de ser assim: "A absolutização de um método limitado e singular comete uma

⁴⁴ Uma das análises mais criativas sobre os problemas decorrentes da especialização que vem da ciência foi elaborada pelo filósofo espanhol Ortega y Gasset, como foi dito no início deste trabalho. No seu livro famoso *La Rebelión de las masas* ele explica que : "O homem da ciência atual é o protótipo do homem massa. E não por casualidade, nem por um defeito unipessoal de cada homem da ciência, senão por que a ciência mesma - raiz da civilização - o converte automaticamente em homem massa, que dizer, faz dele um primitivo, um bárbaro moderno" (ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: "La rebelión de las masas". *En Obras Completas*, v. IV, Alianza, Madrid, 1994.Pág. 216). E por que faz? Porque seu saber se limita ao objeto de sua ciência, mas ele ignora todo o resto, inclusive o conhecimento das outras ciências. E como se disse no capítulo: *Totalitarismo e ética em Ortega y Gasset* no livro *Poder e moralidade; o totalitarismo e outras experiências antiliberais na modernidade*: "em todos os assuntos que solenemente ignora espera opinar e impor sua posição como se de tudo fosse profundo conhecedor" (CARVALHO, José Maurício de (org): *Poder e moralidade; o totalitarismo e outras experiências antiliberais na modernidade*. Annablume, São Paulo, 2012.Pág. 121). Para Ortega, a especialização da ciência seria superada com a síntese filosófica e a formação de um pensamento culto. Para Jaspers, o que a Filosofia fornece é a consciência das limitações da ciência singular e mesmo da síntese filosófica no convívio da consciência com o transcendente (ou englobante).

usurpação, pois com ela está enlaçada, tácita e sem crítica, uma ingênua metafísica que pretende saber do verdadeiro ser"⁴⁵.

Portanto, a orientação que a Ciência fornece não pode vir isolada do sentido metafísico dessa orientação, precisa ser parte de um conhecimento amplo que o corte epistemológico da ciência não permite fazer. Só a Filosofia é capaz de ir além do que cada Ciência estuda singularmente. No entanto, para servir de base num conhecimento geral que sirva de orientação no mundo, a Filosofia não pode prescindir dos conhecimentos que as ciências fornecem como saber sobre o mundo. Não é mais possível oferecer uma compreensão geral sobre o todo sem o saber particular que as ciências fornecem. E a razão é que esse todo, como imagem do mundo, não encontra sustentação em nosso tempo no puro exercício da razão metafísica. Esta pretensão acabou-se com Kant. Diz Jaspers: "Já não há uma totalidade onde o todo encontre seu lugar: nem o todo ontológico da escolástica, nem o todo absolutizado das categorias e métodos mecanicistas, organicistas e outras peculiaridades, nem tampouco o todo dialético de Hegel"⁴⁶.

Estamos, portanto, diante de um saber limitado que somente vale nas limitações de um campo epistemológico, o reconhecimento de algo que ultrapassa esse saber limitado e a impossibilidade de chegar a um todo metafísico que fundamenta os saberes parciais. Neste sentido, na Filosofia vamos adiante do conhecimento que a Ciência oferece, mas sem atingir um princípio fundante capaz de unificar toda realidade. Para Jaspers, o desafio é conviver com a transcendência sem desconhecer os limites da razão. Neste contexto, a Ciência orienta no saber do mundo e a Filosofia prepara a convivência com tudo o que a ultrapassa.

⁴⁵ JASPERS, Karl: *Filosofia*. Universidade de Porto Rico, Porto Rico, 1958. Pág. 153.

⁴⁶ JASPERS, Karl: *Filosofia*. Universidade de Porto Rico, Porto Rico, 1958. Pág. 155.

O exercício da Ciência e a compreensão de seus limites abre espaço para o pensar metafísico e também para a satisfação prática menos exigente que a Ciência fornece. Um saber sobre algo da realidade só se satisfaz quando aplicado como orientação. A satisfação que nasce da prática da Ciência decorre da inseparabilidade vital entre conhecer e atuar. A prática científica permite a satisfação de tratar profundamente a realidade. Contudo, essa satisfação se torna problemática quando pretende afirmar uma verdade mais profunda do que a Ciência tem meios de alcançar. Portanto, a satisfação prática não pode confundir o saber do objeto delimitado pela Ciência com aquele fundo de onde ele emerge. E tanto mais legítima é a satisfação quanto mais se aprofunda a objetividade científica possível, sem abandonar a tensão da profundidade que está além da que a Ciência alcança.

A satisfação que brota da prática da ciência vem da profundidade que ela pode alcançar. Ela fornece uma verdade objetiva no tempo, um conhecimento que pode ser compartilhado de forma segura e que ninguém pode recusar, mas esse conhecimento específico sobre o funcionamento do mundo não é a verdade fundamental sobre a unidade do mundo. A tentação é grande de querer ficar no positivo que por si se impõe. A Ciência deixa o espaço da subjetividade e das convicções pessoais e se articula num campo de fatos compartilhados, seguros e comprovados pela existência empírica. O risco de ir além e concluir o que não se pode é o que o filósofo explica como se segue:

A satisfação que produz o convincente e impositivo por virtude da objetividade segura conduziu a mal entendidos: a confundir a verdade em geral com a exatidão impositiva, e com ele, a tendência de reduzir toda a satisfação do saber ao reconhecimento do impositivo⁴⁷.

⁴⁷ JASPERS, Karl: *Filosofia*. Universidade de Porto Rico, Porto Rico, 1958. Pág. 160.

O conhecimento do mundo que a Ciência oferece não dá a impressão de descrever perfeitamente a totalidade do real? Em outras palavras, as teorias físicas sobre a natureza não parecem esgotar o seu significado e oferecer uma palavra definitiva sobre o que existe? A ideia de unidade que a Ciência oferece não remete à unidade mesma da realidade? Construir uma teoria aceita e válida sobre o mundo não oferece satisfação ao cientista? Partindo da última questão pode-se dizer que com certeza o cientista ficará satisfeito, certamente a unidade que a teoria fornece não é apenas formal, ela ajusta o contato com a infinitude das observações. Contudo, entende Jaspers, acompanhando Kant, que "a unidade da respectiva ideia não existe como existindo ou impondo-se objetivamente, mas como unidade procurada"⁴⁸.

O conhecimento do mundo que o cientista obtém só é válido e universal quando fica nos contornos metodológicos nos quais a Ciência trabalha. Quando vai além deles se transforma num empirismo dogmático. A dificuldade que enfrenta é que a certeza possível de ser obtida com a sensibilidade parece tão forte que ela se generaliza não só entre especialistas, mas entre a população em geral. Jaspers observa que esse empirismo popular não deixa de ser uma forma do dogmatismo quando se alimenta "da fortificação da ciência positiva em uma autoridade inconcebível e asfixiante"⁴⁹. Esse empirismo que se alegra com os fatos é nomeado por Jaspers de teoria da satisfação contemplativa. Trata-se, em outras palavras, "de um esquema tradicional, de reduzir o mundo a um mesquinho agregado de sinais e signos de realidades utilizáveis"⁵⁰. É um risco permanente que o filósofo deve saber enfrentar.

⁴⁸ JASPERS, Karl: *Filosofia*. Universidade de Porto Rico, Porto Rico, 1958. Pág. 161.

⁴⁹ JASPERS, Karl: *Filosofia*. Universidade de Porto Rico, Porto Rico, 1958. Pág. 163.

⁵⁰ JASPERS, Karl: *Filosofia*. Universidade de Porto Rico, Porto Rico, 1958. Pág.

Superando preconceitos no caminho para a Verdade

Para conviver com os limites da ciência e do conhecimento que ela fornece é preciso superar críticas e preconceitos que falseiam o caminho até a Verdade. A primeira é julgar que a Ciência tenha algo a dizer sobre a totalidade. Ela não tem, mas não quer dizer que não seja importante por causa disso. Se se quer tratar da verdade fundamental usando unicamente os dados positivos não se vai muito longe, pois o saber que as ciências oferecem não é incondicionado. Insistir nesse caminho leva ao ceticismo ou ao niilismo epistemológico. Porém, não se pode perder vista que o saber positivo, como dito até aqui, é etapa necessária na construção da verdade fundamental. Como lembra Paula Arizpe: "o sujeito, enquanto consciência empírica se encontra ante um mundo de objetos mediante os quais pode satisfazer suas necessidades básicas"⁵¹. A verdade científica não serve como orientação fundamental para a vida e não pode se tornar a Verdade sobre a totalidade estudada pela Filosofia, mas, lembra o filósofo, é parte importante na edificação dela. Assim é porque ajuda não só a enfrentar os problemas imediatos do mundo, mas a conceptualizar o mundo que se objetiva na consciência.

Outra crítica que muitas vezes se ouve é a de que a procura pelo conhecimento tira a alegria e a esperança numa vida boa e tranquila. Essa crítica tem por pressuposto que assim como o indivíduo desenvolve crenças válidas para ele e com elas torna suportável a vida, o próprio conhecimento humano em geral não consegue superar essa limitação. Em outras palavras, a Ciência serve para destruir crenças que nos mantém firmes na existência. Para Jaspers, essa crítica nasce de um preconceito, uma visão incorreta da ciência e da verdade que ela pode oferecer. Somente

162.

⁵¹ ARIZPE, Paula: "La verdad comunicativa como reto creativo en Karl Jaspers", en *Tópicos*, 16, México, Universidad Panamericana, 1999. Págs. 149.

quando inadequada e inadvertidamente se entende que a Ciência é um saber definitivo e total, de valor absoluto, é que se chega a tal conclusão. Porém, como já foi dito o saber positivo nunca deixa de ser particular e relativo, ele "não pode dar, por exemplo, um prognóstico absolutamente seguro"⁵². Não só as teorias científicas contém elementos de imprecisão, o que é tanto mais verdade quanto mais migramos do campo da Física para a Biologia, por exemplo. É importante notar que muitas teorias científicas que já foram consideradas verdades intocadas em certo tempo, com o passar dos anos foram substituídas. Afirma o filósofo: "O saber mesmo está sempre em movimento e, em lugar de permanecer defasada, sempre se põe em questão a si mesma" (p. 166). E completa logo adiante: "Porém, assim o saber pode destruir, pode também levar a existência a sua profundidade, a levá-la a sua verdadeira transcendência"⁵³. Se há alguma comodidade ou aparente felicidade que pode ser destruída pelo saber consciente de seus limites, então esse saber é falso e questionável, conclui o filósofo. A prática correta da ciência não destrói a felicidade e nem as crenças fundamentais que nos mantém na existência.

A terceira crítica a se superar é a de que o conhecimento das realidades vitais empobrece a vida mesma já que não responde a tudo. Essa crítica, para Jaspers, também não tem sentido, pois a desilusão com alguns resultados não invalida a procura ampla pelo conhecimento. Quando o conhecimento se busca por uma vontade incondicionada não é preciso justificá-lo. A admiração pelas coisas dirige a razão até o mundo. A busca da verdade não resulta da exatidão, por outro lado, o conhecimento positivo ainda que incompleto e sempre perfectível é condição para propor uma

⁵² JASPERS, Karl: *Filosofia*. Universidade de Porto Rico, Porto Rico, 1958. Pág. 165.

⁵³ JASPERS, Karl: *Filosofia*. Universidade de Porto Rico, Porto Rico, 1958. Pág. 165.

verdade maior e mais ampla que possa servir de guia à existência. Esclarece o filósofo:

É da verdade, na qual eu, como existência, me sustento e caio, que o impositivo da ciência pode receber seu *pathos* derivado (...). A importância existencial da orientação intramundana é que com ela termina o saber, e ante o abismo do nada, a existência se transforma em possibilidade de transcender. O saber não dá uma satisfação última, porém é o caminho pelo qual a existência pode chegar a ser si mesma"⁵⁴

É preciso superar essas críticas entorno à verdade da ciência para que dela se possa obter todo o proveio que só a Ciência pode oferecer. Não se pode pedir mais nem se deve pedir menos da Ciência, mas o que ela pode oferecer. E o que ela pode oferecer não é pouco.

Para ir além do positivo

Ao tratar a realidade positiva e o conhecimento da matéria não se pode evitar querer ir além do conhecimento alcançado. Nenhuma surpresa nessa atitude, todo saber quer mais, quer ir além de onde conseguiu chegar. É esse propósito que promove o contínuo desenvolvimento da ciência, o intento de querer ir mais longe de onde já se chegou. Contudo, por mais que se avance no conhecimento da realidade material, fica sempre um resto que não pode ser alcançado pela Ciência. Para uma orientação geral é preciso de juízos que tratem da unidade do real, mas isto não é possível com o conhecimento que a Ciência oferece. Não há como tomar por objeto a totalidade do mundo já que essa totalidade é

⁵⁴ JASPERS, Karl: *Filosofia*. Universidade de Porto Rico, Porto Rico, 1958. Pág. 168.

inobjetivável, isto é, não se mostra inteira como objeto para a consciência. Para aprofundar a questão seria necessário examinar o conceito de englobante, eixo central da metafísica de Jaspers, o que não temos como aprofundar aqui. Uma ideia rápida do que significa isso que não pode ser objetivado, mas é a raiz de onde tudo provém, pode ser obtida com a leitura do capítulo inicial de *Filosofia de la existencia*. Ali o filósofo explica: "O ser aparece para nós sem se fechar, nos arrasta por todos os lados até o ilimitado. E, não obstante, cai sempre como um ser determinado que nos vem ao encontro"⁵⁵. E é justo por isso que "o englobante é o que sempre se anuncia nos objetos presentes no horizonte, porém nunca se torna objeto"⁵⁶. O capítulo III da *Iniciación Filosófica* também contém boa síntese do que o autor entende por englobante. Ali afirma: "Se concebermos o englobante em termos de interpretação filosófica, reincidimos na objetivação daquilo que, por essência, não é objeto"⁵⁷.

Mesmo quando se toma o mundo material como algo que me envolvente completamente, ainda que ele pareça completo e perfeito nessa condição, a forma como ele se mostra somente pode existir numa consciência, que, por sua vez, é ela própria um mundo. Jaspers revela, ao pensar assim, situar-se no espaço da fenomenologia. Temos então, no caso, dois mundos: um que se reconhece dentro e um outro que o envolve. E assim, sempre que me aproximo da totalidade, sempre que a comparo com outras percepções da totalidade, sempre chego a uma que se mostra entre outras possibilidades e outros mundos, já que o mundo mesmo não está fechado segundo explica o filósofo:

O mundo está aberto, enquanto que nós como seres cognoscentes, jamais o penetramos. A relatividade do saber imposto, a

⁵⁵ JASPERS, Karl: *Filosofia de la Existencia*, Aguillar, Madrid, 1961. Pág. 44

⁵⁶ JASPERS, Karl: *Filosofia de la Existencia*, Aguillar, Madrid, 1961. Pág. 44

⁵⁷ JASPERS, Karl: *Iniciación Filosófica*, Guimarães, Lisboa, 1987. Pág. 34.

insuperabilidade da infinitude, a acessibilidade da unidade na imagem do mundo, o atestam. Os limites da ação teleológica no mundo o deixam experimentar na prática⁵⁸.

As dificuldades elencadas na busca de um saber sobre o mundo que possa orientar o caminho existencial de cada homem não constituem um obstáculo quando o pesquisador caminha para chegar aos limites do que pode. Se desejar ir além mergulhará no desânimo e fracasso, mas o espaço que há para progredir é enorme e a pesquisa tem possibilidades praticamente infinitas. E ao proceder assim a humanidade pode caminhar na construção do saber irrecusável, que é uma grande tarefa.

Para o filósofo, o limite da razão tem dupla face, de um lado o que a Física quântica e a Física da relatividade começaram a mostrar sobre a impossibilidade de prever com exatidão os movimentos da matéria⁵⁹, de outro o limite positivo que está na experiência da liberdade pessoal. Chegamos aqui ao possível:

As ciências naturais tratam de capturar o impenetrável em leis e teorias; as ciências do espírito constroem as obras e as manifestações

⁵⁸ JASPERS, Karl: *Filosofia*. Universidade de Porto Rico, Porto Rico, 1958. Pág. 169.

⁵⁹ No artigo *Os estudos de Schlick sobre a realidade; uma análise do problemas dos universais*, mostra-se as dificuldades de prever o movimento atômico e os problemas associados à mensuração desse fenômeno. Além disso, o artigo mostra de que modo é possível "verificar o sentido empírico de uma afirmação quando seu significado se refere à existência do mundo" (CARVALHO, José Mauricio de: "Os estudos de Schlick sobre a realidade; uma análise do problemas dos universais", em *Phibra*, 1, Juiz de Fora, 1986. Págs. 36). Encontra-se, Schlick, com as dificuldades do chamado *Círculo de Viena* que começam nas dificuldades de observar e prever o movimento atômico e de construir proposições válidas sobre o mundo. Vivendo neste momento e em contato com os físicos alemães, Jaspers interpreta as dificuldades que testemunhava conforme sua formação kantiana e fenomenológica, desviando-se das posições dos positivistas lógicos, mas preservando o que de Kant havia no tratamento do empírico.

da liberdade, atualizando mais conscientemente suas leis e sua significação normativa. Porém o limite absoluto é, para as ciências naturais, o obscuro e absolutamente outro; para as ciências do espírito, a liberdade da existência como origem da comunicação⁶⁰.

Estamos diante de um roteiro para o desenvolvimento da ciência. Permanecer no espaço crítico das limitações da consciência, segundo a tradição iniciada por Kant, abandonar a tentativa de construir sobre o mundo uma referência para a qual a razão não é suficiente. Contudo, se o homem se mantém aberto ao englobante, supera os limites que marcam sua existência. Ele o explica em *Psicologia de las concepciones del mundo*: "O homem existente no englobante, por tendência, está excluído das situações limites"⁶¹. Estas ficam substituídas para ele pela imagem fixada do mundo e dos valores"⁶².

⁶⁰ JASPERS, Karl: *Filosofia*. Universidade de Porto Rico, Porto Rico, 1958. Pág. 170.

⁶¹ Situação-limite é um conceito caro a Jaspers. Ele denomina Situação-limite àquelas realidades que nos acompanham como homens e das quais não conseguimos escapar. Elas podem tomar formas ligeiramente diferentes, mas permanecem essencialmente as mesmas para todos: o sofrimento, a morte, a necessidade do esforço, a culpa. São realidades com as quais estamos sempre em contato. O filósofo diz no segundo capítulo da *Iniciação Filosófica* que Situação-limite: "são situações fundamentais de nossa existência (...). Quer isto dizer que são situações que não podemos transpor nem alterar" (JASPERS, Karl: *Iniciação Filosófica*, Guimarães, Lisboa, 1987. Pág. 19) E as enumera: "tenho que morrer, tenho que sofrer, tenho que lutar, estou sujeito ao acaso e incorro inelutavelmente em culpa" (JASPERS, Karl: *Iniciação Filosófica*, Guimarães, Lisboa, 1987. Pág. 19).

⁶² JASPERS, Karl: *Psicologia de las concepciones del mundo*, Gredos, Madrid, 1967. Pág. 398

Considerações finais

Karl Jaspers considera a existência humana como um modo de estar no mundo. Este modo significa mais que sentir e perceber o mundo, representa descobrir nas experiências que se faz as razões para viver e atuar. É assim que cada homem constrói um caminho existencial singular como singularidade, descobrindo suas razões para viver. E por que o homem tem que construir um caminho só seu é que a lição de Jaspers aqui resumida permite aproximação com a filosofia prática, pois ela propicia enfrentar dores e dificuldades existenciais que surgem na existência. Ao orientar para superar o que não se compreende bem, essa lição de Jaspers ajuda a pessoa a consolidar posições e fazer escolhas. As implicações teóricas da trajetória existencial tomada como abertura foi examinada por Paula Arizpe no artigo *La verdad comunicativa como reto creativo en Karl Jaspers*. Ali ela explica:

Jaspers pretende guiar o homem, enquanto existência possível até as profundidades da comunicação existencial onde a verdade toma a forma de crença na abertura. Esta abertura consiste em um conhecimento por presença em profundidade (não na superfície) que inclui a distância da reflexão e a imediatez da intuição conjuntamente. A abertura é a única categoria que pode albergar a aspiração humana do conhecimento criativo, que é tão ampla como a liberdade. A verdade humana é a crença no que não somos porém podemos ser, uma crença no que não temos feito porém devemos fazer. A liberdade é uma aventura por realizar e que só pode conquistar-se mediante uma luta cotidiana por existir⁶³.

Na condução desse processo há o desafio de formar uma imagem do mundo que oriente o querer, a atuação e as escolhas. Para tanto o uso prático da reflexão é estratégia fundamental. Nosso trabalho

⁶³ ARIZPE, Paula: “La verdad comunicativa como reto creativo en Karl Jaspers”, en *Tópicos*, 16, México, Universidad Panamericana, 1999. Págs. 150.

ficou nas orientações fornecidas pelo filósofo e não tratou propriamente do processo de abertura existencial tema do artigo de Paula Arizpe. Entretanto, em razão do modo como evolui o pensamento de Jaspers, da prática da ciência para a investigar seu significado, mostramos que a orientação da ciência é parte de um processo maior de reflexão, justamente o tema de Paula Arizpe no artigo mencionado. A orientação fornecida pela ciência, da forma como Jaspers a propõe, tem implicações importantes num consultório de filosofia prática, pois ajudará o cliente a corrigir erros de raciocínio, reconhecer crenças injustificadas e superar posições dogmáticas,

O caminho que o saber sobre o mundo percorre tem um limite intransponível cuja raiz pode ser vislumbrada nas tematizações de Emmanuel Kant, agora reconstruídas com os resultados da ciência dos dias que viveu nosso filósofo⁶⁴. Ao referir-se a Kant, Jaspers abre uma linha de atuação para o filósofo prático que pode orientar o consultante a organizar arquetonicamente os problemas que encontra em sua trajetória existencial, apresentando-os claramente

⁶⁴ No livro *A problemática do culturalismo*, Antônio Paim mostra que no final do século XIX e início do século XX a universidade alemã cuidou de: "fixar a singularidade das ciências da cultura e da história. Na década de noventa as figuras catalizadoras são Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) e Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936). Windelband considerava que existiam dois tipos de ciências. Denominou as primeiras de nomotéticas e as segundas de idiográficas" (PAIM, Antônio: *A problemática do culturalismo*, Edipucrs (2. ed), Porto Alegre, 1995. Pág. 16/17). E explica: As primeiras são Física, Química, a Biologia, etc. e as segundas, as culturais (Historiografia, Direito, etc.). Pois bem, diz Paim, toda essa discussão sobre o sentido da ciência mantêm-se "sob a influência de Kant" (PAIM, Antônio: *A problemática do culturalismo*, Edipucrs (2. ed), Porto Alegre, 1995. Pág. 16). Pode-se dizer que Karl Jaspers vive o clima deste movimento, ainda que não se encaixe exatamente na escola culturalista alemã, à qual se filiam os filósofos mencionados e outros nomes de primeira linha como Emil Lask (1875-1915), Max Scheler (1874-1928), Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950), entre outros.

e sem confusão para análise. A clareza do problema já encaminha uma solução razoável.

Para transcender o que se sabe não se pode perder como referência que "o mundo é fenômeno, no qual não surge o Ser em si. Este transcender, que nos aparece nos limites da orientação científica no mundo em formas concretas, modificadas, é a ideia fundamental da orientação filosófica no mundo"⁶⁵. Aprender como proceder a uma orientação que nasce da ciência, reconhecer seus limites, é uma forma de exercício crítico. Ao fazê-lo, acompanhando as ponderações do filósofo prático, o cliente melhora sua capacidade de raciocinar, articula melhor os conceitos e reconhece as fragilidades do seu raciocínio.

Deste modo fica esclarecido que o saber que a Ciência oferece é a base, mas não é suficiente como orientação para a existência. Como diz o filósofo no ensaio *Peligros y albuces de la libertad*: "o conhecimento se dirige à inteligência geral, em que todos somos idênticos, porém a exigência da liberdade se dirige a cada indivíduo"⁶⁶. Essa exigência de liberdade pede reflexão filosófica, já que a Ciência não oferece valores válidos. Contudo, não se pode avançar, hoje em dia, na investigação filosófica e no caminho metafísico de Jaspers, retratado por Paula Arizpe no artigo citado, sem o conhecimento que a Ciência oferece. O motivo é a clareza que a Ciência propicia quando nos deparamos com o funcionamento do mundo. São os resultados da Ciência que impedem que a Filosofia se perca em investigação puramente subjetiva, em metafísicas que desconsideram os resultados objetivos do funcionamento do mundo. Esse conhecimento é imprescindível para viver e pensar em nosso tempo. A Ciência nos deu um conhecimento do mundo muito maior do que se podia

⁶⁵ ARIZPE, Paula: "La verdad comunicativa como reto creativo en Karl Jaspers", en *Tópicos*, 16, México, Universidad Panamericana, 1999. Págs. 171.

⁶⁶ JASPERS, Karl: *Balance y Perspectiva; Discursos y Ensayos*, Revista de Occidente, Madrid, 1953. Pág. 220.

supor antes de seu desenvolvimento, mas não deu a orientação necessária para viver⁶⁷. Se o filósofo ajudar o cliente a seguir as intuições de Jaspers, ele aprenderá como construir razões válidas para experiências vividas e intuições pouco refletidas. Assim, com as referências da ciência, o cliente pode se posicionar melhor diante das questões da vida.

Quando não considera os resultados da Ciência moderna, o pensador fica sem conhecimento do funcionamento do mundo, o que é em nosso tempo uma falha imperdoável. Sem essa consciência terá dificuldade de análise e de entender o mecanismo do mundo.

O que a Ciência oferece é muito e necessitamos cada vez mais dela, mas ela não enfrenta o problema de seu próprio significado. Esse significado nasce dos resultados que o cientista obtém, dos impulsos e propósitos do próprio pesquisador, que como tal não têm fundamento científico. Por isso, é que a reflexão filosófica que parte dos dados da Ciência ajuda a clarear o significado da Ciência, permitindo superar dúvidas e falsas crenças que trazem dificuldade e frequentemente sofrimento à pessoas incapazes de refletir com clareza.

Este é o modo de Jaspers retomar os contributos ainda válidos do iluminismo, e o que dele se deve deixar de lado por alimentar

⁶⁷ O filósofo português Delfim Pinto dos Santos, um leitor de Jaspers, comentando os rumos de humanismo científico num ensaio com este título, afirmou que: "a Ciência não deu ao homem o ele espera, dando-lhe inesperadamente o que ele não esperava" (SANTOS, Delfim Pinto dos: "Humanismo Científico". En *Obras Completas*, Calouste Gulbenkian (2. ed.), Lisboa, 1982. Pág. 497). Parece algo próximo do que pensava Karl Jaspers se consideramos que a Ciência não ofereceu a verdade fundamental que os positivistas acreditaram que ela daria, mas ela ofereceu um saber sobre o funcionamento do mundo que não se podia imaginar possível antes do avanço das pesquisas científicas.

falsas crenças. É o raciocínio bem treinado que orienta para a vida e, sem ele, se desorganiza a estrutura existencial da pessoa.

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PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE AS ACTION RESEARCH. THE SOCRATIC DIALOGUE METHOD AT NORWEGIAN FOLK HIGH SCHOOLS

LA FILOSOFÍA APLICADA COMO INVESTIGACIÓN-ACCIÓN. EL MÉTODO DEL DIÁLOGO SOCRÁTICO EN LAS UNIVERSIDADES POPULARES NORUEGAS

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Abstract: In this article the authors discuss whether and how philosophical practice in general and the Socratic dialogue method in particular can be understood, not only as a form of counseling or education, but also as a form of research. For this purpose references and comparisons to so-called participatory action research are made, on the one hand. On the other, by means of several short case studies, a project about Socratic dialoguing is presented, which was conducted at so-called Norwegian folk high schools and which should point out the inherent research-character of philosophical practice.

Keywords: philosophical practice, participatory action research, Socratic method, Norwegian Folk High School

Resumen: En este artículo, los autores discutirán si es posible, y cómo, la Filosofía Aplicada en general y el método del diálogo socrático en particular puede ser catalogados no solo como una forma de orientación o de educación sino, además, como un mecanismo para investigar. A tal fin, se articulan comparaciones con la, así denominada, investigación-acción participativa. Por otro lado, partiendo de un conjunto de pequeños casos, se presenta un proyecto

sobre diálogos socráticos. Éste se llevó a término en las universidades populares noruegas, lo cual pone de manifiesto el carácter investigador inherente a la Filosofía Aplicada.

Palabras clave: philosophical practice, participatory action research, Socratic method, Norwegian Folk High School

Introduction

Today, one can find a vast amount of publications on philosophical practice. By now, there is also a diverse range of methodologies in use within the field¹. Nevertheless, since the “hour of birth” of philosophical practice, the discussion on what kind of activity it actually represents and how it can be defined, did not fall silent until today. For this reason, one of the guiding questions of this article reads: What is a philosophical practitioner actually doing, when performing philosophical practice – and to what extent can this activity be understood, not only as a form of counseling or education, but also as a form of research?

Philosophical practice as a counseling or educational activity

Since its beginnings in the early 1980ies, many practitioners proclaimed that philosophical practice is a counseling activity – so-called philosophical counseling. Other approaches, like the Socratic method after Leonard Nelson, or the so-called Philo Cafè as introduced by Marc Sautet, suggest philosophical practice to be more of an educational activity. The respective (academic) literature on philosophical practice, however, shows that

¹ see WEISS, Michael N. (ed.): *The Socratic Handbook. Dialogue Methods for Philosophical Practice*, LIT Publishing, Vienna, 2015.

understanding it either as an educational or as a counseling activity is both problematic.

There are several publications, which discuss the identity and uniqueness of philosophical counseling compared to psychotherapy, coaching, life counseling, pastoral care etc.² In our opinion, however, the respective literature on the matter remains inconclusive. In its essence there seem to be too little decisive aspects that would identify philosophical counseling – mainly practiced in one-on-one settings – as clearly genuine and different from other counseling approaches, like existential analysis or existential psychotherapy³. Furthermore, our personal and professional experiences over the last years, leads us to the question, whether philosophical counseling really deserves the name “counseling” or whether it actually is an activity of a rather different kind⁴.

When understanding philosophical practice as an educational activity, then it is obviously not an educational activity in the traditional sense – though without any doubt certain philosophical practices can lead to learning effects with the participants. However, these effects are not the outcome or the result of *teaching* as we normally understand it. Rather, one can interpret the kind of learning achieved in philosophical practice in the sense of so-called

² see i.e.: ACHENBACH, Gerd: “Philosophy, Philosophical Practice, and Psychotherapy”, in LAHAV, Ran & TILLMANN, Maria da Venza (eds.): *Essays on Philosophical Counseling*, University Press of America, Lanham, MD, 1995. Or: LAHAV, Ran: “A Conceptual Framework for Philosophical Counseling: Worldview Interpretation”, in: LAHAV, Ran & TILLMANN, Maria da Venza (eds.): *Essays on Philosophical Counseling*, University Press of America, Lanham, MD, 1995.

³ see *ibidem*, p. 11

⁴ see HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: “The Call and Practices of Wonder. How to evoke a Socratic Community of Wonder in Professional Settings”, in WEISS, Michael N. (ed.): *The Socratic Handbook. Dialogue Methods for Philosophical Practice*, LIT Publishing, Vienna, 2015. p. 219f.

anamnesis. Anamnesis, as a certain form of learning, was presented in the Plato's dialogue *Menon*, where only by means of questioning and not by direct teaching Socrates succeeds in making a slave (who never received any previous training in mathematics) solve a geometrical problem.

One has to admit that many philosophical practitioners do neither refer to counseling nor to education when defining their work-approach. Often they rather refer to terms like critical thinking, existential reflection, philosophizing or dialoguing – but these activities are not necessarily unique to philosophical practice (i.e. existential reflection or dialoguing is done in other professions or disciplines too). To put it in other words, a teacher is supposed to teach, a therapist is supposed to treat, a counselor is supposed to counsel etc. – therefore the question is: What is a philosophical practitioner actually doing when she performs philosophical practice? To approach this question it is necessary to go into the specific context of this particular activity.

Philosophical practice as a research activity

Until now research in philosophical practice has been a rare phenomenon, so to say. This issue of the *HASER* journal is an “exception to the rule”, being one of the few publications in which philosophical practice *and* research is discussed. In this article we would like to take it even a step further – our intention is to re-interpret philosophical practice *both* as a narrative-based method of investigation *and* as a research activity in itself. In order to do so, we will relate the so-called Socratic dialogue method to what is called participatory action research⁵. In the course of this article we

⁵ see CHEVALIER, Jaques M. & BUCKLES, Daniel J.: *Participatory Action Research: Theory and Methods for Engaged Inquiry*, Routledge, London & New York, 2013.

will present several short case studies, which should exemplify how and why we understand philosophical practice as a research activity in general and a form of participatory action research in particular. However, before introducing these short cases, we would first like to make some theoretical and methodological remarks on the Socratic dialogue method.

The Socratic dialogue method after Leonard Nelson

Today many philosophical practitioners make use of the so-called Socratic method as developed by Leonard Nelson⁶. When conceptualizing it, Nelson's intention was to offer a dialogue method for groups in order to make the respective participants of such a dialogue (like students) *philosophize* about the topic at stake. A unique characteristic of this method is that it does not require any philosophical pre-knowledge with the participants. Another central aspect of the Socratic method is that the chosen topic, subject or phenomenon of the dialogue is investigated by means of concrete cases and experiences, formulated as narratives. A philosophical investigation performed according to the Socratic method consists of several steps, its most central ones are briefly summarized in the following.

The steps of a Socratic dialogue

First, a topic is chosen, preferably a philosophical term i.e. an ethical value like honesty, but it can also be a term like self-knowledge, meaning of life, etc.. Then the dialogue participants are

⁶ see HECKMANN, Gustav: *Das sokratische Gespräch: Erfahrungen in philosophischen Hochschulseminaren*, Schroedel, Hannover, 1981.

invited to tell a personal memory-based story, in which they once experienced the topic at stake. In the next phase these narratives are reflected and investigated in order to make definitions what the topic means according to each narrative. Finally, the group tries to make a more general definition out of the definitions already made due to the different narratives.

Philosophizing by means of story-telling and experience-sharing

An important question, which comes up at this point is how and why such a dialogue can be called *philosophical*? As described previously, narrated experiences represent the starting point of a Socratic dialogue. From these specific cases the investigation leads deeper into the subject matter in terms of making definitions about what the topic at stake actually means. And it is this “movement” in the thinking process, which goes from the concrete (the personal stories) to the general (the general definition) – a characteristic which can also be found in the dialogues of Socrates – that makes such a dialogue philosophical: If one assumes that the activity of philosophizing means to reflect and investigate general aspects of the human condition (like empathy, freedom, the search for meaning, etc.), then such an activity is certainly performed by means of the Socratic method as described here (since general aspects of the human condition, like ethical values, are reflected by means of story-telling and experience-sharing). Moreover, with an emphasis on the term *to investigate*, one can already get a first idea of how and why the Socratic method can also be understood as a narrative-related and experience-based “research activity”.

Forming a community of inquiry and performing narratives

A further characteristic of the Socratic method after Nelson is that the dialogue facilitator (often a philosophical practitioner) and the participants form a so-called *community of inquiry*, to use a term coined by Mathew Lipman⁷. In other words, the facilitator and the participants *investigate* a topic *together* – there is no expert-layman hierarchy, there are only “co-researchers” in a Socratic dialogue. This is the first way in which this dialogue setting relates to the practice-oriented research approach of *participatory action research*, as it will be described afterwards. The other way is concerned with performing the narrations, that is the plot-telling as such, which can be identified as action (which in the next instance turns into interaction between the dialogue participants).

Ricœur-inspired Socratic narratives

By analogy to Ricœur, the narrative process in Socratic dialogues may also be considered as a particular kind of action, understood as follows: “According to Ricœur, the work of art – including literary fiction – may be considered as a particular kind of *action*.”⁸ The question now is what kind of action is this narrative process in a Socratic dialogue about? In our opinion it is an action of self-reflection. For example, by answering a reflective question or sharing a story in the course of a Socratic dialogue, the storyteller

⁷ see LIPMAN, Matthew: *Thinking in Education*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003. p. 84.

⁸ BJØRSNØS, Annlaug: “Den lange veien til forståelse. Om Paul Ricœur og litteraturens epistemologiske funksjon”, in *Norsk Litteraturvitenskapelig Tidsskrift*, Nr. 1, Vol. 15, Trondheim, 2012, p. 61.

herself can reach a revised understanding of herself. That means coming to a clearer or richer understanding of herself, or just starting to understand herself. To put it into more concrete terms: Such a self-reflective action is taken in the course of a Socratic dialogue, when i.e. a participant starts to ask herself: “What does the story that I just told (or heard) tell me about me?” Asking oneself such questions often happens unexpectedly with the participants, but it can bring revealing self-insights for the respective participant to the fore⁹. Such kinds of “actions” are of course neither foreseeable nor predictable in the beginning of a dialogue. But the presupposition in order to “perform” such self-reflections is to share personal narratives.

Furthermore, hermeneutics (that is the interpretation of a literary work, a narrative, a metaphor) and the self-reflective process of a Socratic dialogue seem to correspond with each other. The (trans-)formation (formation in the sense of “danning” in Norwegian) of the self, reflected in the “telling” of the respective narratives and the resulting changes in self-understanding happen simultaneously. But it seems to be the latter that is the object, the phenomenon of a Socratic dialogue in the sense of research.

The actions of Socrates – philosophical midwifery and irony

The term Socrates used to describe his way of conducting dialogues was *maieutics* – the art of midwifery of the soul. The self-image of Socrates was the one of a midwife assisting a pregnant soul in the birth process – an image, in which one certainly can find similarities to counseling activities. However,

⁹ see HANSEN, Finn Thorbjørn: “The Call and Practices of Wonder. How to evoke a Socratic Community of Wonder in Professional Settings”, in WEISS, Michael N. (ed.): *The Socratic Handbook. Dialogue Methods for Philosophical Practice*, LIT Publishing, Vienna, 2015. p. 219f.

when one takes a closer look at what the figure of Socrates was actually doing in those dialogues, it was far more than counseling. Rather, it was to investigate a topic, a term or a phenomenon together with his dialogue partners, simultaneously as giving birth to new stages of self-insight among these adepts.

Investigation and formation

At this point, two key-aspects of the Socratic method have come to the fore: *investigation* and *formation* (“Bildung” in German), both approached *simultaneously*. In other words, in his dialogues the role of Socrates was not the one of a traditional teacher, nor the one of a counselor – it was the one of a researcher and a releaser. However, the relationship between Socrates and his dialogue partners was not constituted according to a researcher/interviewer role model. Rather, he saw *both* himself as well as his dialogue partners as investigators or “co-researchers” and partakers in the “birth process”. At first sight we have to admit that this does not sound convincing, since Socrates often introduced himself as a layman on the matter and his dialogue partner as an expert. However, according to Sæverot this attitude of Socrates is not only a trick to “lure” his opponents into a deeper investigation of the subject matter¹⁰. His saying that “I know nothing except that I nothing know” conceals a double meaning, pointing directly to the intrinsic structure of his philosophical midwifery method and the “judgmental” aspects of the formation processes. With this not-knowing-attitude Socrates tries to give his adepts a definite “push” towards self-reflection in the sense of “Know thyself”.

¹⁰ see BRUNSTAD, Paul Otto, REINDAL, Solveig Magnus & SÆVEROTH, Herner (eds.): *Eksistens og Pedagogikk*, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 2015.

With the role of Socrates as a “co-researcher” in mind, and self-reflection as a specific action in the course of a Socratic dialogue, we would like to continue with a research approach, which comes from outside traditional philosophy and science.

Action research

In general terms, action research represents a form of research, which has the explicit aim to solve a particular problem and to produce guidelines of best practice¹¹. In other words, action research is solution- and practice-oriented. In simple terms, action research investigates certain actions, which are performed in a certain context. It can be undertaken in smaller groups like teams, but also in larger organizational structures like in educational institutions, companies and even in local communities, which face a particular problem. Often, this type of research is performed for the purpose of reflecting, changing and improving a given situation (like improving certain strategies or practices). People involved in action research processes are sometimes also called *communities of practice*¹² – a concept which additionally is rooted in the *community of inquiry* approach as introduced in American pragmatism¹³. Therefore it is also based on experience-sharing by means of story-telling. In this way, the challenges we meet in action research can also involve problems of ethical nature (i.e. social predicaments) or problems in a socio-pedagogical context (i.e. issues concerning “understanding-the-self-and-the-other”).

¹¹ see DENSCOMBE Martyn: *Good Research Guide: For small-scale social research projects*, Open University Press, Berkshire, GBR, 2010. p. 6.

¹² LAVE, Jean & WENGER, Etienne: *Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.

¹³ see LIPMAN, Matthew: *Thinking in Education*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003. p. 84.

The *community of inquiry* concept and participatory action research

As we have seen, the community of inquiry concept plays not only a central role in the Socratic method, but also in action research – especially in a certain type of action research called *participatory action research*. The term *participatory action research* was introduced by Kurt Lewin in the 1940s¹⁴. It intends to point out the unique feature of this form of research: research should not be done “on” or “for”, but “with” people. In the introduction of their anthology *The SAGE Handbook of Action Research*, Peter Reason and Hilary Bradbury state that “communities of inquiry and action evolve and address questions and issues that are significant for those who participate as co-researchers.”¹⁵ In this way, like in the Socratic method after Nelson, also participatory action research dismisses traditional expert-layman hierarchies (which is often in place in other forms of research) and replaces it with a researcher/co-researcher setting. The underlying assumption here is that not only researchers possess valid knowledge, methods and capabilities in order to reflect and to solve a certain problem, but so do the people too, who are directly concerned with this problem (either at work, schools, hospitals, local communities etc.).

Participatory action research and Socratic dialoguing

¹⁴ see LEWIN, Kurt: "Action Research and Minority Problems", in *Journal of Social Issues*, Nr. 2, Vol. 2, 1946. Pags. 34–46.

¹⁵ REASON, Peter & BRADBURY, Hilary (eds.): *The SAGE Handbook of Action Research: Participative Inquiry and Practice*, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2008. p. 1.

Applied in business organizations, in educational contexts and in local communities, participatory action research intends to integrate the following three aspects: participation (life in society and democracy), action (engagement with experience and history) and research (soundness in thought and the growth of knowledge)¹⁶. In the further course of this article we will point out how and why these three aspects of participation, action and research are also of central relevance in Socratic dialogues.

In order to do so, we would like to present several short case studies in the following. These studies are supposed to exemplify and corroborate our interpretation of philosophical practice as a philosophical “version” of participatory action research. These case studies will present different Socratic dialogues, which were performed in the course of an educational project in which philosophical practitioners trained teachers from Norwegian folk high schools. The purpose of this project was that these teachers acquire the necessary skills to facilitate Socratic dialogues at their schools. However, before we go into the short case studies, we would like to make some general remarks about Norwegian folk high schools, since they represent unique and quite different educational institutions compared to the conventional education system.

The movement of Folk High Schools

So-called folk high schools have a long tradition in the Scandinavian countries (there are about 70 folk high schools in Norway alone). Their founding father was the Dane N.F.S. Grundtvig, whose pedagogical ideas were disseminated early in the

¹⁶ see CHEVALIER, Jaques M. & BUCKLES, Daniel J.: *Participatory Action Research: Theory and Methods for Engaged Inquiry*, Routledge, London & New York, 2013.

19th century. His specifications on what a folk high school should be can be found on the common website of the Norwegian folk high schools¹⁷. Here is a short summary:

Grundtvig is the Danish ideological father of the folk high schools, though his own ideas on education had a broader focus. He was a typical representative of the Enlightenment, and the common denominator of all pedagogical efforts of Grundtvig was to promote a spirit of freedom, poetry and disciplined creativity, within all branches of educational life.

Grundtvig's idea of a folk high school was a *school for life*, different from the traditional Gymnasium. The keyword was enlightenment of the spirit, and the most important component was the free, animated communication between teacher and students in and outside the classroom. According to Grundtvig, the dialogue was the unique method of the "curriculum", which also comprehended everyday life as a learning arena. The sole aim was life enlightenment ("livsopplysning" in Norwegian). When it came to human life, students and teachers were equal. He promoted values such as wisdom, compassion, identification and equality and opposed all compulsion, including exams, as deadening to the human soul. Instead Grundtvig advocated to unleash human creativity according to the universally creative order of life. Therefore a spirit of freedom, cooperation and discovery was to be kindled in individuals, in science, and in the civil society as a whole.

On the same website one can also find information about what the schools are like today and what they focus on¹⁸:

¹⁷ see FOLKEHØYSKOLENE: "Hva er folkehøyskole?" available in HU <http://www.folkehogskole.no/hva-er-folkehogskoleUH> (last access October 16th, 2015).

¹⁸ see also OHREM, Sigurd & HADDAL, Odd (eds.): *med livet som pensum. danning og læringsprosesser i folkehøgskolen*, Cappelen Damm, Oslo, 2011.

Folk high schools are one-year boarding schools offering a variety of exciting non-traditional and non-academic subjects, as well as academic subjects. The idea of folk high schools is learning for life, an opportunity to grow both individually, socially, and academically in small learning communities. All students live on campus in close contact with staff and their fellow students. One important part of the folk high school experience is to form a community, in and out of class. [...] The folk high schools do not grant degrees or conduct exams, the aim is to provide a formative (Bildungs) year, nurturing "the whole person". By taking away the pressure of grades and exams, you learn to motivate yourself. You choose the topics that interest you, for instance theatre, outdoor life, music, creative arts, media and communications, philosophy. Folk high schools are separate from the rest of Norway's education system. Students can be any age and can have any level of educational experience. Indeed, these are schools for all people, all "folk"¹⁹

Introduction of the short case studies

With this conceptual background of folk high schools in mind, we would like to introduce the previously mentioned short case studies about different Socratic dialogues, which took place in a teach-the-teachers course on Socratic dialoguing at this type of schools. In 2013 the course was held for the first time, and it lasted for a period of one year. About 35 teachers participated and about 10 philosophical practitioners conducted training. The schedule included two full days of general meetings with all participants and all practitioners, a full day of regional meeting and two full days of local meetings. In the general meetings at the beginning of the

¹⁹ FOLKEHØYSKOLENE: "What is Folk High School?" available in HUhttp://www.folkehogskole.no/site/main/les_mer.php?page_id=357UH (last access October 16th, 2015).

course lectures on the Socratic method and philosophical practice were given, on the one hand. On the other, participants could get first experiences with the Socratic method, since the philosophical practitioners were facilitating respective dialogues in small groups. In the regional meeting one of the philosophical practitioners facilitated a Socratic dialogue with the teachers of 2-4 schools, which participated in the course. Here the goal was to go further into the method by means of a learning-by-doing approach. In the local meeting the teachers who participated in the course had to facilitate Socratic dialogues at their own schools – supervised by one of the philosophical practitioners. The general meeting at the end was mainly used to share experiences, which were made during the course. Cases and certain situations, which occurred during a dialogue could be discussed in plenary. The purpose was to get feedback as well as new ideas, in addition to go further into still open questions.

According to Grundtvig dialogues are the unique method of the “curriculum”, which also comprehended everyday life as a learning arena²⁰. Because of this it was clear from the start of this course that the Socratic dialogues, which had to be performed and supervised, would not be offered as an additional school subject. Rather, the idea was to integrate them into the everyday life at the schools, like into ongoing classes, project days, staff meetings etc. A Socratic dialogue could for instance be conducted together with students in order to reflect on experiences made during an outdoor activity or a school trip abroad, with regards to the existential and ethical learning effects these experiences might have had on the students. Another possibility was to do Socratic dialogues with the teaching staff in order to develop and implement core values or new teaching strategies. On other occasions the Socratic method

²⁰ see FOLKEHØYSKOLENE: “Hva er folkehøgskole?” available in HU <http://www.folkehogskole.no/hva-er-folkehogskoleUH> (last access October 16th, 2015).

was applied with the purpose of team building. In the following, several cases are presented in which Socratic dialogues were performed – these cases should also give a first glimpse of how and why philosophical practice can be understood as a philosophical “version” of participatory action research.

Case 1: Implementing core values by means of the Socratic method

The first case is about a Socratic dialogue that was performed at a school, which is owned by the municipality. The fact that the municipality is the owner of the school is important, because at a certain point the leaders of this municipality decided to develop new core values and mission statements. After this development-process was finished and new core values and mission statements were “on the table”, a campaign was started in which all entities of the municipality were invited to implement these values and mission statements in their respective field of work. Now developing core values can be hard work, but implementing them can be even harder. The teaching staff of the respective folk high school knew that they had a difficult task to fulfill, because only putting up banners on the schoolyard with the core values printed on them would not do the job. The task included two main challenges. The first was how to actually implement core values, which were given to the school from outside? And the second, how to do this implementation in a way so that it would fit the school culture? Soon the idea came up to combine this task with the teach-the-teachers program on philosophical practice and to perform Socratic dialogues on each of these values (these dialogues were part of the course mentioned above and facilitated by one of the teachers as well as supervised by a certified philosophical practitioner). In this way, the dialogue participants (which finally were both members from the teaching and the administrative staff as well as students) could share experiences by which they

experienced the value at stake. One of these dialogues, for example, was on the topic of “professionalism”, which was one of the core values to be implemented. Here the participants shared personal stories, which all started with “Once I experienced professionalism, when...” Most of these stories were about experiences made at the school. The result – the finding of this investigation, so to say – was how the value “professionalism” *already was* and *can actually* be practiced at the school. In other words, instead of discussing how professionalism *should ideally* be practiced, the participants of the dialogue came up with concrete examples of *best practices* by means of storytelling. In addition, the dialogue resulted in a common and more general definition and understanding of what professionalism actually means (at the school).

With regards to participatory action research, we would like to summarize this case as follows: A school was confronted with the task to implement a set of core values, which was given to them from outside, namely from the municipality. However, there were no strategies offered on how to do that. Since the school culture of a folk high school leaves little room for top-down approaches, it was clear from the beginning that the implementation process would have to include both the teaching and administrative staff as well as the students in a rather democratic manner. Since it was not clear how to do the implementation, it seemed to be natural to tell each other stories in which these core values were once experienced and practiced. An advantage here was that many of these experiences were made at that school, because in this way the participants became aware of how these values were already practiced there. In the course of the Socratic dialogue certain best practices came to the fore. Since these practices were communicated in the form of stories, they were also easy to be remembered (simply because stories are much easier to remember

than i.e. plain theories or guidelines)²¹. However, what has to be mentioned is that it was not the direct goal of this Socratic dialogue to find and to develop best practices – the main goal was first and foremost to investigate this set of values by means of a philosophical-practical approach. And maybe this is also one of the main differences between action research and philosophical practice, that the latter is not focusing on finding solutions to a problem, but rather to reflect and to investigate the problem together with those who are concerned with it. That such investigations and self-reflections often lead to concrete actions, however, is undoubtedly the case. In this way, and as this previous case has shown, the three aspects of *participation* (all staff and students have been involved in the dialogue process), *research* (the core values have been investigated together and self-reflection was performed on how each participant of the dialogue could practice this value on his or her own) and *action* (in the form of best practices but also in the form of the dialogue itself) have been present in this dialogue.

Case 2: Team building through philosophizing about the practice of pedagogical and educational ideals

In the next case a Socratic dialogue setting is described in which both the teaching staff as well as the administrative staff from one school participated. It has to be mentioned that the administrative staff not only included the secretaries, but also the staff from the school kitchen as well as the school caretakers. The reason for this was that at this folk high school the opinion was shared, that not only the teaching staff but also the administrative employees

²¹ see HEATH, Chip & HEATH, Dan: *Made to stick. Why some ideas survive and others die*, Random House, New York, 2007.

contributed essentially to what can be called formation (“danning” in Norwegian) with the students, which is the overall goal of all folk high schools: “The aim is to provide a formative (Bildungs) year, nurturing “the whole person”.”²² One could also call this the pedagogical and education ideal of Norwegian folk high schools. Since in former times there was a rather strict distinction at folk high schools between the teaching staff and the administrative employees (a distinction which of course had an influence on the school culture as such), several measures had been taken at this respective school to unite these different “leagues” into a common team. One of these measures was that both the teachers and the administrative employees started to share a common staff room, where they would also have lunch together. This did not only foster the dialogue and the exchange between the two “leagues”, but it was also a clear sign that both the teaching staff and the administrative staff were equally important. Though the teachers and the administrative employees had different tasks to fulfill at their work, the idea was introduced that they still were working towards a common goal, namely formation with the students. This was a first step in the team building process (that is, uniting the two “leagues”). To go further into this process several other measures were taken over the years, and one of them was to perform a Socratic dialogue with all staff members on the question “Hva er god danning?” (in English “What is good formation?”). The overall goal of this Socratic dialogue was not to find a common definition of what good formation would be (this was rather seen as a natural outcome of the dialogue), but to hear, share and philosophize about stories, in which good formation was experienced. Because in this way the staff members would learn from each other how and by what means the process of formation was fostered in their different

²² FOLKEHØGSKOLENE: “What is Folk High School?” available in HUhttp://www.folkehogskole.no/site/main/les_mer.php?page_id=357UH (last access October 16th, 2015).

work contexts. In this case, however, the dialogue was not necessarily about best practices that were developed. Rather, this Socratic dialogue represented a collective self-reflection process in which the whole group and the whole team could become aware of the different situations at the school in which formation with the students was actually fostered. To philosophize about how the common goal of formation can be fostered in everyday life situations at the school, i.e. when cleaning the tables in the dining hall together with the students, and what formation in this context actually means, turned out to be quite fruitful for the team-building process among the staff members.

First, because the staff members did not exchange on an everyday basis in what exact way they would contribute to their overall goal. Therefore, in this Socratic dialogue the different approaches and practices were not only voiced and heard, but also appreciated by the other team members (in this way, the *participation* aspect of participatory action research was included). Secondly, the different stories unveiled a bigger picture of the potential learning areas for formation, which the school as such had to offer (this was the result of the *research*, so to say – the second aspect of participatory action research.). This bigger picture, however, only became meaningful when each staff member of the school performed a self-reflective action so to say, namely self-reflection in the sense of the question “What are my resources, my potentials – in terms of attitudes, ideas and social skills – to help unleash the potentials that the school as a whole is offering, in order to promote the over-all goal (that is formation with the students)?” In other words, the third aspect of participatory action research – which is *action* – received a double meaning here: On the one hand, it was about performing self-reflection (and here the narratives told in the dialogue became a vital resource for this type of action). On the other hand, it was about becoming aware of potential actions (as a result of self-reflection), which the respective

staff member could undertake in order to contribute to the overall goal (which was formation).

Case 3: Experience-sharing between colleagues form different work places

The last short case is about one of the regional meetings as described previously. At this meeting ten teachers from four folk high schools participated. The Socratic dialogue, which was performed in this meeting was facilitated by two certified philosophical practitioners. The teachers were in the role of participants. One of the goals of this dialogue was to make the teachers more aware of the respective steps and procedures of such a dialogue, so that they could facilitate Socratic dialogues on their own in the upcoming local meetings. The topic of the dialogue was courage, and the teachers were sharing many different stories where they once experienced courage at their schools. The outcome of this dialogue was not only a general definition of courage. But rather, the actual benefit of this dialogue was that by means of story-telling the teachers could become more familiar with each other, as well as familiar with certain educational practices from other schools (the teachers did not know each other at all, or at least not very well). Especially the latter aspect seems to be important for the educational idea of folk high schools: Courage is not just one of the cardinal virtues of Aristotle, but developing virtues with the students is seen as an essential aspect of formation at folk high schools. Now, sharing experiences where someone acted courageously at one school was understood by the other teachers in the sense of “leading by example” – and “leading by example” can be seen as a guiding educational principle at folk high schools. And last but not least, this case shows that the Socratic dialogue method is a suitable approach to make people, who do not know each other

from before, *philosophize together* and to share stories with each other – something which should not be taken for granted.

In order to point out how this particular dialogue relates to the three central aspects of participatory action research (*participation, action* and *research*), we would like to start with the aspect of research: *Research* in this dialogue was done in the sense that the participants were *investigating* an ethical value *together* – they were *philosophizing* about it (that is, doing philosophical research, so to say). *Participation* was in place since all dialogue participants were sharing stories and reflecting on them – all of them were engaged and involved in the dialogue process. In contrast to these two aspects, which seem to be rather obvious, was the third aspect: *action*. The actual action that was performed in this dialogue was not planned or intended, it just happened incidentally – it was “to get familiar with each other”. At first sight this might not appear like an action, however it can be understood as a form of social *inter-action*, which is vital for any kind of dialogue: “To get familiar with each other” is a necessary prerequisite for the so-called *togetherness*, which seems to be an indispensable element in any form of dialoguing. Only when this togetherness between the dialogue partners is established, the ethical values of trust, honesty and authenticity (which seem to be essential for the course of a dialogue) can start to evolve.

Socratic dialogues as philosophical “versions” of participatory action research

By means of these three short case studies we intended to point out how the three main aspects of participatory action research (namely *participation, research, action*) are also present in Socratic dialogues, and hence, why and how the Socratic dialogue setting can also be understood as a research setting. In this regard, the

community of inquiry concept, which is central in a Socratic dialogue setting, plays a decisive role: The dialogue participants (those who are concerned with a certain topic, like certain core values in the context of their work) and the dialogue facilitator (the philosophical practitioner) form an investigative fellowship of “co-researchers”, so to say. In a *community of inquiry* there is no expert-layman-hierarchy, neither is there a counselor-counselee role model in place, there is no teacher and no students. In a Socratic dialogue the philosophical investigation – the research, so to say – is not done “on” nor “for” but “with” people. The philosophical practitioner is seen to be “on eye level” with the dialogue participants – practitioner and participants are philosophizing *together*. Therefore, if people who are involved in action research processes are also called *communities of practice*²³, then the people involved in a Socratic dialogue could be called *communities of philosophical practice*.

The “research objects” of Socratic dialogues when understood as participatory action research

As all these three short cases above show, the research objects of a Socratic dialogue are not objects of research in a traditional sense (as cancer or global warming would be, for example). The research objects of a Socratic dialogue are rather phenomena constituted by the language employed within the dialogues (i.e. ethical values). The phenomenon or term under investigation comes to life in and through the dialogues – especially through the narratives, which are shared and which constitute the initial and decisive part of such dialogues. In other words, the research object of a Socratic dialogue

²³ see LAVE, Jean & WENGER, Etienne: *Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.

when understood as participatory action research is the Socratic dialogue itself, and the phenomena, which are occurring through it – in short: the story-telling as such is the actual action which is investigated. The question now is, what can be the result of such an investigation? Here another reference to more traditional action research comes to the fore: action learning.

Socratic dialogues as action learning

The short case studies as presented here were about Socratic dialogues, which had certain learning effects on the participants – even though most of these effects were neither intended nor planned. Nevertheless, when understanding Socratic dialoguing as a specific form of action, then one can say that the participants of the previously presented dialogues learned something by means of telling narratives and reflecting them philosophically. However, the decisive point is: What the participants learned cannot be taught, so to say. Through self-reflection and self-insight the participants learned about certain values, attitudes, mindsets and how they can transcend, transform and even further develop and apply them *in practice*. The outcome of such an action-oriented learning process is not *knowledge* (which would be the goal in traditional forms of research), rather it is what one could call *awareness* (i.e. the awareness of how to practice an ethical value in a given situation). In this way, one could also call a Socratic dialogue to be socio-pedagogical in nature.

Differences between Socratic dialoguing and action research

There are of course also main differences between Socratic dialoguing and participatory action research. Participatory action

research often has a very specific goal, i.e. to solve a certain problem together with the people who are directly concerned with that problem. A Socratic dialogue, on the other hand, is not necessarily goal-oriented. This, however, can also be seen as one of the advantages of the Socratic dialogue setting: Problems are investigated, reflected and seen from different perspectives without the direct intention to solve these problems – and only because of this “intention-free” approach, completely unexpected and genuine ideas on the problem can appear (which then often can be “translated” into solutions). In other words, in a Socratic dialogue you learn to “let go” of a problem – and often it is exactly this “letting go”-attitude, which leads to valuable (self-)insights, and eventually even to unexpected and ground-breaking solutions. But this, again, is a side effect of a Socratic dialogue, so to say, whereas in participatory action research it would be an explicit goal.

Concluding questions instead of concluding remarks

Instead of making concluding remarks at the end of this article, we would rather like to pose some concluding questions. This simply seems to be more natural in the context of philosophical practice, since authentic philosophizing often leads to further questions than to final conclusions. The questions below may not be so easily understood by those readers who never participated in a Socratic dialogue, since they represent questions, which came to us after and during several years of experience with Socratic dialoguing. Nevertheless, or just because of these years of experience, they *feel* important to us.

In this paper we have, among other things, taken a closer look at the interactive processes unfolding between the participants of a Socratic dialogue. This leads us to our first question: What happens when our personal narratives – and with that also our thinking and

telling about ourselves – are put to play in a socio-pedagogical context, in which stories are imparted, recreated and elaborated by a community of inquiry? To be more precise: Are there any remains of individuality left in the totality of disseminations, comparisons of stories and after the interactive “thickening” and elaboration of these stories? And if it is so, how are they expressed?

Another question is about an aspect of Socratic dialoguing, which could be called “re-remembering”: What is phenomenologically happening when we “re-remember” (that is having the story present in mind after we told it), and how does this interact with and is influenced by the verbal storytelling? On the phenomenological level we talk about how stories are created, starting from personal experiences, and how these stories are formed by the act of recollection and creation. So the next question is: How does this kind of recollection and creation relate to other kinds of recollection and creation like writing, dramatization, visualizing, which represent other ways of reproducing memories? A question, which is also about the relation and interaction between storyteller and audience, that is, the specific ways the stories are told to and received by a story-telling and inquiring audience.

The last group of questions has been (and is) one of the most important from a philosophical point of view: When an ethical subject is chosen and the story is elaborated based on this subject (for example, “What does it mean to be brave?”), then in what ways is this story, and its particular parts, relevant in regards to the understanding and practical application of the virtue in question (in this case the virtue of courage)? Furthermore, another interesting question in a Socratic dialogue is how conclusions based on the descriptions of the selected story can shed light on the others’ stories. To which extent is there a correlation between our existing, common (pre-)understanding of, for example, the virtue of courage and individual stories about it (also those which are not shared in

the respective Socratic dialogue) – and the other way around? In other words, is common sense also operating in the realms of narratives, because the connection seems to be very close?

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**COMENTARIOS, INFORMES
Y ENTREVISTAS**

***STUDIES, REPORTS AND
INTERVIEWS***

BEYOND THE AUTONOMY PRINCIPLE. BIOETHICS WITH ALS AND MS CAREGIVERS

MÁS ALLÁ DEL PRINCIPIO DE AUTONOMÍA. BIOÉTICA APLICADA A LOS CUIDADORES DE ELA Y EM

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Abstract: My paper draws on the action-research project “Bioethics with the Caregivers” which I participated in as member of the Applied Ethics and Bioethics Team of the Urbino University. The project focused on the caring experiences of spouses, parents and siblings whose dear ones suffered from non-demential neurodegenerative diseases. It was led *with* and *by* caregivers rather than *on* or *for* them, and brought to light philosophy's irreplaceable role as a critical and dialogic toolbox in dealing with unexplored and/or unaddressed needs. This paper shows how a philosophical approach to caregiving in neurodegenerative diseases puts the more general dynamics of interdependence under a magnifying glass for questioning the priority of the autonomy principle and revaluing outmoded frames of mind and assumptions. The hope is that a more informed and open-minded approach to out-of-the-ordinary conditions can contribute towards a breaking down of the fears which prevent an appreciation of the richness of difference.

Keywords: Bioethics, caregiving, neurodegenerative diseases, autonomy principle

Resumen: Mi artículo explica el proyecto “Bioética con cuidadores”, en el que participe como uno de los miembros del equipo de ética aplicada y bioética de la Universidad de Urbino. El proyecto se centró en las experiencias de cuidado de esposos, padres y hermanos cuyos seres queridos sufrieron enfermedades neurodegenerativas no de tipo no-demencial. Se llevó a cabo con y por los

cuidadores y no *sobre* o *para* ellos. Esta actividad descubrió el papel insustituible de la filosofía como caja de herramientas de crítica y dialógica en el trato al tratar con necesidades inexploradas y/o desatendidas. En este trabajo, se muestra cómo un enfoque filosófico de los cuidados prestados en enfermedades neurodegenerativas amplía la perspectiva sobre la dinámica habitual de interdependencia para cuestionar la prioridad del principio de la autonomía y para reevaluar los marcos y suposiciones antiguas. Se pretende que un enfoque más informado y de mente abierta alejado de lo habitual pueda contribuir a una ruptura de los temores que impiden una apreciación de la riqueza de la diferencia.

Palabras clave: Bioética, cuidados, enfermedades neurodegenerativas, principio de autonomía

Prologue

When I was born my aunt Fulvia was thirteen years old, and I saw her as the best and the most beautiful of all human beings. I would have done anything to look like her. I dreamed that when grew up I know all the songs she knew, speak and understand all the mysterious languages she spoke, and have access to the mysterious world she seemed to belong to. The way she talked, ate, climbed the stairs was absolutely unique, inimitable, and different from anyone else. Whatever she did, I wanted to do the same. She had the real power; she was a queen. And the reason that my aunt Fulvia was so lucky was born with an extra chromosome 21 gene in every cell of her body, a condition which is also called as “down syndrome.”

Philosophy's Gaze

The philosopher looks at the world as one who, grown old, is finally able to see and choose the wisdom of the child. This might be what Aristotle means when he connects the always rebirthing

origin of philosophy with the puzzle and wonder that carries us through the unfathomable mystery of nature.¹ In more recent times, Husserl's phenomenology has come back to this core philosophical attitude by actualizing the ancient concept of skepticism, the *epoché*, or “suspension of judgment.” To the extent that it is possible, the philosopher's gaze strives to strip off all assumptions which might pollute its clarity. To the extent that any human eye can aspire only to a limited viewpoint, philosophical sight brings from within the awareness of its situatedness as a marker of both its contingent conditionality and the possibility of shifting between different positions and orientations. The philosopher's gaze strives to turn for a 360 degree perspective on things and situations, enjoying the disorientation and wonder which result from seeing differently from others, or from the same ways in which others tend to see. This ability to discover and amplify differences is the very antithesis of any kind of in-difference.

Philosophy's engagement with wonder and difference is woven its peculiar epistemological status with respect to other and more recently created forms of knowledge. Whereas sociology and medicine, for example, aim at a certain degree of objective knowledge and apply theoretical frameworks to objectified problems and cases within their respective fields, the philosophical “love for wisdom” has no particular content of its own which separates it from life or knowledge, since it is an ongoing process of research rooted in concrete existence, with no claims to a field of its own purified of the contingencies of life, not to access to some kind of objective and universal certainty.

Far from perceiving himself as an uninvolved and unchanging observer, the subject pursuing philosophical investigation is fully engaged in the process of knowing, and being transformed by this

¹ ARISTOTLE, *Metaphysics* A2, 282 b, trans. W. D. Ross, <https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/metaphysics/index.html> (last access September 2th, 2015).

process is among the motivations spurring him to undertake the unpredictable path of research. In this respect, philosophical exploration stands at odds with modern epistemology, which only credits as scientific knowledge that leaves unchanged whatever falls under its field enquiry. This brings it closer to the epistemological models drawn from post-Eisenstein Quantic Mechanics, which acknowledge the scientist's act of observation as producing certain effects on what is under observation, so that the content of knowledge is shaped by the dynamic relationship between observer and observed.

This entanglement between knowledge, observation, and transformative (inter)action is at the core of contemporary applied philosophy and philosophical practice, where the research process is nourished by love and wonder for what is still not known inducing positive change and transformation from within. Here the adjective “practical” does not really stand in opposition to a theoretical option, but it rather identifies the genuine goal of philosophy as some kind of transformative action expected to be inherent in the research process itself.

What we might refer to as “doing philosophy” is at one and the same time research and action: it is the development of a thought embedded in lived experience, in the body, in the habits and feeling which sustain everyday life. Rather than giving up theory altogether, philosophical practitioners give up theory's pretension to providing an understanding of each concrete case to satisfy the needs of practice, and hence giving up their option to draw from time to time from different theoretical frameworks in order to take advantage of whichever one seems adequate to dealing with the situation at hand. Within this perspective, theoretical options are themselves practical resources, tools to be experienced and adapted to concrete specific circumstances. On the practical ground, these are the starting, the ending and constant reference point of the

philosophical process in its twofold value as research and transformative action.

The hybridization of theory and practice marks applied philosophy out from both systematic philosophy and other fields of knowledge. Whereas theory and practice in medicine or sociological research are both necessary and necessarily interdependent but separate moments, philosophical practice integrates both in a single research process whose ultimate goal is positive constructive change. In contrast to the systematic approach of academic philosophy, which tends to sacrifice reality's multiform concreteness and unpredictable contingency to the needs of the theory, applied philosophy is field research which works outside the system with the aim of deconstructing perceptions and conceptions we take for granted to shed a new light and different alternative perspectives on what is generally conceived and perceived as being "just the way it is". Applied philosophy is also engaged in catching and cultivating certain aspects of a reality which have not yet been codified in an overall system of knowledge, or not even perceived and conceived, so that they remain an unexplored potential. Differently from any systematic knowledge, it does not aspire to a pristine overview distanced from what it looks at by a grid of theory. Its ambition is to systematically get its out-of-the-system gaze directly inside the situations at hand. Theories are taken up not to avoid facing the concrete specificity of what is under investigation, but to help towards an understanding by the free exercise of intelligence and sensitivity.

Not only does practical philosophy avoid the slavish adherence to explicit theories, it also avoids the automatic categorization processes that implicit theories activate in thought and perception, to which it has to address a particularly vigilant eye if it really aims to bring a different and transformative gaze to what it is trying to look at from within.

The vigilance of the philosophical eye is essential for a deep *epoché*, in itself essential in opening and being receptive to the uncharted waters of understanding. In its intrinsic involvement with people, the true axes of applied philosophy research is the depth to which it listens and discloses new horizons to thought and perception. What people bring to us in terms of themselves and their unexpected situations is much more difficult than one would think: it is a process whose steps are never guaranteed, and its end never definitive. And it is the infinite task of the philosophical practitioner and the researcher in applied philosophy who conceives of her or his work as a service to the wider human community, helping them to gain a deeper awareness and more critical approach to general commonsense conceptions that shape their habits and practical attitudes. Within this perspective, the revival of practice in contemporary philosophy shares with ancient ethics in its essential difference from moral philosophy.

The Greek word *éthos* has a multifold sense: it means “habit, use, custom”, but also “character, way of thinking, inclination”; furthermore, it can as well indicate the house which one uses to live in or the calm mood conveyed by a well-achieved work of art. To understand the overall meaning, one should pay attention to texts of ancient ethics, and especially to Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Nicomachean ethics*. Here the ancient conception of human character is clearly revealed as the plastic result of a ongoing dialectic between innate personal inclinations and behavioral habits, context and education. In this perspective habits and education are not just a matter of individual or family choice, but a true and important political matter since they complementarily shape the personal and the collective character of the people.

Following Plato, Aristotle, and others, ethics is the discipline of life that promotes virtuous circularity between everyday actions, personal and collective attitudes, and ways of thinking. It originally implied a strict connection between moral theory and practical

training, but in the modern era Ethics has tended to be confused with moral philosophy and reduced solely to its theoretical dimension. This is why in contemporary research the diction “Applied Ethics” is preferred to refer to works and research projects which emphasize as essential their practical aspects and objectives.

The project I am going to illustrate here below belongs to the contemporary fields of Applied Ethics. It was carried out by the Applied Ethics and Bioethics Team of the University of Urbino “Carlo Bo” with co-funding from the Pesaro Savings bank and in collaboration with local healthcare staff, touching on core issues surrounding contemporary bioethics, or “Ethics of Life”. Its broader objective is to highlight outside-the-system look at end-of-life situations which increasingly tend to fall under the fragmented gaze of specialist disciplines and the anonymous power of medical technologies. Our major ambition in carrying out the project was to dig into the human and interpersonal side of the cases at hand and to present a portrait from the inside which can help both the people involved and the healthcare system to better understand and deal with unmet and undetected needs².

Action-research *with* the Caregivers

The action-research “Applied Bioethics with the Caregivers. Therapeutic Alliance and Quality of Life” was aimed at identifying the main issues concerning caregiving for people suffering from neurodegenerative diseases which do not imply a loss of cognitive

² A detailed report on the research-action has been published in Italian. ANDREANI, Monia, and DE PAULA, Luisa, *La bioetica con I caregiver. Alleanza terapeutica e qualità della vita*, Unicopli, Milano, 2015. http://www.edizioniunicopli.it/Novita_2015_Aprile.html (last access September 2th, 2015).

abilities, such as Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), Multiple Sclerosis (MS), and dystrophies.

ALS, MS and dystrophies are each different diseases with different prognostic scenarios and life expectancies, each presenting different subtypes of their own which imply as many different prognoses. Besides, every case of non-demential neurodegenerative disease is a unique, special and unpredictable. However, a feature they all share is a progressive loss of motor abilities without any parallel significant degeneration of mental faculties. People who are affected need increasing degrees of assistance to perform basic daily tasks such as eating, dressing, urinating, defeating, and even breathing.

In the first stages the main target of the project was chosen; the eighteen subjects identified as primary caregivers with their attendant sufferers. However, soon after our action-research began we realized that the needs, thoughts and experience of the people at the forefront of caregiving did not lend themselves to being assessed without regard for the needs, thoughts and experience of the people they were caring for and their home environment. As a matter of fact, as these diseases progress, the greater the sufferers need for their primary caregiver, and the stronger becomes their bond. By the same token, the dependent relationship between sufferer and caregiver intensifies, the more the caregiver needing more support and help from other family members or professional caregivers and from society in general to recover some private space for themselves. But first, as a reference for the outline of a progression model for non-demential neurodegenerative pathologies.

At the onset of the disease the affected person shows problems or defects in the movement of their limbs and body trunk. A contingent difficulty that may also arise at the beginning is dysarthria, a reduced capacity to articulate phonemes, and/or dysphagia, a reduced capacity to swallow. Depending on the rate of

progression, soon or later the sufferer must resort to a wheelchair and rely on loved ones for dressing and ambulatory movement. In a subsequent stage he or she is no longer able to chew or ingest food, and has to undergo a gastrostomy, which is a surgical intervention where a feeding tube is inserted into the stomach for artificial nutrition. At a final stage in some of the rare neurodegenerative illnesses sufferers lose their respiratory capacity and have to be attached to a ventilator with a tracheotomy, forming a symbiotic relationship with a mechanical device which blows air into their lungs.

The linear course of progression which has been just provided is a rough simplification. In a good number of cases remission and relapse phases alternate. The summary description given here fits people afflicted by ALS, where the conflict between motor disability and mental lucidity which is the hallmark of non-demential neurodegenerative diseases in general tends to be even more pronounced and dramatic. At some stage in their illness, individuals affected by ALS go through the locked-in syndrome, a state in which they are still conscious but cannot move a single muscle of their body and are unable to communicate with the outside world.

ALS sufferers can survive with locked muscles for more than a decade before arriving at a terminal stage. Eye muscles and ocular movement are usually retained the longest and can remain the sufferers' only means of contact with the external world. Today, thanks to sophisticated computer devices, the ocular movements of people who have lost all motor ability can be translated into written and spoken language. Even though ALS sufferers are completely dependent on others for their basic vital functions, they are still able to think and express themselves with the same autonomy as any other person enjoying perfect health.

Our action-research hinged on a pivotal element in the experience of these diseases, which is the unique bond of

dependance that the ill person establishes with their family and caregivers. We were interested in exploring the thoughts, needs and experience of those who take charge of dear ones suffering from chronic diseases which aggravate their physical condition on a daily basis while leaving intact their ability to reason, understand, perceive, and feel the full gamut of emotions, pain, and fears, is left intact.

We worked through four steps. In the first and preliminary phase we cooperated with the nursing staff of the local Integrated Home Care service, who played a key role in helping us identifying the case histories on which to focus our attention. Eighteen primary caregivers and their ill dear ones and families were identified as participants.

In the second stage the participants were asked to fill out the Family Strain Questionnaire, Short Form, a psychometric tool for measuring the level of distress experienced by caregivers of patients affected by incurable chronic diseases. The analysis of the questionnaires allowed us to define a first general overview of the caregivers' life conditions, providing demographic and psychometric data as well as basic information about the communication of the diagnosis and the management of emergencies and daily situations.

In the third stage we met each caregiver in their home or work place, in most cases in the presence of the person they were caring for. This meetings were the core of the entire process. We followed a model of the semi-structured interviews focused on the objectives of the research, but we did not stick to it. Our explicit goal was to work *with* the caregivers, rather than *for* them or *on* them. What was most important to us was that people could introduce the issues they felt urgent and pressing, and that they could freely orient or even completely change the outline we had drawn up for the conversation. In this stage we were not just interviewers or researchers in bioethics, but philosophers engaged in a dialogue

with the maieutic purpose of allowing unknown truths to express themselves through opening to the other in a relationship of genuine exchange and mutual support to one's own expression. The meeting in person with the caregivers and the visit to the homes that in most cases they shared with their cared for provided significant information integrating or complementing the verbal exchange.

The fourth and last stage consisted in Focus Groups where caregivers were invited to participate together with the nursing staff and the persons receiving care still able to move. The Focus Groups were conceived of as a follow-up on from the home face-to-face interviews conducted with each caregiver and were carried out three months after completion of the third stage. This timeframe allowed us to carefully analyze the material collected and to identify core themes and issues. During the groups, our supervisor, my colleague and I facilitated the dialogue and took the opportunity to observe the process as participants were allowed to share and exchange their experiences.

I previously referred to the project as an “action-research” since it involved research and action at one at the same time. As already mentioned, the home interviews consisted in dialogues carried on in the maieutic spirit of exploring and bringing in a new light what had been supposed to be known. In our roles as researchers and interviewers, we were committed to promoting a dialogue in which both we and the caregivers were being ourselves, sharing our implicit and explicit beliefs and our limited baggage of experience and assumed knowledge. From the beginning in most of these interviews were carried out for the most part as face-to-face dialogues between one of us and the one family member who had been identified as the primary caregiver, in a way that might be compared to a one-to-one Philosophical Counseling. Conducting the Focus Groups within a maieutic framework facilitated dialogue and encouraged a philosophical spirit of learning by an integrated

process of *epoché*, with its focus on listening to others, comparing and integrating arguments, building a space of shared reasoning³. Naturally enough, the group dimension left space for an enlarged collective dynamic rather than the asymmetric duality between counselor and counselee.

Last but not least, the research was an action because it included in its achieved objectives the dissemination of results through public conferences and a report which was also published in a book.

What follows is a summary of the analysis carried out on the research material. The main arguments developed throughout the project are organized around the four macro-issues that have been identified corresponding to the different stages faced by people directly and indirectly affected by non-demential neurodegenerative diseases and the course of their pathology. The first group of issues concerns the life change that had to be faced; the second surrounds the dimension of free will and decision-making accompanying the process of degeneration and loss of motor abilities; the third refers to the resources and values emerging from the caregiving experience. We will start our quick philosophical investigation with the questions arising at the onset of the disease.

³ In English, Spanish, French, Italian, German and probably other languages are not at all familiar with the fact that the modern word “dialogue” derives from the ancient Greek *diálogos*, which in turn is a compound of the two words *diá* and *lógos*, meaning respectively “between, through, across”, and “thought, word, principle inherent to reality”. The etymology suggests that dialogue is some kind of “reason between”, a shared and constructive rationality gained through listening to the others' perspectives and (ex)change of ideas.

Tell (the Truth), face (the Disease)!

When a diagnosis of ALS or MS is given the recipient often feels as though he or she has been given a life sentence. For the sufferer and their close relatives and dear ones, the day they are told they have a neurodegenerative pathology marks a dramatic turning point in their life. From then on, more or less all their energies are focused on the disease as a invincible enemy to be fought in a losing battle. But to what extent does the chronic and often fatal course of progressive neuropathology entirely account for such an approach? Here the philosophical attitude of *epoché* in stimulating and listening to the narrative of the people's lived experiences helps to uncover what we tend to take for granted or assume is a simple given. This is why the two substantives you read in the title of this section are in parentheses: the intent is to suspend and question the apparent obviousness of the terms involved so as to identify and critically assess the impact of our implicit assumptions and commonsense categorizations on the way a chronic and progressive pathology is conceived, experienced, and perceived by those who “live” it as reflected through its social context.

The “to tell (the truth)” in the title refers to the critical issues surrounding the crucial moment when the definitive diagnosis is revealed to the diseased person, in 99% of cases through a process of mediation by one or more of the closest family members. Almost a *cliché* for the philosopher, skepticism about *the* truth of the disease might here prove useful to all the parties who are concerned. First of all, it has be said that ALS, MS and related diseases are large diagnostic categories, each presenting different subtypes and symptomatology. Every case is a case on its own, so that the trend and rate of the disease progression cannot be predicted: the person affected can lose all her motor abilities and die within a few years or go on for decades in relatively good conditions. To this we must also add that most of

neurodegenerative diseases can be ascertained only through differential diagnosis, which in most cases comes after long and exhaustive research excluding disorders with similar symptomatology or symptoms that tend to be overlooked both by medical doctors and laymen.

The wait for a definitive diagnosis is an aspect that contributes to conferring on this particular moment its peculiar revelatory aura. “There was no diagnosis” were words we often heard from our interviewees who had to spend months or even years with the anxiety of not knowing what was happening to their loved ones. Another related problem is the authoritative role played in the process by the medical doctor, who in our self-styled lay society tends to take on the role of a secular priest of a human life in its rejection of death as a foreign and terrible enemy⁴. Sufferers people and their relatives expect the truth from the voice of science, as though awaiting and oracle from on high, with the result that the message is bound to sound inadequate, incomprehensible, or even inadmissible.

The technical nature of medical language is only partly the issue at stake here. Rather, the overall problem is the assumptions underlying what might be referred to as “the truth of the disease”. In the case of neurodegenerative pathologies, such truth is perceived and conceived as an overwhelming entity that the medical doctor tend to deliver to the sufferer's closest family member(s) with his hands raised in resignation, given the

⁴ The conception and perception of death as the opposite to life is a byproduct of the modern mentality. An early definition of these terms comes from Xavier Bichat who identified life with a set of functions resisting death. In the antiquity, death was considered inherent to life. In this respect, an example is found in Aristotle, *De anima*, 412 a, where the philosopher defines life as “the process of nutrition, increase and decay from an internal principle”. ARISTOTLE, *On the Soul*, available in <https://archive.org/details/peripysycharist00arisuoft> (last access, September 14th, 2015).

unavailability of a cure. But the fact that the disease will be ongoing is just a part of the truth and sometimes not even that, since what it really means to be affected by a little known and chronic pathology is something that has to be first and foremost lived and experienced day-by-day, with peoples' heart and mind open to the irreducible singularity and unpredictability of the situation. Different aspects should be here taken into account to critically reconsider how a neurodegenerative disease and its alleged truth is perceived and faced by all who are involved.

First of all, more than any other pathologies not subject to curative treatment, progressive neuropathology show how little science is able to tell us about the “truth” of human life and its degenerative and recovery processes. This is best illustrated by a case in our own research where a man was returned home after a year in hospital with a locked-in syndrome, his wife having been told he would never recover. He had had a tracheotomy to keep him breathing and a PEG feeding him artificially. From the local healthcare services he had received an eye-controlled computerized communicator which costs about 15.000 €, only to have it promptly returned by his wife, who refused to give in to the locked-in sentence, and was determined to work with whatever her hearth and her mind suggested to her on a day-by-day basis to help her husband regain what few abilities were still left to him.

When I interviewed the couple the man was in a wheelchair but could walk a few steps with his wife's support; he had no tracheotomy and no PEG and could breathe and eat on his own; he could articulate words in such a way that I could understand what he was saying. “They took for granted that he would remain bedridden for ever...” His wife and caregiver told me. They went on to say: “Medical doctors should not take what they have studied for granted. They should be careful with their diagnoses, give them gradually, day-by-day”.

These words show some of the other problematic aspects inherent in communicating a diagnosis as a “revelatory moment of truth”. One of these is setting time as a constitutive and essential part of the truth itself. In more than one sense it would appropriate to demystify the “truth of the disease” and return it to what it is in terms of the malaise and its possible care, as experienced moment by moment. Since is that there is neither a reliable prognosis nor adequate knowledge of the diseases here in question, a diagnosis where the name of the pathology is communicated actually says very little about the future of the sufferer. Trying to sent the chronicity of the disease becomes becomes a stop-gap for the absence of certainty, something which the modern mentality seems incapable of coming to terms with. Cases such as the one mentioned above clearly shows that coping with an uncertainty might be far more profitable than to an obsessive quest for certainty, an example of how facing the prospect of progressive neurodegenerative impairment could be extended as a truth for life in general in crisis situations.

Another sense in which truth cannot be separated by its temporal deployment is the gradual way in which a diagnosis is formulated and then communicated. In one of our cases two different medical doctors both gave identical diagnosis to the same sufferer, whose reaction to each was reflected in the different sensitivities to time and graduality the two doctors showed. In the first consultation, the doctor spoke directly and hastily, without leaving space for listening and genuine interaction. The patient's reaction was to not believe him and look for a second opinion⁵. This was a physician who treated the diseased man more as an

⁵ Disbelief and search for a more clement diagnosis are a typical an in a sense “natural” reaction when a severe disease is diagnosed. Communication, however, has a crucial role in shaping the ill person's attitude towards her condition. See KÜBLETR-ROSS, Elisabeth, *On Death and Dying*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1969.

interlocutor than as a patient, who listened and was sensitive to his unexpressed needs and was open to a 360° treatment. They a number of dialogues to which were followed by an agreed program of care and treatment, a long process which allowed the sufferer, his caregiver, the medical doctors and the other people involved to undertake a shared path to face the gradual change of life that a neurodegenerative pathology imposes on a sufferer and his family.

This case shows the need to work on perceptions surrounding the “truth of the disease”, not as something imposed from an outside authority, a new “ground zero” in the life of the sufferer, but rather a process to be continuously renegotiated according to the changing needs and circumstances of the one(s) who are involved, with genuine communication in the etymological sense of “common action”, or “doing together”. In other words, the truth of the disease should be lived and experienced through a therapeutic alliance involving all the participants, which starts with a first effective diagnosis and is thereafter consolidated step by step.

In Italy a lot of work is still to be done, especially with respect to the conspiracy of silence towards the sufferers which is usually the rule. In most cases, the person who is informed of a chronic and/or fatal diseases often by busy doctors, is not actually the sufferer, but a close relative, the person who is most likely to fulfill the role of primary caregiver, also the one who will carry the burden of “truth” and act as a truth-mediator with her or his diseased dear one. In this respect, a comparative action-research within European countries to identify common guidelines would be highly desirable.

To Choose Or Not To Choose: That Is the Question

The second macro-issue which arises from the results of our research-action with caregivers in a philosophical spirit of

investigation concerns the effective value of the autonomy principle, highlighted as the the impairment of motor abilities progresses and the sufferer is can no longer walk without a wheelchair, nourish himself without a feeding tube or breathe without a respiratory machinery.

While theoretic debate rattles on concerning the measures necessary to ensure freedom of choice on the part of the diseased person, contact with the situations on the ground at each of these stages raises the question of whether there is really a margin of choice, and for whom, and whether the classical autonomy principle is even appropriate.

“I had to get accustomed to the wheelchair and it hasn't been simple” an extremely determined and positive woman who had been diagnosed ASL eight years before told us. “Even today, when I see it in the morning for the first time after I woke up, my wheelchair has an effect on me....but there came a moment when I just said to myself: Either I become a recluse in my own house or I go out as I am. If that's a problem for some people, it is not my problem, because I've already got lots of problems!”

We nicknamed this woman “her own caregiver”, but she shows how going out with a wheelchair becomes a problem only when it is seen or supposed as such by other people and society at large. In other words, the problem with a wheelchair is part of the social stigma attached to disease: one that adds to the burden of physical impairment and that could be alleviated through a systematic and through philosophical work of questioning the suppositions shaping and underlying our general attitude when faced with a chronic disease.

Another painful step has to be taken when eating becomes a danger because the diseased person risks choking or dying of pneumonia *ab ingestis* while trying to swallow. At this point natural nutrition ceases and the sufferer has to accept to have a feeding tube inserted into their to stay alive. Although for many it

is a hard decision, if a PEG (Percutaneous Endoscopic Gastrostomy) allows one to survive through the compromise of a feeding tube, it is something that sufferers and their families and caregivers do not usually question, invasive and distressing though it is: feeding through a straw and forgetting flavors is a price they pay without even wondering if it's worth it.

When breathing also ceases to be a spontaneous, autonomous activity, the story changes. The sufferer and their families and caregivers start asking themselves questions and having doubts about whether they should rely on technology just to allow life to drag on for as long as possible. This is the moment when a matter of choice *seems* to arise and actually *does* become an issue of debate and to rely on technology to allow life to drag forward as long as possible. In theory legislation allows sufferers to refuse tracheotomy whereas artificial nutrition is still a mandatory treatment which cannot be refused by the sufferer who would die of starvation without it. This is the stage that provokes bioethical debate on decision-making and issues of choice. But when the concrete situations of the sufferers are approached in practice, one realizes that the terms in which the debate is formulated tend to oversimplify and disguise the complexity of the issues involved.

Theoretical debate tends to overlook the relational and temporal dimension of free choice and decision-making within the concrete, lived experience of the sufferers and their families and caregivers. First of all, what a person decides after thorough reflection is not necessarily what the selfsame person may want at a later stage when the first respiratory crisis suddenly occurs. In this regard the caregiver of a man suffering from ALS and bedridden for ten years gives us an illustrative example:

The moment came when the doctor told me he needed to know whether my husband would want to be helped with any means possible, even if he knew it meant not being able to breathe any more on his own. The hospital wasn't that well equipped to face respiratory

emergencies, and they wanted to know in case other, more specialized machines had to be brought in for the treatment. I spoke to my husband, and he told me that he just wanted that things to go on as they had to, that he didn't want to be obstinate or cause any problems. But when the first crisis occurred he completely changed his attitude. He wanted to be hospitalized with all the specialized care, he wanted to be operated on. It was his survival instinct coming to life. He said: "Whatever help you can get, take it!" And you know, when it comes to the reality, it's a bit different story!

Other witnesses had similar experiences. Another example exerted from an interview with the sister and caregiver of a 50 year old man suffering from ALS.

When I told him my brother would say no to tracheotomy, the medical doctor immediately reassured me: "He'll want it" he said me with a confident smile: "Most people say they won't, but, in the end, they take it

This presents us with another problematic aspect within the theoretical terms of decision-making issue: is the margin of choice given within this kind of situations really something that only concerns the person affected by the neurodegenerative disease in their capacity of thinking and deciding autonomously? We have already noted how the hallmark of progressive neuropathologies is the maintenance of cognitive ability in contrast to the loss of motor ability. But what use is this autonomy of thought when there is complete dependence on others for any elementary task required for simple survival such as eating and going to the toilet?

Here the (inter)dependence relationships shaped by neurodegenerative diseases might work as a magnifying glass on the same relationships which occur in ordinary, everyday life, and show the limitations of the commonsense concept of autonomy underlying our legislation, society, and mental frameworks.

As a matter of fact, irrespective of whether the margin of choice is actual or alleged, the option to prolong one's own bedridden life on a respirator has an impact not only on the ones who take the option to continue to live, but perhaps even more so on their caregivers and dear ones: if they decide to let themselves die they deprive their loved ones of their presence for the time they would have survived attached to a respirator; on the other hand, if they decide to prolong their lives, they commit loved ones, and especially their primary caregivers, to the delicate and full-time task of caring for them while they live on through a mechanical device. We should not overlook the fact that even clumsy accidents like a brief power outage can be fatal to anyone attached to an artificial life support system, so that the presence of primary caregivers and close family members is vital round-the-clock, often irreplaceable. In such situation the idea of having the life of the paralyzed person in one's hands becomes as powerful as it is illusory and deceptive, and naturally brings with it fear, anguish and a sense of inadequacy, making it very difficult for primary caregivers to find closed family members or even paid caregivers to relieve them of some of their round-the-clock tasks.

Reviewing what we have said leads one to question what exactly we are talking about when we call into question that principle of autonomy that is so invoked in legislation and the international press. As one for the leading issues of social legislation and society in general, with all its accompanying ambiguities and confusing abstractions, it has percolated down to find itself rooted squarely in a profound understanding of day to day life as lived by caregivers, although this is not a problem that can be addressed here.

However, the larger issue of autonomy remains as a backdrop to specific problems which arise in relation to the larger issue of the caregiver's experience. If one asks the question "Is becoming a caregiver a matter of choosing your own fate?" the traditional

dichotomy between free will and necessity seems not to hold pointing out the obscurity that surrounds many of our traditional principles and constructs. An inescapable duty which imposes itself as an ineluctable task may be compatible with rational will, or at best a living desire to fulfill it could be seen as a free gesture of love.

To-Give-and-to-Get. Outmoded Values and Unexpected Resources in the Experience of Caregiving

The interviews and working groups showed that caregivers felt the role they had undertaken and the tasks that went with it had been a free choice, but were also fully aware of the renunciations they implied.

I'm not obliged to do what I do." said the wife of the man mentioned above who had been diagnosed with permanent locked-in syndrome. "I could have said: "Yes, you are my husband and I am very sorry for you, but I have to go on living my life. You stay at home, and I keep doing what I have to". But I could never do that, because I love him! I want to do what I do with him, and I know he'd do the same for me if he was at my place

Among the cases in our research, the one that is perhaps the most illustrative in this respect concerns a man in his forties who was born shortly after his father had been diagnosed with MS and then lost his mother when he was still a young boy. He had took charge of his father and held his ground against relatives and friends warning him to think of himself.

I was told that I had scarified my life to be with him, that I would not be able to have a family because I'd be tied to a disable person at home. It was even suggested that I think of myself and put him in a

home...With everyone telling me what I should do, I cut myself off from every relations and friends straight past

Beyond the strong dose of resentment that comes through here, the philosopher perceives a sense of conflict which is not necessarily justified by circumstances.

In fact, in the words and suggestions of relatives and friends that constitutes the male caregiver's immediate world, "thinking of one's self" seems to stand in as axiomatic and uncritically accepted in contrast to "thinking of someone else". The long-standing dichotomy between egoism and altruism is automatically assumed within a context where it is bound not to work. As a matter of fact, the caregivers' thinking of one's self obviously implies also thinking of one's dear one who one is caring for, while it is less obvious the other way round, which is to say that thinking of the dear one who one is caring for also implies thinking one's self for the caregiver who act in the name of hi or her own love and feelings. More than in other and more ordinary interdependence relationships, here it is an outmoded "We" who has to be thought of in spite of any self-proclaimed ideology of loving and thinking to oneself as if this self was a self-sufficient subject whose interest can be clearly distinguished from the interest of his surrounding world. But this idea of self-love, self-interest and thinking of one's self as separated from the love, interest and thinking of one's dear ones is hard to overcome and produces perceptual and conceptual effects beyond the immediate relationships between caregiver and cared for. These effects can also be seen in the way the family unit struck by a neurodegenerative diseases perceives and conceives their relation with their relatives, friends, and social surroundings. In most of the cases involved in our action-research the caregivers interviewed reported that they did not receive significant support from their friends and wider family circle. In some cases they regretted not getting the degree of participation and help they had

expected from their relatives and closest friends, but in the largest majority of cases they claimed they never expected such help, and that it would have been unfair, for example, to ask a friend to help them with a bedridden father or husband or brother even for going to the toilet. “They have their own problems” and “Everyone has their own problems” were *leitmotifs* that I often heard from caregivers claiming not to have been disappointed because they had not expected anything from the outside the closest family unit. But here again: are we really sure that everyone has his or her own problems and that it must be so? Other voices in our action-research suggested otherwise that problems can be shared, that the mere fact of being shared can alleviate and reduce a problem as well as give significant help and support to people who have to face it.

Two cases of two women stand out from the others in showing this principle of a problem shared is a problem halved. The first is the woman previously referred to as “caregiver of herself” who overcame her initial temptation to hole up in her house and lean only on her husband and other closer members of her family, instead opting to maintain and strengthen her network of relatives, friends, colleagues and social acquaintances, hence spreading the “burden” of assistance. Granted, her own cheerful character and the richness of her interests was another source of support, yet day by day she managed to build around her a real win-win solution. The other case is that of the “veteran caregiver” who, as already mentioned, had been looking after her bedridden husband for ten years. After her first years of caregiving this woman realized that she needed some help, and after an unsatisfactory experience with psychology found a way of sharing her burden by forming an association with a women's group.

“You know, it is real that a problem shared is a problem halved” she told me. “It is all an exchange. One of us talks about her problems with

her son, another about her violent husband. You somehow go beyond yourself and your own problems because you can really feel and understand you are not alone”

The way in which our participants preferred an exchange among peers to the paths offered by psychology was a recurrent pattern in our research. Not a single one of the caregivers who had gone through psychotherapy felt it had been useful to them. Caregivers who are engaged round-the-clock in supporting their dear ones', who in turn depend on them in order to face the unpredictable and progressive worsening of their life condition, often feel that people who have not lived through the same or at least some similar experience simply cannot understand them, irrespective their professional skills and background. On the other hand, they are eager to share and enrich their experience exchange which is part of a practical and emotional approach to everyday life useful beyond mere words. By the same token, in the words on one of our interviewees, talking about what they are living through just to talk is probably the thing caregivers need the least. As a matter of fact, when asked what they would do if they had the opportunity to spend some free time outside the home and their caring tasks, they preferred physically and/or socially active options such as going for a walk, swimming, or similar pursuits.

Again, it was our “veteran caregiver” who proved the most conscious and lucid witness to how caregivers generally feel about their own's need for help:

“I went through three, four, maybe five psychological sessions....but they were very discursive and I decided to stop, because my approach was: Look, I've got a difficult reality, a difficult life, ok, but I don't want to escape from it, because it's mine! I went along without a problem for 45-46 years, and than this blow came...but what's the use of complaining? I prefer to have an exchange with other people who are facing difficult situations rather than talk about myself: It's more constructive!”

Other participants said the same. A young woman caring for her mother suffering from ALS reported that her psychologist's insistence that that she had to think of herself bore no relation to what she was living and going through.

“It wasn't what I needed. I want to go on doing what I do for my mother, even do more. This is also why if I have to open up to someone, I prefer to do it with people who are living through my same problem or something similar....That's what really helps! Even if it's just saying 'hallo' to someone who's going through what you are going through, that makes you feel you're not alone and gives you strength. It's really important!” It was the same for the woman the women caring for her husband already quoted above: “If I have to talk to someone that cannot understand my problem because they haven't lived through it...no way! I'd rather talk to a wife, a mother, a sister, someone who knows what I'm talking about because she lives it on her skin”

As a matter of fact, it was not just to other caregivers that caregivers opened up, but also when there was an opportunity to spend some time out, like going for a pizza or a walk. On the other hand, their association with people that had constituted the usual social environments of acquaintances and friends before the life change imposed by neurodegenerative disease turned out to be no longer as pleasant as before, even engendered discomfort and impatience. Our interviewees often reported that when going out with old friends they were uncomfortable with the general topics of conversation, which could no longer hold their attention. Even when they just went out with a single friend, where a one-on-one relationship might seem best for understanding one another they felt alienated though they had no real interest in what was being said and done. The caregivers interviewed attribute this to the fact that their daily life was now so different from the relatively ordinary and “normal” one they used to have and their old friends and acquaintances continued to have. However, this “difference” and “deviation” from ordinary life, should not be one-sidedly

interpreted under the negative commonsense meaning of “sacrifice”⁶.

In its etymological sense the word “sacrifice” means “making sacred” and has little or nothing to do with the idea of masochistic self-restraint one tends to associate with it a time dominated by the blurred ideology of Autonomy and Self-Sufficiency. In Christianity and all other religions, sacrifice's aim is to engender sharing and communion among the different roles of its various participants. Sacrifice and communion take the lineaments of community and defines its relationships as pristine and priori to the single individual, and use them to redefine the boundaries of the self. In current western society the “I” comes first, but this “I” often suffers from self-imposed limitations which construct boundaries against forming strong and profound relations with others.

A woman who was taking care of her tracheotomized father while also caring for her two children and her mother suffering from dementia confessed to me her irritation with people showing compassion for her. She felt that such people understood nothing about life: love and only love is what fills our existence with meaning. Richness in life comes from sharing and giving. Nothing else gives a substantial value to our being-in-the-world.

Of course, the continuous and daily engagement with love that is caregiving for a dear one who has lost motor autonomy brings with it its burdens charge of work and renunciation of the pleasures of light entertainment, such as taking one's own children to the funfair or going out for a coffee with friends. But it is just this kind of strong engagement that brings with it a discovery of the strength of life itself when it is confronted with its most important challenges. This is what the women mentioned earlier describes it:

⁶ See GIRARD, René, *Sacrifice*, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris 2003; GIRARD René, *The Scapegoat*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1986; GIRARD René, *violence and the Sacred*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1977.

“The more I took on my shoulders, the heavier backpack became heavy, and the more I stood up straight and walked.”

What can help to lighten a heavy backpack is humor, which emerged as an unexpected resource in our action-research with caregivers. Jokes, quips, and teasing were frequent among people suffering from neurodegenerative diseases and their caregivers. These last were far more likely to joke in the presence of the sufferers they are caring for, largely as a response to the need to lighten what would otherwise be an unbearable heavy situation. The sufferer and caregiver both had to have an outlet, a way of playing things down, given that they faced incurable illness, worsening handicaps and an increasing dependence on strenuous and constant care. Humor became an irreplaceable tool in looking at and talking about a harsh reality in a bearable form. It functioned as a sort of communication code for speaking out about issues which could never be openly discussed. For families living with a neurodegenerative disease, humor is a vital filter for addressing what most worries them a future dominated by worsening disease and impending death⁷.

A very Short Final Postscript

The chronic and progressively worsening life-conditions determined by neurodegenerative diseases act as a magnifying

⁷ On the value of humor in facing the vulnerability of human life see AMIR, Lydia: “Philosophical Humor for Women – (and Men): Fighting shame and Disgust”, in DE PAULA Luisa and RAABE Peter, *Women in Philosophical Counseling. The Anima of Thought into Action*, Lexington, Lanham, 2015. Pages 83-97. In Amir's reading a truly (philosophical) humorous view of life overcomes the unilateral gaze of both the tragic and the comic to actively embrace the overall truth of existence in a way that makes it acceptable to a human being. Also see AMIR, Lydia, *Humor and the Good Life in Modern Philosophy: Shaftesbury, Hamann, Kierkegaard*, Suny Press, New York, 2014.

glass under which a number of outmoded values are placed: interdependence, sacrifice, vulnerability to humane existence's irreducible uncertainty, the unpredictability of future events. Whereas the universalizing and categorizing gaze of natural and human sciences as medicine and psychology fails to assimilate the autocatalytic potential of caregiving's experience, a genuinely humble philosophical approach can open up the space to the unpredictable inventiveness of different experiences and the richness resulting from their enhancement and comparative exchange through dialogue.

RESEÑAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS
REVIEWS

GONZÁLEZ R. ARNAIZ, GRACIANO y GÓNZALEZ LÓPEZ-COTELO, TERESA: *El asesor cultural en la empresa*, Madrid, Dykinson, 2015. 119 pp.

Las dificultades que atraviesa la cultura empresarial española son una muestra significativa de su actualidad más evidente. A dicha circunstancia, agravada por la presente crisis económica, se une la merma de conciencia ética que, a menudo, pone en entredicho ciertos comportamientos que se dan en el ámbito político, financiero y empresarial. De dicha realidad se ha ocupado tradicionalmente la llamada “Ética de la empresa”, una rama de la ética cuya intención ha sido, desde su origen, el desarrollo de la perspectiva moral de la empresa. Al mismo tiempo, las empresas actuales cuentan con un Departamento de Recursos Humanos que se ocupa de todas estas cuestiones morales y de responsabilidad corporativa, pero, tal y como proponen los

autores, todo este entramado constituido para velar por la responsabilidad ética del medio empresarial no ha cumplido su cometido originario. Dicha afirmación no supone la eliminación de la estructura aducida, sino que, como proponen los autores, se trata más bien de reconducir las derivas éticas de la perspectiva empresarial mediante la incorporación del “asesor cultural”. Esta figura representa la sensibilidad moral que, traducida en clave de respeto, reconocimiento y compromiso con los otros y su cultura, propone una integración responsable del trabajador en su entorno laboral.

No obstante, por el momento esta figura no aparece como tal recogida por el CERSE o Consejo Estatal de RSE (Responsabilidad Social Empresarial), si bien se propone su promoción.

A grandes rasgos, el asesor cultural supone una contribución al contexto ético de la RSE, apostando por el reconocimiento de los distintos

ámbitos de la empresa y que se puede traducir en su presencia en momentos clave como la firma de contratos, negociaciones o intervenciones en diálogos entre empresas pertenecientes a ámbitos culturales diferentes.

Para destacar la importancia del “asesor cultural”, los autores muestran dos aspectos que avalan su propuesta. El primero de ellos, que se corresponde con el Primer Estudio del ensayo, tiene por objeto desarrollar el contenido, la estructura y la solvencia de la figura del “asesor cultural” en el entramado empresarial. En el Segundo Estudio se centran en el contexto sociocultural y ético que explica el significado de esta nueva figura empresarial, algo que se completa con un capítulo final en el que se diseña un posible perfil prototípico del “asesor cultural”.

La figura del “asesor cultural” tiene una estrecha relación con la del intérprete y el traductor, los cuales ejercen un papel mediador en lo que a

las diferentes lenguas y culturas se refiere. Así, a simple vista, parece que el papel del intérprete y del traductor se traduce en una mera traslación de significados que no contempla complejidad comprensiva añadida alguna. Nada más lejos de la realidad: no son pocas las ocasiones en las que estos profesionales deben ir más allá de su cometido inicial para explicar ciertos patrones o modelos de conducta en aras de reducir las tensiones y malentendidos que pueden ser provocados por el desconocimiento de otra cultura. Entramos, así, en un terreno complejo que precisa de algo más que la traducción de significados lingüísticos. Es en este momento en el que la figura del “asesor cultural” se hace necesaria como mediador e intérprete de temas de tipo cultural. No se trata de disminuir la presencia de los intérpretes y traductores, sino de ampliar el campo de comprensión de las relaciones empresariales mediante una figura específica-

mente creada para mediar en cuestiones que escapan a la traslación de significados.

El “asesor cultural” tendría asignadas una serie de tareas propias, tales como: establecer pautas de lectura (para determinar qué temas son apropiados a tratar en una reunión entre personas de culturas diferentes), proponer estrategias de comunicación encaminadas a propiciar la confianza entre los interlocutores, evitar conflictos culturales mediante el conocimiento de los conceptos básicos y las normas de relación de las otras culturas o, entre otras tareas, propiciar el conocimiento de los signos culturales característicos de las diferentes culturas para, así, evitar malentendidos en momentos puntuales y claves como la firma de un contrato.

En el Primer Estudio, titulado *El ‘puesto’ de asesor cultural en la empresa*, los autores nos introducen en la importancia de la comunicación en la era del desarrollo tecnológico. Esta apreciación, lejos de ser

catalogada como una obviedad, nos previene de la necesidad de apostar por un mejor entendimiento entre particulares e instituciones mediante la interacción de los referentes culturales. La sociedad tecnológica en la que nos encontramos no puede eludir la presencia de los elementos culturales, los cuales poseen su propio sistema de sentido y significado que deben ser tenidos en cuenta en el orden de las relaciones sociales. Así pues, se apuesta por una conexión entre los medios tecnológicos y el sistema cultural en aras de mejorar las relaciones y el conocimiento entre personas de lugares geográficos diversos así como de costumbres diferentes. Los autores insisten en afirmar que el intercambio entre las personas, los países y las culturas es algo que siempre ha existido. Sin embargo, la intensidad de dichas relaciones así como el marco contextual (presidido por lo que conocemos como “globalización”) en el que se desarrollan sí ha

cambiado y exige nuevas pautas de comprensión y desarrollo que, presumiblemente, podrían ser desarrolladas por el “asesor cultural”: “en su papel de consejero o de asesor, ni está obligado a ser neutral, ni es su deber necesariamente mediar entre las dos partes que intervienen en una negociación. Su papel sería “descifrar” la cultura de la contraparte para entender su forma de pensar para, desde ahí, elaborar una estrategia de negociación (en el caso de que se esté negociando), una estrategia de trabajo (en el caso de que hablemos de la realización de proyectos conjuntos) o una estrategia que facilite la adaptación de los trabajadores extranjeros en la empresa o la de aquellos que, en nombre de la empresa, salen a trabajar al exterior” (53).

El segundo estudio se titula *El asesor cultural en el seno de una sociedad intercultural. Perspectiva ética*. En él, los autores se preocupan por mostrar al “asesor cultural”

las claves del medio en el que van a desarrollar su trabajo. Y es que, no podemos olvidar que la tarea de esta figura supone la complementación de aspectos tanto teóricos como prácticos. Esto es, debe conocer las propuestas que los distintos saberes desarrollan en torno a las distintas culturas y sus relaciones al tiempo que debe ser práctico en lo que a la aplicación de los conocimientos teóricos se refieren. En este capítulo, además, los autores abordan la presencia del “asesor cultural” en el seno de la empresa, destacando la importancia de la ética y la filosofía para la comprensión de las diferencias culturales. Y es que, la cultura no es algo que carezca de vida y dinamismo sino que, por el contrario, se muestra abierta al sino de los tiempos y evoluciona, cambia de paradigmas y necesita constantemente nuevos cauces de interpretación y explicación. Todo este marco cultural no es ajeno al desarrollo de una sociedad tecnológica,

una realidad más compleja que la mera evolución de los procesos técnicos y que se ampara en otras cuestiones como la globalización de la producción y de los intercambios económicos, por situar dos ejemplos clave.

Los autores de *El asesor cultural en la empresa* concluyen su ensayo reconociendo las dificultades de esbozar un perfil determinado del “asesor cultural” en el ámbito empresarial. No obstante, dicha cuestión no es óbice para insistir en la necesidad de su presencia como garantía de asesoramiento, de promoción de una especie de “cultura del diálogo” así como de supervisores culturales en los encuentros entre colectivos de diferentes culturas.

Otra cuestión problemática pasa por reconocer la ubicación del “asesor cultural”, debido a su carácter de “figura transversal”. No obstante, puede ser adscrita al Departamento de Recursos Humanos o en un Departamento de Relaciones Internacionales,

tal y como proponen algunos sectores.

El ensayo presentado muestra la evolución del entramado empresarial en las sociedades avanzadas y la necesidad de ampliar los contextos de comprensión e intercambio cultural. En el complejo marco de actuación empresarial se hace pertinente la figura del “asesor cultural” como mediador entre las diferentes culturas y sus manifestaciones, una pieza clave, al fin y al cabo, en el desarrollo de la ética empresarial. De esta forma, se contribuye a mejorar los canales de comunicación así como a desarrollar la competencia intercultural tan presente en la sociedad globalizada.

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PARÍS, Carlos: *Ética radical. Los abismos de la actual civilización*, Madrid, Tecnos, 2013. 294 pp.

La posibilidad de una regeneración política desde sus implicaciones éticas subyace en esta obra de Carlos París (1925-2014), la cual culmina, además, una trilogía de la que forman parte *La crítica de la civilización nuclear* y *El animal cultural*. El libro que nos ocupa es la ampliación de otro trabajo del autor, *Técnica y Moral. Por una ética de las decisiones radicales*, en la cual se proponía una revisión de la Ética en aras de ampliar su campo de acción. Desde esta perspectiva, París reflexionó en torno a las posibilidades de la disciplina ética en otros ámbitos que trascienden a las relaciones humanas. Tal es el caso del mundo de la técnica y de todo aquello que forma parte de la producción del hombre. Animado por su entorno más cercano, París prosiguió con sus investigaciones para ampliar el contex-

to de estudio propuesto. Partiendo de las diferencias técnicas entre los hombres y los animales, el autor se centra en las relaciones entre la ética y la técnica, puesto que ambas pertenecen a un mismo mundo, ese que es creado día a día por los hombres para vivir. En este punto, cabe preguntarse por las implicaciones que la ética tiene en la actualidad para los hombres que, inmersos en un mundo esencialmente técnico, deben redefinir sus límites e implicaciones.

A lo largo de diecisiete capítulos, París muestra un claro contraste entre una realidad, la nuestra, de calado tecnológico y unas prácticas político-sociales ancladas en una tradición ética-moral que concibe al hombre como peligrosamente omnipotente. París recoge el testigo del existencialismo de Sartre y del raciovitalismo de Ortega y va más allá, proponiendo un horizonte de acción “que mira hacia tales condicionamientos en cuanto creados por la acti-

vidad que organiza una cultura determinada. Y definen el objeto propio de una ética radical. Es decir de la reflexión sobre nuestra responsabilidad en la tecnosfera, la logosfera, la etosfera que levantamos. Y que determinan prácticamente no sólo nuestras posibilidades sino nuestra manera de realizar lo humano” (33). Así, vemos los límites de la moral tradicional y las dimensiones de una ética que cambia y que se encuentra indisolublemente ligada al sistema productivo. De este modo podríamos decir que cobra sentido la afirmación de una realidad globalizada en la que el marco de las nuevas tecnologías y, concretamente, la cibernética, se tornan esenciales para la comprensión de nuestra realidad más inmediata.

Las implicaciones éticas de la conjunción globalización-nuevas tecnologías son muy diversas, tal y como nos muestra el autor. Podríamos decir, a grandes rasgos, que se ha producido un proceso

de transformación en el que por ejemplo, el capitalismo como sistema productivo también ha evolucionado. La preponderancia tecnológica y la globalización imponen políticas restrictivas que se traducen en la inestabilidad laboral o la descomposición del tejido social, tal y como propone París y que afecta no sólo a la vida profesional sino que se introduce en los aspectos más íntimos de la individualidad.

Nos situamos, por tanto, ante un amplio tejido de transformaciones sociales que recorren todos los ámbitos de la vida humana. París incide en la presencia de las armas como telón de fondo para cuestionar los problemas éticos del entorno ético del hombre, puesto que “el ser humano prolonga su realidad en la técnica y no es separable de ésta. La influencia de las armas sobre la conducta, la psicología y la concepción misma de lo humano representa un muy llamativo ejemplo de la sinergia entre el ser hu-

mano y el mundo artificial, de la tesis general que definiendo como base de la ética radical” (40). Como ocurriera con la historia de Caín y Abel, las desigualdades y los abismos entre los hombres están a la base de los conflictos de poder en aras de volver a la vida paradisíaca prometida. Pero la realidad es bien diferente, el desarrollo técnico de la historia (que ya emergía en los episodios bíblicos) nos hacen ser protagonistas de un mundo que resuelve sus conflictos mediante prótesis técnicas que, en el fondo, no hacen más que agudizar el contraste entre el poderoso y el sometido. Las implicaciones éticas de esta realidad forma parte del objetivo principal de esta obra de París: mostrar las relaciones entre la inmediatez de nuestras vivencias y las peculiaridades éticas de la misma.

Pero, ¿cuáles son las consecuencias históricas de toda esta amalgama que invade nuestra contemporaneidad? Tal y como propone París, la

historia está abierta, es decir, no hay presencia determinista alguna que nos indique con firmeza el proceso evolutivo de los acontecimientos. De este modo, los hombres deben implicarse en hacer efectivos los mecanismos de crítica y transformación social. No obstante dicho cometido no es fácil: en un mundo mediatizado por las nuevas tecnologías, el hombre debe adaptar su campo de acción y convivir con estrategias de poder más sofisticadas y, podríamos decir, castrantes. El mundo virtual nos induce a la búsqueda de nuevas formas de lo real en las que tengan cabida las implicaciones éticas en la dimensión tecnológica. Quizá por ello alude París a la necesidad de una ontología que se ocupe de la realidad más inmediata, puesto que “ahora se trata de indagar y precisar la forma de realidad que corresponde a la logosfera, a lo largo de su historia. Y que, con el desarrollo de las técnicas de información y comunicación y, muy especialmente, de

las nuevas tecnologías, suscita la aparición de nuevos espacios en el campo de lo real” (284).

Al igual que le sucediera a Alicia, nos parece habitar en una suerte de país de las maravillas que nos exige nuevos códigos de actuación, comprensión e interacción. Todo ello implica ser conscientes de nuestro papel protagonista en una realidad que hemos hecho a la par que, también, se nos ha ido imponiendo. En un contexto globalizado como el que nos pertenece es menester encontrar los medios pertinentes de desarrollo éticos, tal y como propone París como tesis de fondo en su libro. La realidad mediatizada y globalizada en la que nos hallamos nos exige un profundo ejercicio de crítica que, a pesar de sus tintes utópicos, nos conduzca hacia la justicia y la libertad real: “la historia está abierta. No hay ningún determinismo que asegure el triunfo final. Pero nada puede suprimir a los combatientes por la emancipación “la ale-

gría de la lucha” que afirmaba la feminista Pankhurst y la incansable esperanza. La alternativa no es sino la barbarie” (294).

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BARRIENTOS RASTROJO, J. – PACKTER, L. - CARVALHO, M.: *Introducción a la Filosofía Aplicada y a la Filosofía Clínica. Aplicaciones y fundamentaciones.* Madrid, Visión, 2014. 163 pp.

La obra que comentamos integra trabajos de tres autores, José Barrientos Rastrojo, Lúcio Packter y José Mauricio de Carvalho, centrados en una temática esencial: la interpretación de algunos aspectos de la vida actual. El origen de este trabajo se halla en un seminario sobre ‘La Escuela de Ortega y la acción filosófica de Lúcio Packter’ recientemente realizado en la Universidad de Sevilla (noviem-

bre de 2014). El eje conceptual de este libro consiste, por tanto, en el aprovechamiento genuinamente filosófico de las tesis del pensador y brillante ensayista español por referencia a dos disciplinas: la Filosofía Aplicada y la Clínica. De ambas se presentan sus avances en un desarrollo conceptual filosófico, no limitado a la pura tradición teórica sino en importante medida abierto a la exploración de situaciones vitales típicas de nuestro tiempo.

Se parte de la idea de la autenticidad como motor interno de un proyecto existencial en términos orteguianos en cuyas circunstancias y manifestaciones prácticas, según los autores, se insertan la Filosofía Aplicada y la Filosofía Clínica. Desde una perspectiva pragmática, el raciovitalismo de Ortega, su evidente existencialismo, es susceptible de aportar gran riqueza de matices tal como se deduce de las aportaciones que se describen en este libro.

Las citadas ramas de pensamiento parten de que la búsqueda de la autenticidad de uno mismo es “una vocación” y un compromiso vital íntimamente ligado a la actitud ética —otra faceta que nos devuelve al enfoque filosófico de estas cuestiones— y a la ansiada felicidad, por lo que, cuando el hombre encuentra dificultades o se distancia de dicha “vocación” se siente enfermo. Pero, ¿la vocación de autenticidad es un dato del pensamiento o más bien depende de la cercanía humana, de un acomodo vital, en la serena vivencia de los acontecimientos y problemas diarios? ¿O tal vocación es ambivalente? Porque, además de la vivencia del tiempo actual como fuente de problemas (obstaculizando la reflexión, endiosando lo banal y superfluo, justificando cualquier modo de actuar...), como ya apuntaba Ortega, las ciencias humanas han caído bajo la fascinación de las ciencias experimentales y de las omnipresentes aplicaciones tec-

nológicas, tan apreciadas con entusiasmo en la Medicina, lo que hace imprescindible una reflexión sobre las aplicaciones clínicas. Todo lo cual genera una vinculación que servirá para introducirnos en la Filosofía Aplicada y la Filosofía Clínica desde tres ángulos: la subordinación de la Filosofía Clínica a la Fenomenología; la aportación de Ortega y Gasset a la Psicología, de inspiración fenomenológica; y en el trasfondo el raciovitalismo como faro conceptual de numerosas nociones del filósofo clínico, según advierte en la introducción el pensador brasileño José Mauricio de Carvalho.

El filósofo sevillano José Barrientos, por su parte, plantea un ensayo introductorio a la Filosofía Aplicada. Estudia los orígenes filosóficos de dicha disciplina, analizando los términos de la polémica en torno a la atribución a Gerd B. Achenbach de la fundación de la misma (1981). Señala Barrientos la existencia de numerosos an-

tecedentes en las ‘aplicaciones’ filosóficas, algunos tan prestigiosos y remotos como la pléyade de pensadores que acompañaban y asesoraban a reyes y nobles cortesanos, con ejemplos que podemos retrotraer hasta los tiempos de Platón, Alejandro Magno o Nerón (pág. 19). Tales espectaculares precedentes han evolucionado en nuestros días hasta dar en formas tan variadas y sorprendentes como el curioso modelo del Jardín de Epicuro de Caen (Francia), donde se imparte filosofía a cualquier ciudadano; o en fechas anteriores, el café filosófico que en España Ortega y María Zambrano desarrollaron con la intención de crear un modelo de tertulia filosófica; y en los talleres de reflexión. En definitiva, actividades que implican ser consciente de los beneficios que aporta el aprendizaje y ejercicio de la razón en la vida humana y de paso promover la ruptura con la visión de la Filosofía impuesta por la tra-

dición académica imperante en décadas recientes.

Resulta evidente que, atendiendo a las múltiples experiencias vitales que trata de conocer y encauzar, podrían asignarse numerosas definiciones a la Filosofía Aplicada. Barrientos Rastrojo compendia aquí los puntos comunes que deben compartir cuantas racionalidades quieran integrarse bajo la mencionada Filosofía Aplicada. Su perspectiva, aclara, se fundamenta en “una aproximación modernista basada en un concepto de racionalidad de tipo cartesiana o hegeliana” (pág. 20). Tal actitud implica que la praxis del filósofo aplicado tratará de ayudar a la persona que acude a él confrontándola, en un intercambio dialógico sistematizado, con aspectos de la realidad que sintonicen sus propias creencias o apreciaciones, obteniendo como consecuencia un mejor acomodo con las circunstancias, en la línea de afianzar la vocación de autenticidad que asegura los valores e ideas

sobre los cuales, de modo más o menos consciente, se asientan los pensamientos y sentimientos que rigen los comportamientos humanos. Así pues, el orientador filosófico actúa promoviendo el diálogo y suscitando debates que hagan a su interlocutor, en la práctica denominado “consultante”, analizar y reflexionar conscientemente sobre su pensamiento, ayudándole a sistematizarlo y, muy especialmente, a mejorar el ejercicio de sus recursos racionales. Cuáles son cuestiones relevantes, los objetivos y los resultados deseables, además de con qué herramientas trabaja la Filosofía Aplicada y su metodología son algunas de los principales asuntos que aborda este capítulo, constantemente apoyado en citas y consideraciones sobre los estrechos vínculos entre la Filosofía y sus potencialidades prácticas.

Tras lo anteriormente expuesto, se plantea una cuestión inmediata: ¿qué ámbito epistemológico corresponde a la

llamada Filosofía Aplicada? El filósofo sevillano responde a esta pregunta y explica el desarrollo en dos modalidades, la Filosofía Aplicada Lógico-Experimental (FALA) y la Filosofía Aplicada Experiencial (FAE). Adelantándose a la inevitable pregunta sobre las repercusiones concretas de estas reflexiones en la vida de las personas, también advierte de que no tiene por qué apreciarlas en meros términos utilitarios. Teoría y práctica no son lo mismo. La experiencia hace que algunos argumentos tengan capacidad transformadora y otros no. Ser y sentir, hacer y pensar; tales son las complejas variables. No obstante, el distinto grado de afectación del ser y la profundización en su intelección no sitúan a la FAE y la FALA en instancias radicalmente opuestas. Información y transformación, vivencia y experiencia, no son lo mismo, pero lo segundo siempre implica a lo primero, por lo cual las opciones se mantendrán unidas buena

parte del camino que filósofo y su dialogador (“consultante”) recorrerán. Las distintas aplicaciones de la Filosofía Aplicada, ya sea Experiencial o Lógico-Argumental, que se exponen en el citado trabajo lo evidencian.

Dicha intención integradora se reitera en el segundo capítulo -también de Barrientos-, titulado ‘La orientación filosófica (o Filosofía Aplicada a la persona) desde las raíces zambranianas’. En él -de nuevo subrayando la naturaleza filosófica de este trabajo- aborda las vinculaciones entre la escuela orteguiana y la filosofía experiencial, bajo la cual sitúa la especulación y quehacer de la filósofa María Zambrano. Por citar un solo ejemplo de esta estrecha relación, destaquemos el que ambas perspectivas van más allá del conocimiento para instar al individuo a actuar. A través de su biografía primero y de sus teorías después, este capítulo defiende que la pensadora malagueña sentó las bases de lo que hoy llamaríamos

Filosofía Aplicada Experiencial, convirtiéndose por ello en una pionera en este ámbito.

El tercer capítulo del libro que presentamos, ‘Filosofía Clínica: un prefacio’, del filósofo brasileño Lúcio Packter, entra de lleno en las apreciaciones propiamente vitalistas. Plantea consideraciones generales e iniciales, como, por ejemplo, quién define lo que es saludable, qué es lo que se considera saludable o enfermizo y si la respuesta a estas preguntas alcanza un nivel universalmente válido. La individualidad y consiguiente subjetividad que aparece en cada una de las respuestas, da pie al pensador a argumentar la insoslayable necesidad de conocer la “historia de vida” de cada persona (pág. 81). Se trata de captar un mundo, una trayectoria vital que relaciona con los llamados “itinerarios ajenos” en el ámbito psicológico; es decir, con todo aquello que escapa al estricto control del ser humano y que repercute en él. Se desvela

una evidente interrelación entre la conciencia subjetiva y la vida social conectadas de modo indisociable en la singularidad existencial del cuerpo humano; la inveterada unidad sustancial de cuerpo y alma definida constantemente en la filosofía tradicional. “El cuerpo como espejo de lo que esta sociedad le dice en su modo de ser y estar”, en palabras de Packter (pág. 88), quien -aludiendo a uno de los temas más distintivos y sintomáticos de nuestros días- recuerda que los sentimientos, la confianza en uno mismo, el respeto o indiferencia, la dependencia y autonomía de cada persona se reflejan directamente en su apariencia corporal.

Por ello, el citado pensador postula que en áreas como la medicina, enfermería o fisioterapia se tenga presente esta interrelación. Ante la innegable importancia que tiene para la mayoría de las personas su cuerpo, el autor considera necesario investigar y conectar con la percepción de “qué

es en el conjunto de la persona”. La definición de las funciones del cuerpo, sus relaciones o su existencia “puede ayudarnos a descubrir maneras de tratar, de lidiar y de vivir con y en el cuerpo” (pág. 89).

El cuarto y último capítulo, ‘Ortega y Gasset y la Filosofía Clínica’, de José Mauricio de Carvalho penetra en la problemática ya expuesta y en su inagotable fenomenología en la vida actual. Las confusas dificultades que afronta el hombre hacen imprescindible un acercamiento al mismo (que entroncaría con el estudio fenomenológico de los elementos de la vida), tratando de aprehender lo más ampliamente posible el entorno o mundo de la persona que se somete a tratamiento. Conviene aclarar que el propio autor define la Filosofía Clínica como una “técnica de psicoterapia” que no se vincula en exclusiva al campo de la Psicología ni de la Medicina (pág. 91). Se propone una “clínica filosófica” en la cual,

como vemos, se retoman conceptos orteguianos en el espíritu de su famoso “Yo soy yo y mi circunstancia...” para sustentar teóricamente la problemática específica que se desarrolla en el área de las aplicaciones. Así, aunque es difícil deslindar campos conceptuales que parecen yuxtaponerse y confluir (Psicología, Psiquiatría, autoayuda...), José Mauricio de Carvalho ahonda en los fundamentos de esta problemática dedicando estas páginas a mostrar los referentes de la Filosofía Clínica en el pensamiento orteguiano a lo largo de su evolución. En el pensador y brillante ensayista madrileño encuentra las condiciones y características de la singularidad existencial y, de este modo, una vez identificado y delimitado ese entorno o circunstancia (el análisis categorial), el filósofo clínico trata de identificar, junto a su interlocutor o “consultante”, los elementos de la estructura de pensamiento (experiencias, vivencias, rela-

ciones entre ellas, etc.) y, sobre la base de todo ello, proponer posteriormente una pauta de actuación.

Esta concepción global implica una verdadera metafísica de la vida e incluye explícitamente una “inspiración humanista” (pág. 94) revelada desde el cuidado que muestra respecto al que sufre (el respeto a su dolor y su mundo individual) en la plena aceptación de su libertad, lo cual conlleva la responsabilidad del uso de la racionalidad (y, consecuentemente, la ansiedad de quien busca una certeza ante cualquier colisión en su red intelectual o cognitiva).

Sin embargo, como advierte el citado José Mauricio de Carvalho, la Filosofía Clínica “no es propiamente una teoría filosófica”, pues tendría que aspirar a alcanzar un entendimiento de la verdad fundamental, y no circunscribirse a la comprensión de la estructura de pensamiento del individuo y su relación con la singularidad subjetiva, lo cual se

inclina más claramente al proyecto disciplinar de la Psicología Contemporánea. De hecho, el autor también explica en este trabajo la fundamentación científica de tal materia.

Justamente debido a la dificultad existente para delimitar campos de acción en cuestiones tan complejas y ámbitos de conocimiento con numerosos denominadores comunes y matices, el lector podrá apreciar como especialmente esclarecedoras por su propia naturaleza de pregunta-respuesta -¿trasunto de una sesión consultante-filósofo? las dos entrevistas con que se cierra esta obra. El entrevistador es en ambos casos el autor del prólogo. Los dos entrevistados, los otros coautores (Barrientos y Packter). Ambos pensadores contestan de forma breve y directa a preguntas como la relación entre la Filosofía Aplicada y la actividad filosófica tradicional, las características de las dos modalidades de Filosofía Aplicada, la contribu-

ción de Ortega y Gasset a sus planteamientos y desarrollo, la relación del orientador filosófico o filósofo aplicado con el psicólogo, el psiquiatra y el psicoanalista y la diferencia entre el trabajo del filósofo clínico con estas disciplinas. En esta dirección, también responden a preguntas sobre las investigaciones más recientes de la Filosofía Clínica, las expectativas de la misma y cómo ayuda el estudio de la filosofía orteguiana al filósofo clínico. Sus respuestas ofrecen un sugestivo panorama -aunque necesariamente breve- y riguroso compendio del contenido de la obra. Con tales comentarios y la amplia bibliografía que acompaña al libro, el lector podrá adquirir los instrumentos necesarios para profundizar en estas nuevas tendencias y aplicaciones filosóficas referidas a tantas situaciones vitales conflictivas como ofrece la vida de nuestro tiempo.

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DUTHIE, Ellen – MARTAGÓN, Daniela.: *Wonder Ponder “Yo, persona”*, Madrid, Traje de lobo S.L., 2015, 42 pp.

Aunque haya quien diga que nunca segundas partes fueron buenas, creemos que en esta ocasión la frase hecha se equivoca por completo. En el anterior número de Revista HASER, hablamos de la primera entrega, del primer libro o en definitiva, de la primera arriesgada empresa de estas autoras que tienen mucho de aventureras y emprendedoras y muy poco de locas y soñadoras.

Podemos decir que, por suerte, su periplo en el mundo de la Filosofía Visual para Niños está dando frutos, aunque muy lentamente para nuestra desgracia. Sin embargo, este nuevo número de *Wonder Ponder*, publicado en junio de 2015, se centra en la propia persona. Uno de los temas predilectos y de más calado entre las niñas y los niños que comienzan a reconocerse

desde su propio concepto de persona, desde su cerebro-pensamientos e incluso desde la perspectiva individuo-sociedad.

En esta ocasión Ellen y Daniela nos ofrecen, con el mismo humor inteligente y divertidas y originales ilustraciones, unas cuestiones que van desde los robots, los intercambios de cerebros, los cambios de cuerpo, la propia historia de los nuestros “yoes”, la clonación, la libertad, la educación, la familia, las relaciones afectivas, el concepto de cuerpo, el juego, la paradoja o la inteligencia, siempre desde el ángulo del yo como concepto abstracto y del yo siempre conectado a lo real y a lo emocional.

Es de agradecer, como en el anterior número de *Wonder Ponder “Mundo Cruel”*, que se deje espacio en las imágenes para ver “más allá”. Es decir, que las imágenes sean complejas y no son simples instrumentos para el razonamiento del infante. Cada imagen, en su conjunto, es un

todo lleno de pequeñas partes que a su vez son espacios para reabrir y reestructurar de nuevo todo el diálogo, llegando a hacer de pequeñas partes de la imagen una posibilidad ilimitada de preguntas y posibles diálogos.

De nuevo facilitan -que no dirigen- a padres, docentes, filósofos o animadores instrumentos para un diálogo en base a preguntas situadas en la parte trasera de cada imagen. Esto es, que cada imagen tiene asociada un número considerable de preguntas que muestran distintas opciones desde donde trabajar cada imagen en su conjunto o alguna de sus partes. Incluso algunas preguntas van mucho más allá de la propia imagen, siendo esta el soporte para avanzar en la reflexión grupal o individual.

Pero no solo se queda aquí, además de lo dicho, nos ofrecen diferentes formas de usar esta caja/libro. “Como un libro” en el uso corriente que hacemos de las lecturas, “Cambio de cerebro” empe-

zando a ayudarles a que los participantes adopten roles que no son los suyos, “Como un juego de (sobre) mesa” barajando las fichas y eligiendo una al azar para plantear las distintas las preguntas que se asocian a cada imagen, “Diseña tu propia persona” con el fin de que cada uno pueda reconstruir su identidad desde las partes que más le gustan y las que menos, “Detector de robots” para cuestionarse en qué nos diferenciamos a los robots, “Yo, cuentista” narrando una escena en la que ellos mismos liberan su creatividad y, así, fabricar su propia escena con diálogos, personajes, tramas, conflictos y desenlaces o como “Crea tu propia escena de Yo, persona”, en esta última nos detendremos un poco más a continuación.

Las creadoras de este proyecto ya nos habían acostumbrado a que fuéramos nosotros los protagonistas finales de la caja/libro al dejarnos terminarlo. Así, como en la anterior entrega, la caja incluye

tres fichas para que nosotros mismos seamos capaces de crear una escena en la que poder generar una imagen-conflicto y plantear el problema del “yo”. De este modo, podremos “*wondenpondear*” -como ellas califican a esto del pensar desde las imágenes- desde múltiples formas: la lectura de las preguntas de manera individual, en casa mientras se desarrollan actividades familiares o hasta con amigos en el recreo o en el parque.

Además del gran mapa que incluía también la anterior entrega de *Wonder Ponder “Mundo Cruel”*, en esta ocasión de nuevo nos dan una ficha extra en la que podemos ver diferentes definiciones con más preguntas. Definiciones que nos hablan del Tiempo y el cambio, la perspectiva, la memoria, las posibilidades del yo y definiciones, perspectivas y duraciones, la consciencia, los derechos y responsabilidades de la persona. Una distinción interesante para hacer a edades

algo más grandes o para trabajar brevemente momentos con infantes algo más pequeños.

Si todo lo anterior expuesto no fuera suficiente, además su página

Web www.wonderponderoline.com, donde también puede adquirirse, ofrecen guías filosóficas detalladas, otras propuestas de uso ampliadas, un manual para crear otras nuevas y diferentes escenas, espacios para compartir creaciones, planificaciones y recursos para el libro en el aula e incluso información sobre eventos, cursos, noticias y un blog.

La suerte que tenemos, para todos aquellos que hemos trabajado y seguiremos haciéndolo con estas entregas dedicadas a la Filosofía Visual para Niños, es que su trabajo no va a terminar aquí. Ya nos informan de próximos títulos que aparecerán bajo el emblema de *Wonder Ponder*. En el futuro tendremos otros titulados “De pies y manos” que hablará sobre la libertad,

“¡Pellízcame!” sobre la realidad, la imaginación y el sueño, “¿Será posible?” sobre lo posible y lo imposible, “¿Pero para qué?” que trabajará la felicidad y el sentido de la vida.

Como venimos observando, el camino iniciado con “Mundo Cruel” no ha sido en balde y su avance sigue siendo lento pero continuo, conquistando y encantando a personas de otros países con esta original propuesta para que los más pequeños –y también los más grandes- se hagan preguntas y aprendan a mirar bien, a mirar con detenimiento, a mirar con actitud, en definitiva, a mirar con ojos de filósofos cómo es posible intuir la inmensidad de posibilidades que una pregunta ofrece y que no siempre debe tener una respuesta o una imagen que no solo ofrece una forma de ser vista y experimentada, sino múltiples y muy diversas.

Todas estas posibilidades que ofrece *Wonder Ponder*, acompañadas de un dinami-

zador, docente o entusiasta de la Filosofía para y con Niños, puede llegar a dar unos frutos que en no mucho tiempo podremos confirmar como la revolución de las otras formas de acceso filosófico con niños, de una educación que es complementaria pero esencial y necesaria, de un pensamiento y una reflexión filosófica desde los infantes, de aquellos que todavía hoy tenemos infravalorados y subyugados al “mundo de los adultos”. Ese mundo en el que un día habitarán, pero mientras tanto, que sigan pensando y reflexionando sobre lo imposible, sobre el límite y en general, sobre la pura filosofía.

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Universidad Nacional de
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Normas para la publicación en *HASER* ***Revista internacional de Filosofía Aplicada***

Haser. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada es una publicación académica que edita artículos, reseñas y comentarios de eventos de calidad vinculados con el mundo de la Orientación Filosófica y la Filosofía Aplicada. Para su aceptación, el envío de trabajos responderá a los siguientes ítems, devolviéndose a los autores que no los cumplan:

1. Los trabajos han de ser inéditos y no estar incursos en evaluación por otra revista hasta conseguir el dictamen final de *Haser*.
2. Una vez aceptados, no pueden ser publicados, parcial o totalmente, salvo que dispongan del permiso de los editores de la revista, y siempre habrán de citar la fuente original.
3. Se enviarán a la dirección electrónica de la revista haser@us.es en formato Word 2003 o anterior. Si, en diez días, los autores no recibieran acuse de recibo, deberán volver a remitir el email. Téngase presente que la segunda quincena de Julio y el mes de Agosto será inhábil para la remisión de acuses de recibo.
4. Los artículos se someterán a una revisión por pares externos, que incluye la evaluación de, al menos, dos *referees*. Éstos determinarán su aprobación, rechazo o aprobación con sugerencias a subsanar por el autor. Más tarde, el comité editor decidirá el número de la revista en que se incluirá el trabajo.
4. EXTENSIÓN: Los artículos tendrán una extensión de entre 7500 y 10000 palabras. Las notas de eventos (cursos, congresos, seminarios, conferencias) deberán contener una extensión de entre 3000 y 5000 palabras y las reseñas entre 1000 y 1500 palabras.
5. Todo artículo o nota deberá incluir bajo el título en español, la traducción del título al inglés, el nombre y filiación del autor, su

email, un resumen en castellano e otro en inglés de no más de ciento cincuenta palabras y entre cuatro y seis palabras clave (inglés y español).

6. Se aceptan originales en inglés, portugués y castellano, publicándose en la lengua en que haya sido remitido. Los envíos en otras lenguas serán estudiados por el comité editor.

7. FORMATO:

Es requisito para su evaluación que las citas (siempre a pie de página) se rijan por los siguientes formatos:

a. Libros: APELLIDOS, Autor: *Nombre de la obra*, editorial, lugar, año.

Ejemplo: SÉNECA, Lucio Anneo: *Cartas a Lucilio*, Editorial Juventud, Madrid, 2001.

b. Artículos de revistas: APELLIDOS, Autor: “Nombre del artículo”, en *Revista, número o volumen*, lugar, año. Págs. Xx-xx.

Ejemplo: RUIZ PÉREZ, Miguel Ángel: “La filosofía aplicada en el mundo”, en *Revista de Filosofía Aplicada, número 23*, Sevilla, 2003. Págs. 23-45.

c. Capítulos de libro: APELLIDOS, Autor: “Nombre del capítulo”, en APELLIDOS, Autor: *Nombre de la obra*, editorial, lugar, año. Págs. Xx-xx.

Ejemplo: MÁRQUEZ RUIBARBO, Antonio: “La filosofía aplicada y su futuro ontológico” en GONZÁLEZ MERCADOR, Marcos: *La filosofía aplicada a través del tiempo*, Editorial Miriati, Sevilla, 2006.

c. Artículos procedentes de Internet: APELLIDOS, Autor: “Nombre del título de la entidad referida”, disponible on-line en www.referenciaonline.net (último acceso 11 de enero de 2009).

Ejemplos: - WIKIPEDIA: “Philosophical Practice”, disponible on-line en www.wikipedia.net/philconuns.htm (último acceso 23 de agosto de 2009).

- RUIZ ORDÓÑEZ, Leandro: “Ver para hacer filosofía”, disponible on-line en www.filosofize.org/verpara.htm (último acceso 21 de febrero de 2009).

8. El tipo de letra de los artículos, notas y reseñas será:

- Times new roman 12 tpi para el contenido del artículo.
- Times New Roman 10 tpi para las citas dentro del texto, las notas a pie de página, los resúmenes, abstracts y palabras claves.
- No se aceptarán los subrayados dentro del artículo y los epígrafes irán en negrita.
- No se incluirán líneas entre párrafos.

9. Una vez publicado el trabajo, se remitirá al autor una copia de la revista en versión online vía correo electrónico.

**INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS TO PUBLISH IN *HASER* -
*REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE ORIENTACIÓN FILOSÓFICA Y
FILOSOFÍA APLICADA. (HASER. INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL ON PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE)***

The academic and peer-reviewed *International Journal on Philosophical Practice HASER* encourages authors to submit articles, reviews and resumes of events linked to Philosophical Practice world. Contributions must follow following formats.

1. Articles must be original, they shouldn't be edited by other journals or sent to other journals until authors receive the final report of *Haser*.
2. Contributions published by *Haser* can't be published (in part or totally) without the permission of editor committee of *Haser* in other journal, websites or similar. If *Haser* allows its re-publication, author must indicate its original font.
3. Contributions should be sent to haser@us.es in *Word 2003/97* format. *Haser* will send a return receipt to authors in ten days. If they don't receive it, they must send it again. *Haser* will not send return receipts between 15th July and 1st September.
4. Articles will be sent to two referees, at least, in order to review them. They will decide if the article is suitable for being published. They will give one of these reports: "suitable for publication", "not suitable for publication", "suitable with some corrections made by the author". If an article is "suitable for publication", editorial committee will decide when it will be released.
4. **LENGTH:** The length of contributions will be as follows: Articles must have between 7500 and 10000 words (12-18 pages), event reviews must have between 3000 and 5000 words (5-8 pages) and books reviews must have between 1000 and 1500 words (2 pages).

5. Contributions must include author name, affiliation, email, an abstract in Spanish and English (70-150 word) and 4-6 keywords. Articles will incorporate a “Reference section” with 8-15 books at least.

6. LANGUAGE: Contributions could be written in English, Portuguese and Spanish. Translation services will not be provided.

7. TEXT FORMAT:

Contributors who want to publish articles in *Haser* must follow these formats:

a. Books: SURNAME, Name: *Title*, publisher, place, year.

Example: SENECA, Lucio Anneo: *Letters to Lucilius*, Granta Books, New York, 2001.

b. Articles: SURNAME, Name: “Article title”, in *Journal title, number, volume*, place, year. Pags. Xx-xx.

Example: HUME, David: “Philosophy and its links to Politics”, in *Political Philosophy, number 23*, Baltimore (USA), 2003. Pags. 23-45.

c. Chapters: SURNAME, Name: “Name of chapter”, in SURNAME, Name: *Book title*, publisher, place, year. Pags. Xx-xx.

Example: SMITH, Peter: “Philosophy and life” in MURPHY, John (ed.): *Philosophy as a way to live*, Pearson Publishers, Washington (USA), 2006.

d. Articles from Internet: SURNAME, Name: “Title of article”, available in www.online-reference.net. (last access February 17th, 2009).

Examples: - WIKIPEDIA: “Philosophical Practice”, available in www.wikipedia.net/philconuns.htm. (last access January 23rd, 2009).

- SMITH, Michael: “To make Philosophical Practice”, available in www.filosofize.org/verpara.htm. (last access March 26st, 2009).

8. Type of letters must be:

- Times new roman 12 tpi: Main text of articles.
- Times New Roman 10 tpi: quotations inside article, footnotes, abstracts and keywords.
- Texts must avoid stress, underlined or bold words. Sections titles will be written in bold words.
- Do not include lines between paragraphs.

9. After publishing articles, it will send a whole issue of HASER by email to authors.

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El director, secretario y comité de redacción de la revista *HASER, Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada* garantiza su compromiso con la ética en la selección de los trabajos enviados y con la calidad de los artículos publicados. *HASER* tiene como referencia el Código de conducta y buenas prácticas de COPE de *Scopus*, que puede descargarse aquí: http://publicationethics.org/files/Code_of_conduct_for_journal_editors.pdf.

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Aunque los directores y los miembros del comité editor de la revista no compartan las opiniones vertidas en los trabajos, respeta el contenido de los artículos y la integridad de los mismos. El comité de redacción se compromete a publicar las correcciones, aclaraciones, retracciones y disculpas cuando sea preciso.

HASER declara su compromiso por el respecto e integridad de los trabajos ya publicados. Por esta razón, el plagio está estrictamente prohibido y los textos que se identifiquen como plagio o su contenido sea fraudulento serán eliminados de la revista si ya se hubieran publicado o no se publicarán. La revista actuará en estos casos con la mayor celeridad posible. Al aceptar los términos y acuerdos expresados por nuestra revista, los autores han de garantizar que el artículo y los materiales asociados a él son originales o no infringen los derechos de autor. También los autores tienen que justificar que, en caso de una autoría compartida, hubo un consenso pleno de todos los autores afectados y que no ha sido presentado ni publicado con anterioridad en otro medio de difusión.

